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Preface 
This study was commissioned to the African Studies Centre (ASC) by CNV Internationaal, the 
international affiliate of the Dutch trade union CNV (Christelijk National Vakverbond). The report serves 
as a background document for the new four year programme (2013-2016) of CNV Internationaal funded 
through the Trade Union Co-Financing Programme (TUCP) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
In preparation of the 2013-2016 TUCP programme CNV Internationaal held consultations with their 
partners during which the accessibility of social protection was mentioned as a priority area, specifically 
by West African trade unions. Building on these consultations CNV Internationaal decided to assist their 
partners in Niger (CTN), Guinea (CNTG), Togo (CSTT), Benin (CGTB & COSI) and Senegal (UDTS) in 
lobbying, advocating and networking for the extension of national social protection schemes to informal 
workers. The ASC was subsequently asked to conduct a mapping of the availability of social protection in 
these five countries, in particular focusing on the accessibility of informal workers to old age pensions, 
health care and insurance for occupational accidents and illness.  
The study comprised of field work, carried out by four local researchers between 7 and 18 April 2014, 
and a desk study conducted by one junior and two senior researchers at the ASC. The ASC was in charge 
of the overall coordination of the research, the development of the questionnaires which formed the 
basis of the interviews and data collection on the ground, as well as the writing of the final research 
report. The field work encompassed interviews with CNV Internationaal’s partners in each country, data 
collection through various governmental and non-governmental institutions and semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders (representatives of relevant Ministries, local NGOs and FBOs, informal 
workers organisations, the ILO country office and, in the case of Togo, the ITUC-Africa headquarters). 
The findings from the field were presented in five country reports drafted by the local researchers which 
have been integrated in this final report. As you will see the depth of the data differs from country to 
country, this is due to the difference in the availability of data on social protection in the countries under 
study.  
The desk study entailed a literature review of key academic publications and reports of relevant (inter) 
national organisations, as well as a screening of relevant statistical data from the ILO and ISSA. An 
extensive bibliography is included in the annex.  
Several persons contributed to the study, first and foremost the local researchers:  Muhammed Ba 
(Senegal), Alpha Barry Bacar (Guinea), Issa Younoussi (Niger) and Pierre Zanou (Togo & Benin).  Ms. Zjos 
Vlaminck (MSc), political scientist and research assistant at the ASC was in charge of coordinating the 
local research partners, conducting the literature review and writing the final report. Dr. André Leliveld 
and Dr. Marleen Dekker both economists and senior researchers at the ASC coordinated the study on 
behalf of the ASC and ensured the quality control of the report, while Ursula Oberst, information and 
documentation specialist at the ASC Library, provided literature searches and the bibliography.  
For the issues raised in this report, we did not only consult the documents that were provided to us, but 
we benefited as much from interviews with representatives of ministries, trade unions, IWOs and civil 
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society such as NGOs and FBOs. We are very thankful for their inputs and comments. For the complete 
list of interviews per country we refer to annex 2 in this report. 
We equally thank Ms. Marjolein Groenewegen, programme officer, responsible for the social protection 
theme at CNV Internationaal and Uzziel Twagalimana, CNV Programme Advisor for Africa and WSM 
Continental Programme Coordinator, for their support and advice.  
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Introduction 
 
In March 2014 the ASC was commissioned by CNV Internationaal to conduct a mapping of the 
accessibility of social protection schemes for informal workers in five West African countries: Niger, 
Togo, Benin, Guinea and Senegal. This report is the result of this analysis. The terms of reference 
indicated that the study should answer the following questions:   
1) Which social protection systems are in place in each country? 
o What is covered by the social protection schemes in the country?  
o Are these systems providing social protection for formal and/or for informal workers?  
o What number of informal workers has access to social protection? 
o Is there a legislation which permits informal workers to join the national social 
protection systems?  
o Is there a lobby at national level going on to make social protection accessible for 
informal workers? 
o What is the mechanism which is used: through Mutual Health Insurances (private) or 
through National (Government) Social Security Schemes (caisses nationales)?   
o Are there already linkages between Mutual Health Insurances and the national Social 
Security System? 
o  Are there best practices of national Social Security Schemes covering informal workers? 
How does this work (mechanisms)? 
o Are there best practices of other social protection schemes which informal workers can 
access?   
2) What is the role of CNV Internationaal’s partner organisation in this scheme? 
o  Are they a board member of the national social security system? 
o  Or involved in (tripartite) dialogue concerning functioning of these schemes? 
o Which strategies/activities do they adopt to extend the accessibility of social 
protection?  
3) Which (international and national) actors do lobby at national level to make social protection 
more accessible for informal workers in the country?  
o With which actors could we join forces in the coming future? 
o  Are there institutions which offer funding for these initiatives?  
4) Are there (research) documents which provide best practices regarding this theme (studies from 
ILO, ITUC, FNV, ACV, WSM) and which may orient us in the development of a (lobby) strategy for 
each country? This will include also studies in Ghana and Rwanda, two countries where 
strategies have been developed to open up the national Social Security System to informal 
workers. 
o Recommendations to improve the accessibility of the existing schemes for informal 
workers in each of the five case study countries.  
12 
 
To avoid confusion it is necessary to briefly classify the different social protection regimes that exist, 
before moving on to the specific interests of this report.  
Depending on the definition of social protection that is adopted a wide variety of classifications can be 
found. The table below is therefore not the one-and-only categorisation, but hopes to serve as guide for 
understanding the social protection terminology that will be used throughout the report.  
Table 1: Social Protection Regimes 
Name Description Contributory/non-
contributory 
Beneficiaries 
Social Assistance Social assistance comes 
in many forms, such as 
social safety nets (e.g. 
exemption of medical 
fees for the most 
vulnerable groups); 
public work programmes 
and in-kind or cash 
transfers. They can be 
state-organized or by 
NGOs or international 
institutions.  
The common dominator 
of social assistance 
schemes is that they are 
non-contributory. The 
schemes are funded by 
the state based on tax-
revenues or by donors 
such as the World Bank 
which funds many social 
assistance programmes 
in Africa 
Most social assistance 
programmes are targeted 
to specific population 
groups through means 
tests, which are 
developed to identify the 
most vulnerable people. 
These tests have different 
criteria depending on the 
social assistance 
programme. Some social 
assistance programs are 
however universal (e.g. 
all children between 0 
and 5 have access to free 
health care in Senegal).   
Social 
Insurance/social 
security  
Social insurance 
schemes are organized 
by the state and 
controlled by public law 
and build on an 
employer-employee 
relationship. Most social 
insurance schemes 
protect the employee 
against loss of income 
due to life-cycle changes 
such as old age, 
maternity, illness, etc.  
Social insurance 
schemes are 
contributory and in 
many African countries 
mandatory for private 
and public sector 
workers. Contributions 
are paid to the scheme 
by the employer (which 
for public enterprises is 
the state) and the 
employee. 
Most social insurance 
schemes (although often 
open to informal 
workers) only reach 
public employees and 
workers in the formal 
economy because 
registration is generally 
based on a contract 
between an employer 
and an employee, which 
most informal workers 
lack. 
Private Insurance Private insurance 
schemes are organized 
Private insurance 
schemes are based on 
Private insurance 
schemes are on paper 
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by private insurance 
companies or banks 
within a legal framework 
developed by the state.  
They are often 
complementary to social 
insurances schemes and 
provide protection 
against life-cycle 
changes or other risks.  
voluntary contributions 
from the person who 
wishes to insure him-
/herself against a 
certain risk (insurance 
companies are profit 
making enterprises so 
contribution rates are 
often high). 
open to everyone 
(workers in 
formal/informal, 
private/public 
enterprises) but in Africa 
generally only reach a 
small group of wealthy 
individuals who can 
afford to pay the high 
contributions.  Some 
insurance companies are 
however developing 
micro-insurance schemes 
in order to reach out to 
informal workers (see 
Senegal case).  
Community-
based/ or 
informal social 
protection 
These schemes operate 
alongside solidarity 
networks based on 
principles of reciprocity 
within social networks, 
based on kinship, 
neighborhood, 
friendship, religious 
affinity, and so on. 
Common examples are 
funeral insurances, 
ROSCAs  or Tontines.1.  
 
Members pay dues to 
the informal schemes 
on a voluntary basis and 
can count on solidarity 
mechanisms in times of 
need (community-based 
schemes are generally 
non-for-profit 
enterprises and have 
lower contribution 
rates).  
Community-based 
schemes in general are 
accessible to a larger 
group than social or 
private insurance 
schemes. In Africa most 
informal workers rely on 
these types of schemes 
for social security. 
Membership is organized 
across family, 
community, occupational 
lines.   
Les mutuelles de 
Santé 
Mutuelles or mutual 
health insurance 
schemes are a mixed-
category. They are 
community-based and 
Beneficiaries pay 
contributions to the 
mutuelles in return for 
health care and benefits 
in the form of 
In many African countries 
the mutuelles fill in the 
gap left behind by 
national health insurance 
schemes, which mainly 
                                                          
1
 “Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas)  or Tontines in French speaking countries are one of the most 
prevalent forms of informal ﬁnancial institution in developing countries. The basic principle of roscas is 
almost the same everywhere. A group of people gather for a series of meetings. At each meeting, everybody 
contributes to a common pot. The pot is given to only one member of the group. This member is then excluded from 
receiving the pot in future meetings, while still contributing to the pot. This process is repeated until every member 
receives the pot” (Ambec, 2013: 2).  
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generally only provide 
health insurance.   
subsidized medicines 
for instance. Some 
mutuelles also are 
supported by 
government/donor 
funding.   
cover formal workers. 
They have a wider 
accessibility and in some 
instances informal 
workers’ organizations 
have formed their own 
mutuelles (see e.g. 
Transvie).   
Source: compiled by author 
 
The aforementioned classification depicts the wide variety of social protection systems available. 
Because CNV Internationaal wishes to assist their partners in “reinforcing the national social protection 
systems by strengthening the role of trade unions as a watchdog and a partner in social dialogue in 
matters regarding the accessibility of social protection for informal workers”, this study will focus on 
national social insurance as well as schemes that have the potential of being scaled up and supported by 
government institutions (at national, regional or local level). 
The ToR further instructed to focus on three issues which are particularly relevant for the world of work: 
old age pensions, insurance for occupational accidents and illness and health care.  
In sum, the study will look into the schemes mentioned in the matrix below and forms the basis for the 
development of a lobby and advocacy strategy, for CNV Internationaal’s partners in Niger, Senegal, 
Benin, Togo and Guinea, towards more accessible social protection.  
Table 2: Priority Areas 
 Social 
Assistance 
Social 
Insurance 
Private 
Insurance 
Community-
based/informal 
social protection2 
Mixed-
schemes 3 
Old age pensions      
Occupational 
accidents and illness 
     
Health care      
                                                          
2
 The study will focus on those schemes that have the capacity to be scaled-up beyond the initial target group 
through the support of government institutions. Therefore, small scale family-based/kinship based social 
protection schemes fall beyond the scope of this study. This however does not mean that they are unimportant 
safety nets for many people in Niger, Guinea, Togo, Benin and Senegal (see Devereux & Getu, 2013).  
3
 Mixed schemes combine elements from different social protection schemes (social-assistance, private/public 
insurance or informal).  
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Best practices/ 
other schemes that 
are relevant for 
informal workers 
     
Source: compiled by author 
 
Based on the forgoing this report will be structured as follows. Chapters one and two will allow for a 
common understanding of informal workers and social protection, respectively. The chapters will entail 
a brief description of the different views on informal workers, as well as social protection in Africa, 
based on the history of interpretations of both concepts.  Subsequently, the report is divided into 
chapters per country with the following sub-sections: socio-political and economic context, existing 
social protection schemes, old age pensions, insurance for occupational accidents and illness, health 
care and conclusions and recommendations. Chapter 6 provides insights from social protection schemes 
in Ghana, Rwanda as a reference point.  The last chapter will draw general conclusions and 
recommendations for improving the accessibility of social protection for informal workers and the role 
of CNV Internationaal’s partners therein.  
 
1. Informal Employment 
1.1. Defining informality 
Since the concept of informality was coined by Keith Hart in 1972 it has been attributed a plurality of 
meanings (Sindzingre, 2006). Depending on the theoretical lens that is adopted informality may refer to 
anything between an illegal economic activity (il-legalist school), a survival strategy (dualist school), a 
structural element of the capitalist economic system (structural school) or a micro-entrepreneur’s 
choice of avoiding cumbersome bureaucratic procedures (legalist school) (WIEGO, 2014). A distinction 
can also be made between definitions which take an employment approach, and those based on 
enterprise characteristics; the latter being most often used.  Scholars now widely agree that there is no 
linear relationship between informal and formal economies. Rather there exists a complex, fluid 
dynamic between both, with articulations of the formal economy in the informal economy and vice-
versa (Sindzingre, 2006). People increasingly engage in both spheres simultaneously, based on their own 
preferences and incentives, or as a coping mechanism (Siegmann & Schiphorst, 2014). The informal 
economy therefore is a vibrant part of economy and society, covering a diversity of activities and actors 
- ranging from big entrepreneurs to small self-employed, and from quasi-formality to extreme 
informality (Sindzingre, 2006).  
Due to its wide acceptance and conceptual clarity we have opted to follow the ILO’s comprehensive 
definition of informality, which captures the diversity of informal employment. According to the 
definition an informal worker is someone who “carries out a job which is not subject to national 
legislation or income taxation and has no entitlements to social protection or employment benefits, in a 
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formal sector enterprise, informal sector enterprise or household” (ICLS, 2003 in Hussmanns, 2003). 
Hence informal workers can thus be understood as anyone classified in groups 1 to 10 in table 3 below.  
Table 3: Conceptual Framework Informal Employment (ICLS, 2003)4 
Production 
units 
 
by type 
Jobs by status in employment 
Own-account 
workers 
Employers Contributing 
family workers 
Employees Members of 
producers’ 
cooperatives 
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Formal sector 
enterprises 
    1 2    
Informal 
sector 
enterprises (a) 
3  4  5 6 7 8  
Households (b) 9     10    
Source: ICLS, 2003 in Hussmanns (2003) 
1.2. The state of informality in Africa 
In many Sub Saharan African countries, including West-Africa, the informal economy constitutes more 
than 80 % of the workforce, a figure that has steadily increased over the last three decades. Fine et al. 
(2012) estimate that over the past ten years, Africa’s labour force has expanded by 91 million, but only 
37 million of the new entrants were employed in wage-paying jobs. Two million joined the ranks of the 
unemployed, and the majority—some 52 million people—turned to subsistence activities to earn an 
income. The growth of the informal economy in Africa can be related to the structural adjustment plans 
of the 1980s (SAPs) which lead to mass redundancies in the public and private sector and budget cuts in 
governments’ social spending. More recently, increased casualization, flexibilization and global and 
African market restructurings – informed by neo-liberal policies – have contributed to above 
developments, further blurring the divide between formal and informal work. Several investigations in 
various African countries observe a rising trend in non-standard and non-permanent employment 
relations such as temporary work, fixed term contracts, seasonal work and outsourcing or 
subcontracting (Theron, 2011). 
                                                          
4 a) As defined by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (excluding households employing paid 
domestic workers). (b) Households producing goods exclusively for their own final use and households employing paid domestic 
workers. Note: Cells shaded in dark grey refer to jobs, which, by definition, do not exist in the type of production unit in 
question. Cells shaded in light grey refer to formal jobs. Unshaded cells represent the various types of informal jobs (ILSC, 2002) 
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So, the assumption that informality is a characteristic of economically less-advanced countries which will 
fade away once higher levels of economic development are reached, has been refuted by the reality on 
the ground (Heintz & Valodia, 2008). Informality seems to be here to stay.  
Due to the fact that informal workers constitute the majority of the labour force in Africa and will most 
probably continue to do so for a long period of time, trade unions increasingly acknowledge that they 
need to address labour issues of informal workers as well. Literature also suggested that the legitimacy 
of African trade unions depends on their ability to reach out to workers in informal employment 
(Booner & Spooner, 2011). This not only strengthens their bargaining power towards the government, 
as informal workers represent an important electoral mass (TUCP 2013-2016), but also allows them to 
enhance their connections with grassroots, clearing their reputation as “representatives of the formal 
few” (Mosoetsa & Tshoaedi, 2013). Expanding services, such as social protection, to informal workers 
has been promoted as an effective way of attracting new members, as well as a moral obligation 
following the solidarity principles on which the global union movement is based (Kalusopa et al., ). 
Service delivery activities however frequently face financial problems due to the low amount of 
membership fees that informal workers can provide and the limited budget African unions generally 
have (Kalusopa, et al, 2012). Faced by these challenges some unions have sought alternatives, opting for 
cooperating with service delivery NGOs for instance (Spooner, 2007). Others believe it is the 
government’s responsibility to provide basic social protection for its population.  The mapping in this 
report focuses on the latter of both alternatives and aims to investigate how and to what extent unions 
can push their governments to take up responsibility and provide social protection for their population 
which – according to article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – is their universal right. 
The report thus focuses on the third pillar of the Decent Work Agenda or the right of all workers, formal 
and informal, to social protection (ILO, 2002). In the following chapter we will elaborate on this concept, 
its interpretations, significance and trends in Africa.  
2. Social Protection 
2.1. Defining Social Protection: a literature review 
Similar to the concept of informality, social protection has been attributed a fair share of interpretations 
and meanings over the last three decades (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). Depending on the 
development mantra of the time it has been promoted as a way to cushion the externalities of the SAPs 
(Jacob, 1987), a tool for poverty reduction (Holzmann & Jorgensen, 2001), a prerequisite for decent 
work (Coleman, 2011) and, most recently, an instrument to achieve societal change (Devereux & 
Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004; Adesina, 2012).  This diversity of definitions has to a certain extent hollowed out 
the concept and consequently, problematized the operationalization of social protection (Devereux & 
Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004). To enable a better understanding of how social protection is framed in this 
study we will briefly discuss the four previously mentioned approaches.  
Adjustment with a human face  
In the late 1980s social protection gained wide attention as part of the Social Dimension of Adjustment 
or “adjustment with a human face”, coined in the 1987 UNICEF annual report (Jacobs, 1987). By that 
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time the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), as well as the UN, had come to recognize the 
detrimental social consequences of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in developing countries 
and by 1986, the then just retired IMF-director, Jacques Larosiere stated that “adjustment that pays 
attention to the health, nutritional and educations requirements of the most vulnerable groups in society 
is going to protect the human conditions better than adjustment that ignores them (in Jacobs, 1987), 
hereby acknowledging that a sole focus on budget deficit management and macro-economic 
stabilization was not going to improve the lives of the poor.  Social protection was put forth as a cushion 
for the detrimental social effects left behind by the SAPs in many developing countries. However, 
instead of restructuring the orthodox foundations of structural adjustment, adjustment with a human 
face was promoted and “involved the use of safety nets to address the social costs of adjustment” 
(Adesina, 2012: 456). Furthermore social protection was based on strict targeting of the “deserving 
poor” (Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004: 3). In practice social protection took the form of safety nets 
for those failing to become “economically-active”, and increased public spending on education and 
health. Poverty was perceived to be residualist, or a condition that would be automatically resolved 
once a certain level of economic growth was reached, so in the meantime the “deserving poor” were 
supported through free health care and education programmes (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012: 13).  
Poverty reduction and Social Risk Management 
In the early 2000s Social Risk Management (SRM) emerged as the new way of approaching social 
protection and was actively promoted as such by key development institutions, the World Bank in 
particular (Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004). Holzmann & Jorgensen’s (2001: 530) define social 
protection as “public interventions to (i) assist individuals, households and communities to better 
manage risks and (ii) provide support to the critically poor”. Unlike the earlier conceptualizations of 
social protection, SRM takes into account preventive measures or as Holzmann & Jorgensen (2001: 530) 
phrase it, “spring-boards for the poor”. Poverty is interpreted as vulnerability to shocks (Adesina, 2012: 
457), both natural and man-made, in line with the thinking of poverty as a multi-faceted problem 
(Holzmann & Jorgensen’s, 2001: 531). The SRM framework not only enables the poor to cope with 
shocks but also hopes to enable the poor to become more risk-taking and “thus provides the opportunity 
to gradually move out of poverty” (Holzmann & Jorgensen’s, 2001: 531).   Another addition of SRM to 
traditional social protection thinking is the attention for non-state social protection providers, such as 
informal and market-based actors and institutions (Holzmann & Jorgensen’s, 2001: 542). Most recently 
the 2014 World Development Report characterized risk management as encompassing: insurance, 
coping, protection and knowledge strategies. Through this comprehensive framework the World Bank 
hopes to provide an analytical framework to both prevent and cope with risks (World Bank, 2013).  
Although SRM is a welcome improvement to the narrow “targeted safety-nets” approach of the 1980s 
and 1990s, it has been heavily critiqued by scholars for its limited economic-conceptualization of 
vulnerability, its neglect of the chronic poor, its focus on public and market-based social protection 
strategies, the limited role of the government and its uncritical stance towards the neoliberal paradigm 
which “maladjusted” many African economies in the first place (Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004: 6-
8;  Mkandawire, 2005 in Adesina, 2012: 459).  Despite these shortcomings donors still very much push 
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SRM and it is remarkable how well African government officials speak the SRM-lingo when discussing 
issues of social protection (Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004:6).  
Social protection as a sine qua non for Decent Work: A rights-based approach 
In the meanwhile the International Labour Organisation (ILO) followed a parallel path when it comes to 
social protection policies. In 1952 social security was enshrined as one of the core labour standards 
through the adoption of convention 102, following article 22 of UDHR, which states that each member 
state should provide basic social security in the form of: medical care, illness benefits, unemployment 
benefits, old-age benefits, employment injury benefits, family benefits, maternity benefits, invalidity 
benefits and survivor’s benefits (C102, ILO 1952). The ILO thus actively supports a rights-based approach 
to social protection wherein the state is obliged to guarantee social protection for its citizens and 
citizens in return can claim their rights and entitlements (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012: 13). Initially, 
social protection was geared towards (formal) work and income related risks and limited to social 
security and social insurance schemes, which aren’t adapted to the reality in many developing countries 
with a largely informal labour force. The ILO made a shift in 2004 with a milestone report “Economic 
Security for a Better World”. Although the title might suggest the opposite the authors promote a 
comprehensive conceptualization of security, which goes beyond income security and encompasses 
labour  market security, employment security, security of work and skills, job security and finally voice 
representation security (ILO, 2004). Another shift came about due to the Decent Work agenda (DWA), 
which is applicable for all workers including those in informal employment. The DWA thus accentuated 
the need to expand the conceptualization of social protection and so the ILO became an active promoter 
of the social protection floor (SPF) initiative which was endorsed by the United Nations Chief Executive 
Board in 2009. The SPF was officially adopted by ILO members during the International Labour 
Conference (ILC) in June 2012 and has a two dimensional strategy: (1) providing a universal minimum 
level of income security and basic health care for all and (2) progressively higher levels of security based 
on ILO social security standards.  Much emphasis is placed on the role of the government as the primary 
provider of social protection and the importance of social dialogue as a way to ensure its effectiveness. 
Furthermore the extension of social protection does not proffer a one-size-fits-all approach, but leaves 
the operationalization of both dimensions to the respective governments (ILO, 2012).  
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Figure 1: Social Protection Floor 
 
Source: Extending Social Security to All. A Guide through challenges and options, ILO, Geneva, 2010 
Transformative Social Protection 
Most recently, a progressive interpretation of social protection has emerged which does not only 
address the symptoms of fluctuating incomes but tries to understand and mitigate the root causes of 
economic, and more importantly, social vulnerabilities. Transformative Social Protection (TSP) therefore 
places much emphasis on empowerment and “policies that relate to power imbalances in society that 
encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities” (Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, 2004: 9). According to 
Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler’s (2004: 9) TSP framework “social protection is the set of all initiatives; 
both formal and informal, that provide: social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; 
social services to groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; 
social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihoods shocks; and social 
equity to protect against social risks such as discrimination or abuse”. Building on SRM, transformative 
social protection takes into account a broad range of interventions which can be categorized as 
protective, preventive, promotive and transformative. A  recent World Bank study considers the 
objectives and functions of social protection in terms of equity (protecting against destitution), 
resilience (insuring against impacts of different risks) and opportunity (promoting human capital and 
access to productive work) (World Bank, 2012), whereby ‘opportunity’ reflects the promotive and 
transformative functions of the TSP framework.  
Adesina (2012) argues that Devereux & Sabatas-Wheeler, and in extension the latest World Bank 
framework, stopped at a half way build house by refraining from critically questioning the neoliberal 
paradigm in which their approach is vested. According to Adesina (2012), social protection cannot and 
should not be seen as an isolated intervention towards inclusive development, rather it is part and 
parcel of a set of social policies which according to him should be vested in equality and solidarity in 
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order to achieve societal change. Although Adesina’s (2012) perspective is  normative he does make an 
important link between social protection and inclusive development, which will be elaborated below.   
2.2. Social protection and inclusive development 
In the last decade many African economies have shown unprecedented growth rates, which have raised 
optimism about Africa’s economic future and its ability to raise the standards of living of its people. 
Between 2001 and 2012 the top 10 of fastest growing economies contained 6 African countries, namely 
Angola, Niger, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda. These figures however say little about the 
distribution of wealth, social development and inclusiveness. In fact, 6 out of 10 of the most unequal 
economies are also located in Africa, notably, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Lesotho, Central African 
Republic and Sierra Leone (AfDB, 2012). Due to the global economic crisis, the fragility of economic 
growth and income security has been accentuated, boosting a renewed interest in social protection as a 
means “to protect household incomes and stabilize aggregate demand” (Coleman, 2011: 7). After a 
period as lonely neighbours, wherein there was little dialog between both policy spheres, it seems that 
scholars and policy makers alike have come to realize that inclusive growth and social protection go 
hand in hand. In fact, social protection is increasingly perceived to be an important, though challenging, 
stimulator of inclusive development, especially in times of recession (Coleman, 2011 & Kalusopa et al., 
2012). Social protection can lead to inclusivity in the short term by reducing income and non-income 
poverty, decreasing inequality and increasing access to labour markets and basic services. In the long 
term, it can support economic growth by stimulating domestic demand and productivity, may improve 
the quality of governance by building stronger institutions and may decrease intergenerational poverty 
(Szirmai, 2012). These processes pass through various transmission channels at a household, community 
or national level (Barrientos, 2012). These dynamics have changed the general perceptions of social 
protection, as more and more governments view social protection as an investment rather than a cost 
(Videt, 2014).  
2.3. Global and African initiatives to boost Social Protection 
The last decade has seen a proliferation of initiatives, memoranda, conventions and institutions 
concerned with the extension of social protection schemes. The following table presents some of the 
key initiatives and declarations relevant for Africa.  
Table 4: Social Protection Initiatives 
Name Date Initiators Description 
Conférence 
Interafricaine de la 
Prévoyance Sociale 
(C.I.P.R.E.S.)  
1993 Ministries of 
Finance of the 
francophone 
West-African 
countries 
CIPRES was installed to function as 
governing body of all National Social 
Security Schemes (CNSS). 11 West African 
countries ratified the treaty.  
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Global Campaign for 
the extension of social 
protection 
2001 ILO At the ILC in 2001 ILO member-states 
reaffirmed the importance of SP as a 
human right and in 2003 the global 
campaign for the extension of SP was 
launched. 
Ouagadougou 
Declaration and Plan of 
Action on Employment 
Creation and Poverty 
Alleviation 
2004 AU The Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of 
Action (POA) have the overall aim to  
empower people, open opportunities and 
create social protection and security for  
workers through building a people-oriented 
environment for development and national  
growth. 
Livingstone Call for 
Action 
2006 AU Social protection programmes, including 
social transfers and cash transfers, when 
combined with other social services, 
directly reduce poverty and inequality. 
Importantly it was agreed that a 
sustainable basic package of social 
transfers is affordable within current 
resources of governments and with support 
from development partners. 
Social Policy 
Framework for Africa 
2008 AU The SPF focuses, in no particular priority, 
on 18 key thematic social issues: 
population and development; labour and 
employment; Social Protection, health; 
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other infectious 
diseases; migration; education; agriculture, 
food and nutrition; the family; children, 
adolescents and youth; ageing; disability; 
gender equality and women’s 
empowerment; culture; urban 
development, environmental sustainability, 
the impact of globalisation and trade 
liberalization in Africa and good 
Governance, Anti-Corruption and Rule of 
Law.   
Declaration for Social 
Justice and Fair 
Globalization 
2008 ILO At the ILC in 2008 all member-states 
acknowledged the right to a basic income 
and other objectives of the Philadelphia 
Declaration. 
Africa Platform for 2008 CSOs The APSP’s main objective is to support the 
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Social Protection development of effective national social 
protection policies and programmes and 
thereby contribute to the achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals and the 
goals of the African Union Social Policy 
Framework (SPF). 
Social Protection Floor 
Initiative 
2009 UN (with 
WHO and ILO 
leading the 
initiative) 
The Chief Executive Board of the UN adopts 
the SPF as a one of the Joint Crisis 
Initiatives. 
Yaoundé Tripartite 
Declaration  
2010 ILO During the 2nd African Decent Work 
symposium the member-states adopted 
the Yaoundé Tripartite Declaration on the 
Implementation of the SPF. 
Vancouver 
Commitment 
2010 ITUC Trade unions committed themselves to 
support the ILO in their efforts to achieve 
SPF for all. 
World Bank Social 
Protection Strategy 
2012-2022 
2012 World Bank The strategy provides a unified vision for 
social protection and informs the choice of 
instrument, financing mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements for social 
protection. 
SPIREWORK 
 
2013 ECOWAS & 
AU 
In 2013 ECOWAS and the African Union 
(AU) committed itself to create a Social 
protection plan for workers in the informal 
economy and those in the rural areas by 
formalizing existing institutional 
frameworks and establishing a legislative or 
regulatory structure based social protection 
for various sector. 
  Source: compiled by author based on Kalusopa et al. (2014) 
2.4. The state of Social Protection in Africa 
Similar to historical social protection systems in the rest of the world, Africans traditionally relied on 
their extended family to provide assistance for income reduction or loss due to life cycle changes such as 
old age, disability or illness (Kalusopa et al., 2012).  
Due to the increased intensity of globalization and urbanization, traditional family ties – which did not 
provide universal coverage – are fading and institutionalized social protection systems have, as of yet, 
not been unable to fill in the gap, a situation which Sen (1981: 31) labeled the pre-existing systems 
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transition or PEST5.  These shortcomings were further aggravated by the implementation of social 
protection schemes by the colonial bureaucracies which were copies of the schemes the colonial powers 
were accustomed to at home. So, French colonies inherited mandatory contributory social insurance 
schemes which provided work injury, family and child benefits, as well as old age pensions, disability and 
survivor grants and health-care. The English colonies on the other hand were left with social security 
institutions which covered a reduction of income due to retirement, disability or death. These schemes 
were based on the prerequisite of a labour market with a large number of salaried workers, as was the 
case at the time in France and the United Kingdom. Needless to say, this was not the reality in the 
African colonies, were salaried work was an exception and most people were own-account or family 
workers (Diop, 2003).  
 
Despite increased recognition of the importance of social protection – exemplified by the various 
initiatives mentioned above – coverage is low, benefits insufficient, administration troublesome and the 
share of government budgets allocated to social protection unsatisfactory (Kalusopa et al., 2012). In 
comparison, many Latin American countries have since the debt crises in the 1980s and 90s, developed 
broad-based social protection schemes such as the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil, which covers about 
44 million Brazilians (Ferreire & Robalino, 2010). In what follows we will briefly discuss the main 
challenges related to social protection in Africa.  
Low coverage 
In Sub-Saharan Africa the overall coverage rate of social security schemes is about 6%, compared to a 
global average of 25% (Forteze et al., 2010 in Kalusopa, 2012: 31). Parallel to the shrinking formal 
economy, coverage rates are declining in many countries as national social security schemes are based 
on mandatory contributory schemes inherited from colonial bureaucracies. According to the literature, 
several factors make the contributory social insurance schemes incompatible with the African reality 
and specifically the large and growing informal labour force (Kalusopa, 2012). First, they are based on an 
employer-employee relationship, wherein both parties pay fees to the scheme. Most informal workers 
                                                          
5
 PEST is “the phase of economic development after the emergence of a large class of wage labourers but before 
the development of social security arrangements is potentially a deeply vulnerable one” (Devereux & Sabates-
Wheeler, 2004: 15). 
Pension schemes in Francophone West Africa 
The labour code, which was ratified by the French Government in 1952, allowed the creation of 
The West African Social Insurance and Pensions Institute (IPRAO) in former French West Africa 
by 1958. The voluntary scheme was open to all private-sector employees by collective 
agreement between employers and workers’ organizations. After independence some members 
withdrew from the IPRAO but in Senegal it survived and was renamed IPRES in 1978 (Diop, 2003; 
Gruat, 1990). 
 
25 
 
however are self-employed and therefore have to carry the burden of both contributing parties 
(Ginneken, 2003). Second, the fees are often too high for informal workers; most make such small 
profits that they are not able or willing to invest in social insurance from which no immediate benefits 
will be derived (Ginneken, 1999). Thirdly, the flexible and highly mobile nature of informal employment 
make it difficult to install a well-functioning insurance system as it makes collecting contributions as well 
as paying benefits cumbersome. Lastly, the fact that informal workers have volatile employment 
statuses and change jobs quite often poses challenges for the transmission of insurance from one 
employment to another. Many African countries do not have the administrative capacity to make this 
possible.  In this study we will investigate whether these challenges ring true in the five case study 
countries we have studied. 
Due to these difficulties some scholars argue that non-contributory social assistance systems are better 
equipped to reach out to informal workers (Leliveld et al., 2010), this however poses financial and 
targeting problems, which will be discussed below.  
Benefits 
When it comes to social protection benefits ISSA’s 2011 report on Africa mentions two key features: 
adequacy and quality. Both are important indicators of a programme’s effectiveness and can possibly 
enhance popular support for social protection programmes. Adequacy is often measured in monetary 
terms and in that sense refers to the sufficiency of a cash benefit to foresee in a decent standard of 
living. This however is a rather narrow approach as some benefits come in the form of in-kind services, 
such as food subsidies and others serve longer term goals, such as increasing gender equality, which 
cannot be measured on a monetary scale. Each social protection programme must thus come with an 
appropriate adequacy measure. In Kalusapo’s et al. (2012) review of social protection systems in Africa 
most countries offer low benefits which are insufficient to provide a decent living.  
The ISSA 2011 Africa report mentions three levels on which the quality of social protection programmes 
can be analysed: the legal framework, the national political strategy and the strategic approach towards 
quality insurance at the level of social security institutions. All levels can be measured through client 
satisfaction. Haddad et al. (1998) conducted a study in two communities in Guinea in which they aimed 
to capture local perceptions on the quality of health care. According to their respondents the following 
criteria are important measures of quality (1) technical competence of the health care personnel; (2) 
interpersonal relations between the patients and care providers; (3) availability and adequacy of 
resources and services; (4) accessibility and (5) effectiveness of care (Haddad et al., 1998: 381).  
In conclusion we can state that quality should not only be measured in material terms but also personal 
relationships between health care providers and patients are important. Quality management and 
customer satisfaction inquiries across all these scales must be upgraded in most African countries in 
order to increase the effectiveness of health services.  
At present the quality of services are often not up to standards – health care centers for instance do not 
always have enough medicine and medical equipment to provide professional treatment – attributing to 
public skepticism regarding the usefulness of social insurance schemes (Kalusapo et al., 2012).  
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Administration and management of social security schemes 
In most African countries public trusts manage the public schemes. Francophone countries typically 
have a CNSS, managed by a governing body with a tripartite structure with representatives from the 
government, employers’ associations and trade unions. Anglophone countries have similar institutions 
such as SNITT in Ghana and NASSIT in Sierra Leone. In some countries private funds exist next to the 
public ones and public-private partnerships are also on the rise. Enterprise-based provident funds on the 
other hand are managed by trade unions or an elected team. Kenya for example has a well-developed 
infrastructure of brokers, fund managers and insurance companies (Kalusopa et al., 2012: 39-40).  
As indicated above, African social protection schemes are characterized by weak administrative 
performance generally caused by poor record keeping, lack of incentives for board members and 
corruption. The high administration costs are another important obstacle for sound management. In 
some countries, such as Ghana, up to 20 % of the contributions are spent on overhead costs. The lack of 
up-to-date data hampers the processing of claims and delays payments. Although the ILO and ISSA 
continue to support African governments in implementing sound administrations the road is long and 
the challenges significant (Kalusopa et al., 2012: 40-41).  
Government’s social spending 
The political commitment to social protection can be measured on the basis of national social protection 
expenditures. Although the World Social Security Report 2010-2011 stated “there are practically no 
systematically collected data which would indicate not only the expenditure on such schemes, but also 
numbers of beneficiaries and effective coverage in terms of percentages of target groups reached” (ILO, 
2010: 74 in Holmes & Langa-Ntale, 2012: 19), the ILO’s Social Security Inquiry (SSI), allows us to compile 
data on public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP as shown in the table 5 below6. These figures 
include spending on health care and education. According to the SSI data the majority of the countries 
reach the social expenditure standard, of 4.5 %, set by the African Union in the 2008 Social Policy 
Framework for Africa. Furthermore the large differences between countries and regions are 
noteworthy; in general North African countries have higher levels of social spending as a percentage of 
their GDP and on average West African countries score worst. If we only look at the social protection 
expenditure on benefits for working age population, as shown in table 6, the picture is less rosy. Firstly, 
data on social protection expenditure is only available for a select number of counties. Secondly, the 
amount spent on social protection for the working age population is low. Southern African countries, 
South-Africa, Angola and Botswana are amongst the five highest spenders and Cote d’Ivoire, perhaps 
surprisingly, ranks the best of all Sub Saharan African countries. The table 7 presents public expenditure 
on old age and survivor pensions. In general these are higher than spending of social protection for the 
                                                          
6 The SSI was developed by the ILO in 2005 to collect, stores and disseminates comparable statistical data on social security 
worldwide (see http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home?p_lang=en to access the entire database). The data in table 6 has 
been compiled based on the figures mentioned in the worldwide overview (See 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c).  For more statistics on  social protection 
schemes, laws and rgulations visit http://www.ilo.org/dyn/sesame/ifpses.socialdbexp . 
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working class population.  No general trends can be derived from the figure, no region scores 
particularly better then another.  
Table 5: Public Social Expenditure in Africa 
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Table 6: Total Public social protection expenditure on benefits for the working age 
 
Source: compiled by author based on ILO’s Social Security Inquiry 
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Table 7: Expenditure on old age and survivor pension 
 
Source: compiled by author based on ILO’s Social Security Inquiry 
3. What this report is about 
In conclusion, despite the long tradition of social protection in Africa and the numerous policies and 
frameworks that have been developed, African governments are still struggling to create social 
protection programmes that are accustomed to the characteristics of African labour markets.  Despite 
the efforts of the African Union to create a social policy framework (SPF, 2008) and stress the 
importance of extending protection to informal workers (SPIREWORK, 2013), the political efforts of most 
African governments have not exceeded making paper commitments to the cause. In similar vein, 
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Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale (2012), argue that the social protection agenda is very much driven by 
international donors, with their own priorities; In order to secure funding, African governments try to 
please each donor and therefore most African countries lack a coherent national social protection 
strategy (Ethiopia is one of the few countries that has been able to harmonize donor priorities through a 
national social protection strategy). Although, in general, significant progress has been made with 
regards to health care and education, other social protection branches such as insurance for 
occupational accidents and illness are paper commitments with little tangible results. African countries 
should furthermore increase their efforts in compiling up to date labour market data, as specifically 
workers in informal employment are often not found in national statistics. In order to develop tailored 
social protection strategies, which can reach out to the majority of African workers in informal 
employment, having a statistical picture of the labour force is essential.  
Building on these insights, the remainder of this report will entail 5 case studies in which we will discuss 
social protection landscapes in Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Benin. To recapitulate we will focus on 
three focal themes, namely, old age pensions, insurance against occupational accidents and illness and 
health care provided by five types of social protection schemes: social assistance, social 
insurance/security, private insurance, communal/informal schemes and mutuelles de santé (see Table 1 
above for a description of the various schemes).   
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CHAPTER 1: Guinea 
1. Setting the scene 
1.1. Socio-political context 
Guinea is an illustrative case of a country which has not managed to transform its natural wealth into 
sustainable inclusive growth, whereby a decent living for the entire populations can be ensured. This 
chapter will briefly discuss Guinea’s political climate in relation to the Guinean labour market and trade 
unionism. For a detailed depiction of the Guinean political history and socio-economic landscape we 
kindly refer to the CNV Internationaal context study, “Guinea at the Crossroads: A labour rights 
perspective”, writing by Kaag et al. (2013).7  
Guinea gained independence from France in 1958, two-years prior to its Francophone counterparts, 
after an abrupt and violent decolonization. Sékou Touré, a unionist and founder of the first West African 
trade union centre, led the decolonization struggle and founded a single-party socialist state. Touré’s 
dictatorship, which ended with his death in 1984, was characterized by ethnic conflicts, violent 
oppression (approximately 50 000 people died during his regime), economic deterioration and 
diplomatic isolation.  Conté, who took over power in 1984 installed a liberal economy (in line with two 
SAPs, notably in 1996 and 1998) but was far from politically liberal and ruled in similar vein as Touré.  
After a two year military junta, between 2008 and 2010, led by Moussa Dadis Camara, the first elections 
were held in 2010.   Although the elections – won  by Alpha Condé, leader of the opposition party 
Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée (RPG) – marked the end of approximately 50 years of dictatorship, 
Guinea is a long way from being a consolidated democracy (Kaag et al., 2013). The relatively free and fair 
parliamentary elections in 2013 however have raised hopes for sustained political stability (AEO Guinea, 
2014).  
As political actors the Guinean trade union movement also suffers from the political instability. The 
leaders of CNTG, CNV Internationaal’s partner, have been the victims of intimidations and oppressions 
during 2011 and 2012. These are clear violations of the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) core 
conventions 87 and 98 on the freedom of association and collective bargaining ratified by Guinea. 
Nonetheless, negotiations of the social partners have resulted in the instalment of a general minimum 
wage for workers in Guinea on 14 December 2012, which is a  first step towards a more significant role 
for Guinean unions in policy making proceses (Kaag et al., 2013). 
                                                          
7
 For a more detailed depiction of the socio-economic and political context of Guinea see Kaag et al. (2013).  
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1.2. Economic analysis: Huge potential, limited returns  
Guinea is one of the richest West African countries when it comes to mineral resources, namely bauxite, 
iron ore, gold and diamonds. It also has a highland fertility but the returns on this natural wealth have 
been piecemeal. The capital insensitive extraction industries create little job opportunities and the 
revenues are not invested into social expenditures, which have become increasingly important in light of 
Guinea´s demographic changes (Manlan, 2014). The population has experienced rapid growth between 
2007 and 2012, with an average annual growth rate of 3,1%. There is also a considerable youth bulge, 
22% of women and 23% of men are between 15 and 19 years of age.    
Since 2009 progress has been made in macro-economic terms but the GDP growth dropped from 3,9% 
in 2012 to 2% in 2013, due to the political unrest caused by the postponement of the parliamentary 
elections and a decrease in mining investment (see table 8). Furthermore, the government has not been 
able to address the budget deficits which raise questions about the stability of the economy. For the 
majority of Guineans the situation remains destitute as 55,2% of the people live in poverty (Manlan, 
2014). The social problems can also be measured through the low score on the HDI. Guinea is ranked 
178 out of 187 countries and makes very little progress on all indicators (HDR, 2013).  
Table 8: Macro-economic indicators Guinea 
  2012 2013(e) 2014(p) 2015(p) 
Real GDP growth 3.9 2 4.2 4.3 
Real GDP per capita growth 1.3 -0.5 1.7 1.8 
CPI inflation
8
 15.2 11.9 9.9 6.8 
Budget balance % GDP
9
 -3.2 -5.2 -2.5 -0.4 
Current account balance % GDP
10
 -33.9 -20.2 -18.3 -24.7 
Source: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' (Manlan, 2014) calculations 
                                                          
8
 CPI Inflation measures the inflation based on the Consumer Price Index: a measure of the average change over time in the 
prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and service. 
9
 Budget balance is the overall difference between government revenues and spending. 
10
 Current account balance compares a country's net trade in goods and services, plus net earnings, and net transfer payments 
to and from the rest of the world during the period specified. These figures are calculated on an exchange rate basis. 
 
Trade Union Rights 
Right to Organise: Guinean workers have the right to organize and there is an anti-union 
discrimination law which prohibits discrimination against unions but the law does not foresee 
any measures to insure this.  
Right to strike: Although on paper unions are allowed to strike in practice the law 
encompasses several restrictive requirements: many sectors are described as “essential 
services” are thus prevented from striking. Many strikes are also called unlawful because 
their objective is not recognized a lawful reason for holding a strike.   
(ITUC, Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2010a) 
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Kaag et al. (2013) state that: “in 2011 the Guinean workforce is depicted to be 4.6 million. Around 45,8 % 
of the Guinean workforce is estimated to work in the agricultural sector. The industry and commerce 
sector is estimated to be 18% and services 6%. The informal economy is the largest economic sector, and 
it is estimated to cover about 65 to 85% of the Guinean workforce and to account for 45% to 65% of the 
Guinean GDP.  Informal work is most common in the agriculture sector (agriculture, livestock, fishing, 
and forestry), wholesale and retail trade, passenger transport and construction. Working conditions in 
the informal sector are extremely poor; most workers do not have contracts, have little job security and 
no protections under the law” (Rio Tinto Simandou, 2012 in Kaag et al., 2013: 14). Against this backdrop 
developing effective social protection systems is essential. The natural treasures, such as bauxite, 
furthermore create an opportunity for financing national social security systems. The following section 
will zoom in on the state of social protection in Guinea. Which systems are in place and how well do 
they reach out to informal workers?   
Table 9: Employment figures Guinea 
 2002 2007 2012 
Employment    
 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Public employee 18.8 1.1 4.9 13.3 1.0 4.0 16.4 1.4 5.4 
Microbusiness 
employee 
5.5 0.3 1.4 5.9 0.4 1.8 9.5 1.3 3.5 
Employer 1.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.4 0.7 2.0 0.8 1.1 
Independent 
agriculture 
4.8 51.9 41.9 6.4 60.0 46.7 10.0 58.6 45.8 
Independent non-
agriculture 
66.2 8.7 20.9 53.1 9.4 20.3 49.5 9.2 19.8 
Other dependent 2.9 37.2 29.9 20.0 29.8 26.5 12.6 28.7 24.4 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: INS 2012 (Calculations based on EIBEP-2002, ELEP-2007 and ELEP-2012) in Kaag et al. (2013) 
 
2. Social Protection 
In the following we will discuss the state of social protection in Guinea, followed by a mapping of the 
existing social protection schemes in the field of old age pensions, occupational accidents and illness and 
health care. For an overview of the available social security statistical data as well as key legislation and 
the ratification of key ILO conventions, please see annex 2.  
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2.1. The state of Social Protection in Guinea 
Compared to other African countries there is a lack of information on social protection in Guinea. Most 
documents on social protection in general are ILO programme reports or evaluations or reports on the 
progress made with regards to the Bamako initiative, which will be discussed in more detail below.  The 
following is therefore to a large extent based on the context study by Kaag et al. (2013) as well as the 
field data collected by Alpha Barry Bacar, our local research partner.  
As discussed in the introduction statutory social security in many West African countries find their roots 
in the Code du Travail des Territoires Français d’Outre Mer – or the Overseas Labour Code – which was 
developed by the French government in 1952. In Guinea the law resulted in the creation of the Caisse de 
Compensation des Prestations Familiales (CCPF). In the beginning the CCPF only provided family benefits 
for employers of state-led enterprises and the colonial administration. Benefits in case of work-related 
accidents or illness were added in 1959. Finally, in 1960 the Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale (CNSS) 
was created and old age pensions, disability benefits, as well as health care were added.  
The CNSS still exists today and is the sole provider of formal social security in Guinea. It is administrated 
by an Administrative Council (Conseil d’administration) consisting of 10 members: two members 
representing the Ministry of Social Affairs, one representative of the Ministry of Finance, one 
representative of the Ministry of Health, three members representing the employers’ organisations, and 
three members representing the trade unions (CNSS website in Kaag et al., 2013)11. 
The CNSS is a mandatory contributory social insurance scheme, which includes eight out of the nine 
minimum social security standards indicated in the C102 ILO convention, namely: old age benefit, 
disability benefit, occupational accidents benefit, illness benefit, maternity, child care, health care and 
survivors benefit. Unemployment benefits are not provided by the CNSS. The scheme is financed 
through employer and employee contributions. About 23% of a wage is paid to the CNSS with a 
maximum of 200 000 GNF per month.   
The CNSS covers all employees in the public and private sector registered in the labour code, which in 
theory is open to formal and informal workers. The labour code however adopts a narrow definition of 
labour and workers can only be registered if they can prove a contractual employer-employee 
relationship. The labour code therefore discriminates against most informal workers who either are 
own-account workers or have an employer but no legal contract to prove it.  To a certain extent this 
shortcoming was addressed by specifically including domestic servants, workers in agriculture, as well as 
apprentices, interns, and students at technical schools, as target beneficiaries of the CNSS (ISSA website 
country profile Guinea). Nevertheless, only approximately 3% of the Guinean population is covered by 
formal social protection schemes.   
Table 10: Social Protection Schemes in Guinea 
                                                          
11
 http://www.cnss.org.gn 
36 
 
 
O
ld
 a
g
e
 
S
u
rv
iv
o
r 
D
is
a
b
il
it
y
 
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
n
a
l 
a
cc
id
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 
il
ln
e
ss
 
C
h
il
d
 b
e
n
e
fi
ts
 
M
a
te
rn
it
y
 
b
e
n
e
fi
ts
 
H
e
a
lt
h
 c
a
re
 
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
C
a
sh
/
in
-k
in
d
 
tr
a
n
sf
e
rs
 
CNSS x x x x x x x   
Mutuelles       x   
PSSP        x x 
 
The weaknesses of the CNSS have been drawn up by the ILO, which evaluated the statutory social 
security schemes of CNSS in 2001. The evaluation (ILO, 2002) came to the following conclusions:   
 The CNSS is incapable of increasing its coverage despite a growing population.  
 The administrative costs have increased to 20% of the contributions, leaving fewer funds 
available for the payment of benefits.  
 There have been problems with the payment of benefits due to a lack of effective control 
mechanisms 
 The pension fund has large deficits, mainly caused by an unfavourable demographic 
composition (the dependency ratio is 86% (GESS country profile Guinea) 12) 
 Unnecessary and corruption-strife medical evacuations13 have furthermore put a strain on 
the health care budget  
The general inefficiency of the CNSS led to a significant lag on the payments of benefits at that time 
(2001) and despite recommendations of the ILO the CNSS was not able to improve its functioning14. 
Kaag et al. (2013) identified similar obstacles adding that the “scheme shows a lot of difficulties: 
administrational, legal, statutory and normative shortcomings leading to bad governance practices, 
financial problems, a feeble service level, and the exclusion of a substantial part of the salaried workers”.   
Due to the political instability Guinea has witnessed since its independence, the social assistance 
programs are less developed than in other countries with a more stable political history. There is one 
social safety nets programme worth mentioning, namely the Productive Social Safety Nets Programme 
(PSSP) financed by the World Bank and approved in May 201215. As the name of the programme 
indicates, PSSP does not only provide protection against income loss but also hopes to generate asset 
creation. The programme encompasses three strategies: (i) implement a labour intensive public works 
                                                          
12
 Population aged 14 or younger plus population aged 65 or older, divided by population aged 15-64. 
13
 There have been examples of local doctors demanding unnecessary evacuations which entail large costs 
(transport, flights, etc.).  
14
 For more details of the ILO evaluation please consult the evaluation report “Guineé : rapport du gouvernement : 
évaluation actuarielle du régime géré par la Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale au 31 décembre 2001. Geneva, BIT 
(2004). 
15
 For more details on the PSSP please see World Bank 2012 
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program (LIPW) and life skills development in urban areas targeted at youth to rehabilitate and 
construct critical urban infrastructure and create short term employment; (ii) pilot a cash transfer project 
to improve human capital in rural areas; and (iii) strengthen the institutional capacity of the government 
to design and coordinate social safety net interventions. The programme targets 200.000 urban youths 
in the country’s regional capitals and costs approximately 25 million dollars (World Bank, 2012). Yet, it 
must be noted that PSSP is very donor driven as none of the respondents interviewed by Alpha Barry 
Bacar mentioned its existence.   
2.2. Recent Reforms 
According to Kaag et al. (2013) the recently drafted National Social Protection Policy (Politique nationale 
de protection sociale) is an improvement of the institutional framework as it explicitly targets the 
informal sector. Among its aims are organizing and supporting of the informal sector in developing 
income generating activities, among other things through microfinance programmes. In addition, 
putting in place health insurance schemes, to which, within 5 years’ time, 50% of the informal sector 
should adhere, with an enlargement of coverage to 80% in 10 years’ time (Projet de document de 
Politique nationale de protection sociale 2012). In general, the social protection coverage should be 
extended to the entire Guinean population by 2025 (Kaag et al., 2012). In the new policy document, 
special attention is also devoted to particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, elderly, people with 
a physical or mental handicap, chronically ill people, including those with HIV/AIDS.  
The latest poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) also accentuates the necessity of social protection as 
a means to increase households´ resilience (PRSP III 2013-2015). The fourth strategic axis of the PRSP III 
deals with social services and social protection. According Alpha Barry Bacar (2014) specific attention is 
giving to safety nets and employment policies (e.g. Youth Employability).  
It is also worth mentioning that a new labour code was adopted by the government in 2014 and, most 
recently in April 2014, a general strike was held in order to pressurise the government in issuing a 
decree which would stipulate the attribution, organisational structure and management system of the 
l’Institut National d’Assurance Maladie Obligatoire (INAMO), which would provide health insurance for 
civil servants.   
Despite these promising policy initiatives, Kaag et al. (2013) conclude that “in a state in which basic 
human and legal security and democratic rights are not assured, it is difficult to see how the extension of 
social protection to all categories of the population is feasible and even a real priority for the 
government, other than for winning votes”.  
2.3. Financing Social Spending 
It is clear that the implementation of the aforementioned National Social Protection Policy necessitates 
the increase of financial resources destined to social protection, both at the level of the state and at the 
level of the population. Its implementation was therefore explicitly considered in the framework of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) II and III, which leading principles is the promotion of economic 
growth on the basis of a solidarity economy, in other words:  inclusive economic growth (Kaag et al., 
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2012). Nevertheless social spending, including health and education in Guinea only amounts to 2,47% 
GDP in 2010 (see table 5).  
Pal (2005) calculated that universal basic social protection is affordable for Guinea. According to his 
modeling exercise the Guinean government could finance a basic social protection package (universal 
old age and disability pensions, health care, child benefits and basic education), entirely based on 
domestic revenues by 2032 if it were to spend one third of its national budget on social protection (Pal, 
2005: 22). Although interesting from a hypothetical point of view, Pal’s (2005) study does not take into 
account the political economy of social protection schemes. At the end of the day the government has 
to have the political will to prioritize social protection, an issue that will be discussed in more detail 
below.  
3. Focal Themes 
In what follows we will zoom in on the three focus themes outlined in the ToR: old age pensions, 
insurance for occupational accidents and illness and health care, respectively. The analysis is largely 
based on the data collected by our local research partner Alpha Barry Bacar, recent academic literature 
on these subjects is limited.  
3.1. Old Age Pensions 
The CNSS provides a bulk-sum old age benefit for all public and private sector workers registered under 
the labour code, which have at least worked 15 years. Employees who have worked more than 30 years 
can receive an old age pension. The benefits, however, are very low which makes a number of civil 
servants turn towards private insurance companies for an old age pension insurance. For most 
employers this is out of the question as their low salaries do not allow complementary insurance. 
Additional shortcomings of the formal pension schemes provided by the CNSS include the irregularities 
of payments, the long waiting hours for receiving the pension (particularly inconvenient for old people 
who are often not in good health), and the fragmentation of payments.  In addition, the non-functional 
tripartite Administrative Council of the CNSS decreases the potential of improving the pension schemes.  
In sum, we may say that the old age pensions in Guinea do not offer sufficient security for loss of income 
due to old age for the majority of Guineans.   
Most Guineans thus rely on community, kin or family ties at old age. It is generally so that younger 
generations take care of the older ones but these traditional systems have not been institutionalised 
and mutuelles do not specifically address old age pensions, although their health care services are of 
course accessible for people of old age as well. While elderly people (over 65 years) only constitute 4,5% 
of the population, or 508,500 people, they need extra attention as they are often a marginalised and 
neglected category. Explicit attention should be given to their risks and needs in formal and informal 
social protection schemes.   
3.2. Occupational Accidents and Illness 
The CNSS provides benefits for work related injuries and illness for all public and private sector workers 
registered under the labour code. However – partly due to the discriminatory nature of the definition of 
a worker according to the law – only 3% percentage, of the active population in Guinea has access to 
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formal social insurance schemes for these risks. In addition the level of protection provided by the CNSS 
is piecemeal. There is a lack of medical infrastructure, a shortage of medication and an absence of re-
education programmes and assistance after severe work-related injuries or illness.  Nonetheless Alpha 
Barry Bacar, argues that the availability of an institutional framework at least provides a basis for 
rebuilding a more inclusive formal social insurance system for work related accidents and injuries.   
In practice, Guineans mostly count on traditional solidarity mechanisms or mutual health insurance 
schemes when confronted with occupational accidents or illness. A good example of such a mutuelle is 
the Mutuelle Hadja Rabiatou Sérah Diallo.  
 
 
3.3. Health care 
Formal health care systems through the CNSS 
As we mentioned above, the CNSS only provides health care for private and public employees which are 
registered under the labour code. Furthermore the benefits for civil servants provided by the CNSS are 
very low according to Kaag et al. (2012). Public servants therefore create mutuelles de santé per 
ministry, professional group or office location, such as the mutuelle nationale des douanes, to which 600 
families in Conakry and 1200 in the whole country are subscribed (ISSA country profile Guinea in Kaag et 
al., 2012), because subscription is based on registration in the labour code the mutuelle in the public 
sector are in practice not accessible for informal workers. 
Due to the limitations and the small coverage of the CNSS most Guineans rely on alternative systems, 
such as solidarity among kin and within the village or urban neighbourhood, and support through 
religious and professional networks. They may also participate in communal informal organizations such 
Mutuelle Hadja Rabiatou Sérah Diallo 
This mutuelle was created in 2006 and holds the name of the retired Secretary General of the 
CNTG. The mutuelle has approximately 3845 members and 32 service points (Noyau de 
solidarité) which offer services to workers affiliated to transport and mechanics union of the 
Ratoma community in Conakry. The mutuelle is entirely financed by the members, who pay a 
contribution of 1500 GNF (or 0,16 euro) each month. Affiliates include drivers, mechanics, 
sheet metal workers, painters, traders and street-sellers which sell their goods near to stations 
or garages. Although the mutual insurance scheme lacks a sound judiciary framework the 
mutuelle has been able to provide significant social services, specifically when it comes to 
occupational accidents and illness. In addition help is also provided for loss or reduction in 
income due to marriage, decease or children. At present the mutuelle is also building a health 
clinic.    
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as credit and savings associations (tontines) or in communal health insurance initiatives. The mutuelles 
are based on five principles: voluntary admission, solidarity amongst members, non-for-profit  
organization, democratic management and the self-sustainability and independence. Because research 
has indicated that mutuelles de santé, are the most important providers of health insurance for informal 
workers in Guinea we will zoom in on their strength and weaknesses. 
 
The Bamako Initiative and the importance of community ownership 
Studies on health care in Guinea have mostly been conducted throughout the 1990s in relation to the 
Bamako initiative16. These studies mainly focus on the effectiveness of community financing of basic 
health care (Levy-Bruhl et al., 1997) and local perceptions of the quality of health care centers (Haddad 
et al., 1998). Regrettably, there is little known about the “Bamako” health centers at present. Based on 
interviews with key stakeholders, Alpha Barry Bacar, concludes that the mutuelles are not equipped to 
provide health care services to the entire Guinean population (regrettably data on coverage and 
contributions was not available). There is an urgent need for more sensitization, income generating 
activities and the training of health care providers. 
 
 
 
Out of interest in the reasons behind the declining membership to community-financing schemes for 
health centres – as promoted by the Bamako initiative – the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp 
conducted an insightful action research project, PRIMA—Projet de Recherche sur le Partage de Risque 
Maladie, between 1996 and 2000. PRIMA followed the set-up and implementation of a Mutuelles de 
                                                          
16
 http://www.unicef.org/sowc08/docs/sowc08_panel_2_5.pdf 
The Bamako Initiative 
The Bamako Initiative which was adopted by African ministers of Health in 1987 aimed to increase 
access to primary health care, through the implementation of integrated minimum-health-care 
packages by community health centres. The focus was on meeting the basic health needs of 
communities through access to drugs and regular contact between health-care providers and 
communities. Communities were directly involved in the management and funding of essential 
drug supplies through village committees. Community financing was implemented to capture a 
fraction of the funds households were already spending in the informal sector and combine them 
with government and donor funding to revitalize the health services and improve their quality 
(UNICEF). 
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Santé from start to finish in order to gain understanding of the influencing factors for subscription to a 
mutuelles de Santé.  
Criel et al., (2002) concluded that in contrast with the general assumptions, African people are not per 
definition risk-averse.  PRIMA identified the bad quality of services as the main reason for the limited 
subscription to mutuelles. The study argued that beneficiaries understand and appreciate the idea of 
insurance schemes and the benefits of solidarity mechanisms across traditional lines. According to Criel 
et al. (2002) the problem however arises during the implementation of these mutual insurance schemes. 
Respondents mentioned that the core reasons for non-subscription are: the mistrust in the management 
system – in particular if the mutuelles was perceived to be linked to the state; the lack of resources and 
the poor quality of care. Another finding relates to the importance of community-ownership. People in 
general appreciated the mutuelles established by PRIMA because of its genuine participatory set-up. 
From the start the communities were involved and the intensive preparation phase of more than a year 
was highly valued.  It gave the community members a sense of ownership.  This lack of sense of 
ownership has been identified as one of the core causes of the failure of the Bamako health centers 
which were created throughout the 80s and 90s. Although the Bamako Initiative is based on the 
principle of participation, the scheme was so centralized and institutionalized, that it hampered local 
creativity and many people withdrew from the schemes because they didn´t feel respected or heard 
within the health care system by the state or health care providers. Against this background private 
mutuelles are a welcome alternative but Criel et al. (2002) clearly state that mutuelles are also not magic 
bullets which automatically lead to increased health care accessibility. The schemes must be 
implemented and controlled in close cooperation with local communities, in order to ensure well-
functioning quality services and attract many subscribers (Criel et al., 2002).  
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
It is easy to lose focus when reading all the initiatives and policy documents issued by the Guinean 
government related to social protection. It seems that social protection is at the centre of the political 
debate and it is recognized that a profound restructuring is necessary to make the existing schemes 
compatible with characteristics of the Guinean labour market. If we place these political statements 
against the socio-economic reality for most Guineans the commitments become rather unrealistic. The 
aforementioned labour rights violations and the fragile (according to some researchers, e.g. Docking 
2002, collapsed) state institutions depict a political-economy which does not place social protection, in 
particular for informal workers, high on the political agenda. In practice the contributory social security 
schemes managed by the CNSS are not accessible to informal workers and the majority of workers 
resort to traditional safety nets within their family or mutuelles if they are confronted with a loss of 
income due to old age, work related accidents or health problems.  
Nevertheless, hope can be derived from the recent success booked by trade unions in setting a 
minimum wage. This exemplifies that unions have not entirely been placed outside the political playing 
field despite the general oppressive climate. Building on these achievements and the paper 
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commitments of the government, we recommend Guinean unions to take into account the following 
recommendations:  
 First things first. The primary step that could be taken by Guinean unions is lobbying the 
government to change the definition of “labour” in the labour code, which forms the basis of 
the eligibility criteria of the statutory social insurance schemes. Labour is limited to an 
employer-employee relationship, which for the majority of workers in the informal economy 
(own-account workers) does not hold true.  The ratification of C102 on the minimum social 
security standards could also be an important lobby point for Guinean unions and the CNTG, 
specifically.  
 Thinking large, acting incrementally. Although the Politique nationale de protection sociale and 
the PRSP III indicate progress in the development of a comprehensive social protection 
framework they do not sufficiently address interlinked themes such as redistribution and the 
quality of care (see recommendations below). The first step for trade unions might therefore be 
to pressure the government to develop a framework, in cooperation with all relevant partners 
(unions, mutuelles, employers’ organizations, ect.), that adopts a systems’ approach (see 
Robalino, et al. 2012). Many countries (e.g. Niger, Senegal) have developed social protection 
strategies in a participatory manner and these processes could serve as examples. It is however 
of primary importance that the framework has a well-designed phased plan in which the most 
important needs are addressed first.  
 Picking your battles. Due to the fact that Guinea is a low income country and ranks amongst the 
10 lowest countries on the HDI it is important to prioritize in social expenditure. Trade Unions 
could play a role in defining the priorities based on the needs and perceptions of their 
constituencies17.  
 Redistributing revenues gained from mineral resources.  The policy papers and academic articles 
and reports do not link the social protection agenda with the economic potential of the 
extractive industries. Trade unions could lobby to put this issue on the political agenda. The 
revenues gained from the extraction of Bauxite for example – which according to AEO 2013 will 
increase significantly over the following years – could serve as a financial base for social 
expenditures (health, education, …). 
 Working with the grain. In relation to the Politique nationale de protection sociale – which hopes 
to achieve 80% health insurance coverage in 10 years’ time – unions could stress the importance 
of working with and building on the mutuelles that are already in place.  The example of Rwanda 
(which will be discussed later on) has indicated that harmonizing and centralizing the 
management systems of existing mutuelles increases coverage and is more cost-efficient then 
installing an entirely new set of insurance schemes. In addition, Criel et al.’s (2002) study has 
shown that local ownership is important and that government installed systems are generally 
mistrusted due to the Guinea’s history of 50 years of dictatorship.  
                                                          
17 Based on our own assessment we recommend prioritising health care.    
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 Investing in quality. In addition, also building on Criel et al.’s (2002) study, unions could equally 
stress the importance of the quality of health care and other social protection benefits. 
Increasing coverage to insurance schemes is namely related to the quality of the benefits that 
one receives in return for his/her contribution.  
 Taking initiative. Alternatively, in light of the unstable political situation of Guinea, trade unions 
could opt to take measures into their own hands following the example of the mutuelle in the 
transport sector. In other sectors where informal workers are relatively well organized such an 
approach could be advisable. In sectors were the informal workers are not yet well organized, 
unions could increase their efforts in organizing informal workers.  
 Joining Forces. The field data in Guinea has identified no other local actors who are involved in 
social protection. The ILO is the most active and well-known promoter of social protection in 
Guinea and although the multi-actor analyses (see annex 1) mentions civil society actors, no 
specific actor is mentioned and there seems to be no harmonized approach to social protection 
within Guinean civil society. Trying to find the most relevant partners for CNTG in the field of 
social protection could be taken up more specifically in a future study.   
The role of CNV Internationaal in these endeavours could take the form of: organizing exchange 
events between Guinean unions and those in countries which met similar obstacles and found ways 
to overcome them; supporting the improvement of lobbying and advocacy skills; and supporting a 
local awareness raising campaign. An awareness raising campaign in the Netherlands about the 
misuse of the revenues of natural resources, such as Bauxite, might also assist their partners in 
pressuring the Guinean government into spending the gained revenues in a more equitable manner. 
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CHAPTER 2: Senegal 
1. Setting the scene 
1.1. Socio-political context 
In what follows we will briefly discuss the political and economic landscape of Senegal, before moving 
on to the state of social protection. For a more detailed overview of the socio-political  and economic 
context we kindly refer to the CNV context study conducted by Kaag et al. (2009), “Le syndicalisme au 
Sénégal: Une analyse du context”, as well as the updated study which will be completed later this year 
(Kaag et al., 2014). 
Compared to Guinea, Senegal’s political history since independence has been rather stable, with no 
coup d’états, no ethnic conflicts or significant rebellions. Between 1960 and 2000 the country was 
governed by two socialist presidents from the Parti Socialiste (PS). Léopold Senghor (PS) ruled from 1960 
to 1980 and installed a single-party system18. Senghor was able to remain in power due to favorable 
economic conditions which allowed him to uphold clientelistic ties and through the support of the three 
main Islamic brotherhoods. In the late 1970s the economy however deteriorated – due to the falling 
prices for peanuts and droughts – and soon after, in 1980, power was abdicated in favour of Abdou 
Diouf (PS). Diouf, the second socialist president, installed a multi-party system and ruled until 2000, 
largely through a government of national unity.  In 2000 Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the Parti 
Démocratique du Sénégal (PDS), became the first liberal president and marked l’Alternance. Lots of hope 
was placed in Wade’s hands but the political climate under his power was in fact characterized by 
increased corruption and manipulation of the law. The constitution was furthermore altered several 
times in an attempt to secure Wade’s power.  In 2007 Wade was reelected but, due to allegations of 
fraud, opposition parties had withdrawn from the race, leaving the entire parliament and senate to 
representatives of Wade’s party, the PDS (Kaag et al., 2009). In 2011 yet another constitutional 
amendment was made allowing Wade to run for president for the third time. This however sparked 
massive popular protest boosted by youth movements such as M23 and Y en a Marre. The 2012 election 
were won by the opposition candidate Macky Sal of the Alliance for the Republic and Wade’s 
acknowledged his defeat and peacefully handed over power. The new government has committed itself 
to ensure good governance and better management of public resources. However, the liberalization of 
the Senegalese economy has made it vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices and to the 
economic crisis in Europe and political crisis in neighbouring Mali. Recurrent internal challenges are 
natural risks such as floods and other climatic shocks and the slow reform of the road and infrastructure 
programme, especially of the energy sector (Gassama et al., 2014). Finally, 2012 was marked by 
numerous strikes by state teachers. The 2011/12 school year was saved by agreements reached 
between the new authorities and teachers' unions. 
                                                          
18
 See Kaag 2001 for a critical study on the decentralization process.  
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1.2. Economic analysis: a booming tertiary sector but worrying levels of youth 
unemployment 
In contrast with Guinea, Senegal has little natural resources, but due to its favorable geographical 
position, the French chose it as the capital of their West-African colony. After independence in 1960 the 
country therefore had a relative good infrastructure as well as well-trained civil servants. It however also 
inherited an exploitative economic structure mainly geared towards the export of groundnuts and 
cotton and the import of secondary goods as well as staple foods such as rice. On the HDI Senegal 
ranked 154 out of 187 in 2013 and in 2011 46,7% were living under the poverty threshold (HDR 2013 
and Gassama et al., 2014 ).    
The Senegalese economy is further characterized by an important tertiary sector (transport and  
telecommunications, commerce, services, finance, real estate and business services) which comprises 
approximately 60% of the GDP in 2012 (AEO Senegal, 2013). The primary sector  (agriculture, livestock 
and fishery) contributes relatively little to the GDP, approximately  16,7 % in 2012, compared to other 
countries in the region, but employs 54% of the population (AEO Senegal, 2013).  The secondary sector 
(agro-food processing, mining, textile and chemistry), mostly run by government enterprises, is good for 
another 20% of the GDP. It is estimated that the informal economy contributes 60% to the GDP and 
employs up to 90% of the population (Ndour 2007 in Kaag et al., 2009).  
Since 2011 the economy has slowly recovered and in 2013 a growth rate of 4% GDP was measured, 
compared to 3,4% in 2012. The inflation has been contained but the government still has significant 
deficits on its budget balance (-5,9% in 2012) as well as its current account balance (-10,3% in 2012) (see 
table 11, Gassama et al., 2014).  The prospects for 2015 and beyond are dependent on the Plan Sénégal 
Emergent (PSE), the new development strategy looking ahead to 2035. “It seeks to pull together the 
country’s public development policies and has three dimensions: structural transformation of the 
economy and growth; human capital, social protection and sustainable development; governance, 
institutions, and peace and security” (Gassama et al., 2014). It must be noted however that the 
implementation of PSE has not yet reached the wider public or government officials because none of the 
respondents interviewed for this study, were aware of its existence. This is worrisome seeing that one of 
Trade Union Rights 
Right to Organise: the law makes it difficult to create a union (long bureaucratic process & prior 
authorisation by authorities) 
Right to Collective Bargaining: The state arbitrate the collective agreements between employers 
and employees 
Right to Strike: Excessively long notice is needed to hold a legal strike, unions must first go 
through an arbitration process before being to call a strike, the law also allows forcible 
requisitioning of workers strikers  
(ITUC, Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2010b) 
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its core pillars is social protection and several social protection stakeholders were questioned 
throughout the fieldwork conducted by Ba in April 2014. Another important policy document is the  
National Strategy for Economic and Social Development (SNDES) for 2013-2017 which was approved in 
November 2012 and encompasses three areas of action: growth, productivity and wealth creation; 
human capital and sustainable development; and government, institutions, peace and security.  
 
Table 11: Key macro-economic indicators  
 
  2012 2013(e) 2014(p) 2015(p) 
Real GDP growth 3.4 4 4.8 5.3 
Real GDP per capita growth 0.5 1.1 1.9 2.5 
CPI inflation 2.1 0.7 1.3 1.7 
Budget balance % GDP -5.9 -5.4 -5.3 -5.1 
Current account balance % GDP -10.3 -9 -8.4 -9.3 
Source: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' Gassama et al. (2014) calculations. 
  
 
If we look at the labour market we can discern a similar situation to Guinea. From a total population of 
13,11 million, 53,3% forms part of the active population, resulting in a dependency ratio of 88% (ISSA, 
2014). Less than 20% of the population works in the formal sector, of which one third is employed by 
the state and two thirds in private companies. The majority of the workforce works in the informal 
economy (which grew significantly since the SAPs of the 1980s). Agriculture remains the largest sector in 
terms of employment, followed by services and industry. Youth unemployment is a huge challenge and 
was an important agenda point during the 2012 elections. Although the government has initiated 
several projects such as the Accelerated Growth Plan and the New National Employment Policy (2010-
2015), and created specified government institutions such as the National Fund for Youth 
Unemployment and the National Agency for Youth Employment, in order the tackle the problem, 43,9% 
of people aged 15 to 24 in Senegal end up finding a job in the informal economy (Diene, 2012). The 
official unemployment rate is 11,7 % in Dakar and 14 % for the entire country. If we however include 
hidden unemployment the figure is estimated to fall between 28,7 % en 55,5 % (CNV/Mott Macdonald, 
2008 in Kaag et al., 2009)19.  
 
2. Social Protection  
In the following we will discuss the state of social protection in Senegal, followed by a mapping of the 
existing social protection schemes in the field of old age pensions, occupational accidents and illness and 
health care. For an overview of the available social security statistical data as well as, key legislation and 
the ratification of key ILO conventions, please see annex 2.  
                                                          
19
 For a more detailed description of Senegal´s labour market please see the CNV context studies by Kaag et al. 
(2009 & 2014, forthcoming).  
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2.1. The state of social protection in Senegal 
Senegal not only inherited an export-oriented economic structure from its colonial rulers but also a 
mandatory-contributory social insurance system following the French example, based on the 
assumption of a large salaried working class (Diop, 2003). Social security was developed in parallel with 
the labour legislation after the Second World War and cemented through the adoption of the Overseas 
Labour Code in 1952, after a 24hours general strike of all trade unions in former French West Africa 
(Diop, 2003).  The management structure of social security systems in Senegal came about after 
consultations between the social partners and was characterized by autonomy of management and 
institutional pluralism, implying that several schemes could co-exist, in contrast with Guinea for instance 
where the CNSS has a monopoly over formal social security schemes (Diop, 2003).  
The Senegalese social protection system covers eight out of nine social risks which are part of the ILO´s 
basic social security standards (C102 ILO, 1952), with unemployment being the exception (see table 9).  
Table 12: Social Protection Schemes in Senegal 
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CSS    x x x    
IPM       x   
Mutuelles       x   
Private Insurance 
Companies 
x      x   
Sésame       x   
DAS (targeted)         x 
OVC (targeted)         x 
PAP (universal)         x 
CMU (not yet functional)       x   
RSPC (not yet functional) x      x   
                                                          
20
 For some civil servants the benefits are directly paid out of the state treasury, whilst others are paid through contributions to 
the FNR.  
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Food & basic goods 
subsidies 
        x 
Source: fieldwork report  (Ba, 2014) 
  
According to Thiam (2009), only 7,5% of the Senegalese population has any form of social protection. 
The UN-DESA (2011) mentions that 11,4% of the population is covered by social protection in 2007, 
stipulating the lack of accurate data on the issue. GESS indicates that although only 6% of the population 
is covered – notably the salaried private and public workers – their spouses and children indirectly 
benefit as well, increasing the coverage to approximately 13% (ILO GESS website country profile Senegal 
in Kaag et al., 2014). At present, in 2014, the local data collection done for this study stipulates an 
overall coverage of approximately 20%. Social protection of workers in the formal private sector is 
provided by several institutions, namely the Caisse de Securité Sociale (CSS) for family benefits 
and employment injury compensation and prevention, the Institut de Prévoyance de Retraite du Sénégal 
(IPRES) for old age pensions and the Instituts de Prévoyance Maladie (IPM) for health insurance. In the 
public sector there are two social insurance schemes: the Fond National de Retraite  (FNR), covering old 
age, and a component of the state budget through the Ministry of Finance (UN-DESA 2011), which 
covers family benefits, professional injury benefits, and health costs (Kaag et al., 2014).  
The five schemes mentioned above are all mandatory and contributory and based on the notion of 
salaried employment in which contributions are deducted from wages in addition to contributions from 
employers. In other words, salaried workers pay a part of their salary to the funds in return for benefits. 
The employers’ organizations and the trade unions are represented in the administrative council of the 
IPRES and the CSS (Kaag et al., 2014).  
If we look at the quality of benefits offered by the three formal social protection institutions (CSS, IPRES 
and FNR), inequality exists in terms of the adequacy of benefits. In general, public servants receive 
better services for comparable risks, as the pensions paid by the FNR and the CSS are far greater than 
the minimum wage or salaire minimum interprofessionel garantie (SMIG), whereas pensions paid by the 
basic IPRES scheme is less than the SMIG. “In fact, the difference in the average benefit paid by the FNR 
and CSS, on the one hand, and the IPRES, on the other hand, increased from 66% in 2003 to 83%in 
2006”(Thiam, 2009: 8).  
 
In addition, non-contributory social assistance schemes targeted to the most poor and vulnerable exist. 
For example, universal cash transfers are provided to children from birth up to five years of age as part 
of the poverty alleviation programme (PAP) (Thiam, 2009: 3). The newly established family security 
grant also gives in kind or cash transfers to the most poor and Sésame, which will discussed in more 
detail below, provides benefits for the elderly. The Direction de l’assistance sociale (DAS) furthermore 
provides assistance to the destitute through cash transfers and the OVC scheme exempts the most poor 
from school fee and organizes professional training of orphans and vulnerable children (Kaag et al., 
2014). The CMU, which will be elaborated on below, is also an example of social assistance provided by 
the state. Lastly, generalized subsidies of certain food products and fuel are also categorized as social 
assistance schemes (ILO GESS website country-profile Senegal, in Kaag et al. 2014).  
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Despite these initiatives the coverage however still remains relatively low (approximately 20% according 
to the local data collection). This has spurred the creation and expansion of various voluntary mutual 
insurance schemes or mutuelles, mostly to help meet the financial costs of health-care expenditure for 
workers (Thiam, 2009: 3). In the formal economy, mainly in the public administration, mutual health 
organizations offer different services to their members. In the informal economy and rural sector, 
community-based or socio-professional mutual health organizations play an important role in securing 
affordable health care for its members (Kaag et al., 2014).   
2.2. Recent reforms 
The Senegalese government increased its commitment towards the extension of social protection in 
2005 when it developed the Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale (SNPS). The plan was primarily 
focused on health-care and medical insurance and aimed at increasing coverage to 50% in 2015. The 
Stratégie nationale d’extension de la couverture du risque maladie (SNECRM) supplemented the SNPS in 
2008 but regretfully, in 2014, it is clear that this target will not be reached with  coverage of 20%.  The 
core cause of the failure of both plans was the lack of coordination between the many stakeholders 
(several Ministries, including those of Economy and finance; Labour; Health; Women etc., as well as 
technical agencies and civil society organizations) resulting into scattered and incoherent 
implementation (Kaag et al., 2014). 
 
In 2010, the government gave a new impetus towards the protection of vulnerable groups through 
Sugali Jaboot, or the National Initiative for the Social Protection of Vulnerable Groups. The programme 
aimed to help alleviate poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion amongst the most vulnerable groups 
for which better targeting methods would be developed. Sugali Jaboot was part of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper and the SNPS and included the introduction of core community schemes to 
provide good-quality services; local guidance for vulnerable groups; capacity building for institutional 
actors and partners; better access for vulnerable groups to core infrastructure and social services 
(particularly health and education) and to risk prevention and management schemes. In addition, the 
programme aimed to ensure wider access for vulnerable groups to money transfers and direct financial 
products and lastly, better monitoring and assessments of community-based projects for vulnerable 
groups. The initiative is based on a comprehensive, integrated, decentralized and participatory approach 
and was developed through partnership between the State, local authorities, civil society, civil society 
and technical and financial partners. The project has a budget of 30 billion CFA and will be jointly 
financed by the Senegalese state (10 billion CFA) and the technical and financial partners (20 billion CFA) 
(ISSA country profile Senegal, 2014). During the fieldwork conducted for this case study none of the 
respondents mentioned the system, which could either indicate that it has not been implemented or 
that is very much donor driven and little local stakeholders have been involved.  
 
More recently, the Stratégie nationale de développement économique et social (SNDES 2013-2017) has 
reinforced the priority given to social protection in previous poverty reduction strategy papers and 
builds on the aforementioned policies. The Délégation Générale de Protection Sociale et de Solidarité 
Nationale (DGPSSN) was established as part of the SNDES by the government in May 2012, and was 
responsible for reporting to the president “with the aim of establishing a reference and action 
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framework for more consistency, better integration, and a more visible impact of the interventions” 
(Kaag et al., 2014).  
 
The latest reform regarding social protection is the commitment of the current government to work 
towards a universal health scheme (Couverture Maladie Universelle - CMU), which will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
2.3. Financing social security 
These initiatives need to be financed and require a significant budgetary commitment of the 
government. The 5,34% GDP that is currently spend of social expenditures (including health and 
education) will not be sufficient. If we only take into account expenditure on benefits for the working 
age population the situation is much more grim, with an average spending of 0,15% in 2010. Spending 
on old age pensions was 1,78% GDP in 2010 (see tables 5, 6 and 7). Pal (2005) calculated that a 
comprehensive social protection package encompassing, universal old age and disability pensions, 
health care, child benefits and basic education, could be financed entirely by the state by 2022 if it were 
to spend one third of its GDP on social protection (Pal, 2005: 25). Such as in the case of Guinea, we 
should however be weary of these estimations. Social spending is highly influenced by government´s 
priorities and the political economy of the country in general. The study does however indicate that 
effective social protection schemes for developing countries are not per definition financially impossible.   
 
3. Focal themes 
3.1. Old age pensions 
The elderly account for 7 per cent of the Senegalese population or about 750 000 individuals. According 
to the ILO Country Programme for the Promotion of Decent Work (2012), basing itself on a study from 
2008, only 16,6% of the elderly of 65 years or older receive a pension.  Free basic health care for the 
elderly has however been provided from 2006 onwards, through the so-called Plan Sésame, which is 
currently in the process of being updated (Kaag et al., 2014).  
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There are three national pension schemes in Senegal. The Fonds National de Retraite (FNR) was 
established by law no° 61-35 of 15 June 1961, amended in 1964 and 1981 and 2002.  The FNR is 
managed by the state, more specifically the Minister of Economy and Finance and is a social insurance 
system that provides old age pensions, and disability benefits, survival benefits as well as child benefits 
for civil servants and military and para-military state officials. It is financed by employee contributions 
and the national budget.  
 
The institut de prévoyance retraite du Sénégal (IPRES), based on law n° 75-50 of 3 April 1975  manages 
both other schemes, the Régime Général de Retraite (RGR)  and Régime Complémentaire au profit des 
Cadres (RCC). IPRES falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, and is managed by a joint commission of employers’ and workers’ organisations. The 
Régime Général de Retraite (RGR) is a mandatory pension scheme for all private sector workers and the 
staff of public enterprises. The Régime Complémentaire au profit des Cadres (RCC) is a complementary 
scheme for senior executives. Based on 2012 data in total IPRES counts 16 814 affiliated enterprises, 204 
807 affiliated workers, 68 284 retired people and 43 623 widows.    
 
The level of pensions is calculated differently under FNR and IPRES. Pensions which are granted through 
FNR are based on the last earned salary. Whilst in the case of IPRES, a system of points is used. More 
specifically an employee must have saved 400 points, based on the years of remuneration, in order to 
be able to receive a minimum pension, however exemptions exists for casual workers (day-workers and 
seasonal workers) and domestic workers who have to present proof of 5 years of employment in order 
to receive a pension without having to have paid contributions. In practice most day-workers and 
seasonal workers can hardly present such proof as they generally do not receive a contract.  
 
Sésame 
 
All Senegalese elderly, of 65 years or older have access to free basic health care from 2006 
onwards through the so-called Plan Sésame. The scheme provided basic health care for all 
elderly with a legitimate Senegalese passport and covers all costs related to medical care in a 
public hospital. Sésame was financed by the state and IPRES but has ceased to function due to 
the debt of the government to the hospitals. Before Sésame the number of older people 
supported by IPRES and FNR was approximately 30% of the workforce. The remaining 70% did 
not receive any coverage before the programme (UN-DESA, 2011). A grant of 700 million CFA 
(approx. 1.065.617 EUR) was raised from the internal budget to finance this system of solidarity 
(Diagne et al., 2011).  
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The government has recently announced that they will reform the IPRES scheme and will increase the 
pensions, so that they will reach the SMIG and will intensify their extension-efforts specifically towards 
liberal professions and informal workers. Furthermore, steps have been taken towards the creation of a 
universal pension scheme following the recommendations made during the 202 International Labour 
Conference (ILC) with regards to the social protection floor. The government intends to install a 
minimum old age pension for all people of tertiary age who have not or cannot contribute to IPRES.  
 
Another initiative is the Régime Simplifié pour le Petit Contribuable (RSPC), which is still in the 
preparation phase and supported by ILO. The target beneficiaries of RSPC are non-salaried workers who 
are not covered by the IPRES, CNSS and the IPMs. The ILO however envisages a system in which the 
universal minimum pensions co-exist next to the RSPC.  Private pension schemes exist but only a very 
small portion of the population makes use of them. Informal pension schemes are non-existent in 
Senegal according to the field data gathered for this study.   
 
3.2. Occupational accidents and illness 
Only 5,5% of the workers are covered by an insurance for work injuries and profession-related illnesses 
(ILO Country Programme for the Promotion of Decent Work, 2012). The CNSS is responsible for the 
organisation of occupational accidents and illness benefits, following the law n° 73-37 of 31 July 1973 
and n° 97-05 of 10 March 1997. The scheme is financed by employers contributions, which depending 
on the risks involved in the job, can vary from 1, 3 or 5% of the salary, with a maximum of 63 000 CFA 
(aprox. 96 EUR). Employers are mandated to pay the contribution according to the Senegalese law. 
 In theory informal workers may access the scheme but in practice this has proven to be difficult. 
Especially the heterogeneity of the sector, with regards to type of employment as well as level of risks 
makes it hard for the CNSS to define the percentage of contributions that need to be paid. Due to the 
uncertainty of their employment it is also difficult for informal workers to pay the dues.  
In the past the government has tried to increase the coverage of the occupational accidents schemes to 
informal workers. The most often cited example is that of the extension towards craftsmen in 1996 (see 
Box). All government efforts are however geared towards extending the CNSS to the informal economy. 
Informal schemes which provide benefits for accidents and illness at work through communal or 
occupational schemes are not incorporated in the government’s extension plans regarding to 
occupational accidents and illness.  
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3.3. Health Care 
Health care is enshrined in the Senegalese constitution. Article 7 states that the state must protect and 
respect all human beings and declares amongst other rights that all individuals have the right to physical 
integrity. Article 25 declares that it is a state prerogative to ensure sanitary and humane working 
conditions and declares that workers have the right to determine their working conditions and to 
benefit from social security. These constitutional declarations have also been translated into numerous 
laws and regulations regarding the provision of health care (see table for an overview of all laws related 
to social protection). Regardless of this elaborate legislative and juridical structure less than 20% of the 
Senegalese population has health insurance.   
Private sector employees can rely on the Instituts de Prévoyance Maladie (IPM) for health insurance. 
The IPM was created in 1975 and is organized at enterprise level. All enterprises with at least 300 
employees must create an IPM, if the enterprise has less than 300 permanent staff they must link-up 
with an existing IPM of another enterprise. Both employers and employees pay contributions to the 
equivalent of 4-15% of a month’s salary with a maximum of 250.000 FCFA. The IPM initially only covered 
the permanent workers and their family but since 2012, non-permanent workers can also be covered by 
IPM.  In 2012, 120 000 salaried workers were covered by the IPM out of 400.000.  
In article 2 of the Labour Code of 1997 workers are defined as “all persons that are engaged in a 
professional activity, receive a remuneration and under the management of another person, physically 
or mentality, public or private”. This implies that most informal workers, who are own-account workers, 
do not fall under the category of workers according to the law, similar to the situation in Guinea. This 
also implies that the government is not forced by law to ensure social protection to these groups of 
workers. Therefore informal workers have started their own health care systems, the mutuelles – 
community or occupational based health schemes based on voluntary contributions from members. 
According to the 2013 AEO  there were 217 community schemes and 20 mutuelles in Senegal providing 
coverage to around 609 000 people in 2011. “Nevertheless, the coverage rate remains low, targeting is 
not done correctly, resources are insufficient and action taken lacks coordination (AEO Senegal, 2013: 
10). An often cited example is the health care system of the transport sector, “Transvie” (see box).  
Extending social security to craftsmen 
The project aimed at provided insurance against accidents and illness for 450.000 craftsmen 
connected to 78.000 crafts enterprises, as well as 160.000 apprentices in 129 skill centres. The 
pilot, implemented in eight villages in 1996, however failed due to distrust amongst the 
craftsmen, who saw the initiative as a hidden strategy of the government to formalize the 
sector and impose taxes.   
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The couverture maladie universelle (CMU) was launched in 2013 by the government following the social 
protection floor initiative of the ILO. The annual fee for adherence is 7000 CFA (appr. 10,70 euros) per 
person, 50% of which is subsidized by the State and paid in total for the 20% most poor households 
(Jeune Afrique, 2013 in Kaag et al., 2014). The aim of the CMU is to increase health care coverage to 75% 
in 2017. To this end the government will improve and increase the number of community health 
schemes (mutuelles de santé communautaires), which should go from the actual existing 250 to 500. An 
annual fee of 7000 CFA (appr. 10,70 euros) per person is expected, 50% of which is subsidized by the 
State and paid in total for the 20% most poor households (Jeune Afrique, 2013 in Kaag et al., 2014). The 
CMU is managed by multiple Ministries: The Ministry of Health and Social Action, The Ministry of Public 
Administration, Work, Social Dialogue and Professional Organisations and The Ministry of Economy and 
Finance. This multitude of actors raises questions about the coherent implementation of the initiative as 
in the past the cooperation between several ministries have proven to be difficult (see e.g. SNPS). 
 
The implementation of the CMU is based on three pillars:  
 Mandatory health insurance through de IPMs for workers in the private sector and civil servants 
 Voluntary health insurance through the mutuelles and private health insurance companies.   
  Medical assistance through free health care and subsidies for vulnerable groups.   
Informal workers will fall under the second and third tier. The ambitious CMU will be financed by the 
Caisse Autonome de Protection Sociale Universelle (Capsu), which still needs to be created, but its 
financial sustainability is not yet assured. In addition, the programme requires institutional capacity 
building, and the lack of health staff might pose additional problems (Kaag et al., 2014).    
 
Since October 2013, all children between 0 and 5 years have free access to basic health, i.e. the costs for 
consultation, vaccination and hospitalization of these children is free in the health posts and health 
Transvie 
Tranvie is the occupational health care system set-up by workers in the transport sector in 
Senegal. According to the general director Transvie has 3000 members, who can benefit from 
reductions up to 90% for hospital expenses, 70% in health care centres and 30% in private 
pharmacies. In return, members are expected to pay monthly contributions of 7200 CFA (or 11 
EUR). The mutuelle is so effective that is has expanded to include railway officials as well as 
workers in the marine transport sectors.     
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centres, which are the basic health infrastructure in the country, as well as consultations at First Aid 
Posts in the hospitals (Kaag et al., 2014). The elderly have access to free basic health care from 2006 
onwards through the so-called Plan Sésame (see box). 
Trade unions are actively engaged in providing health services for informal workers in cooperation with 
private health care institutions. UNACOIS for instance cooperating with the private health care 
institution Eksina. This mutuelle is especially beneficial for informal workers as the medical officers go to 
the work places of the informal workers, who often have difficulties with travelling to receive medical 
care. Market women for instance cannot leave their stall unattended. Other unions work together with 
medical cabinets such as the UDTS and the Alioun Sow cabinet.  
Private health insurance companies have recently also started a programme specifically targeting larger 
informal businesses, which have more than 50 employees, through the provision of micro-insurances for 
socio professional groups. The contributions range between 5.000 (approx. 7,6 EUR) and 31.000 CFA 
(approx.. 47 EUR) per year per person.  
The RSPC, which was already mentioned above will also have a health care branch specifically for 
informal workers. Through the RSPC the government, following the recommendations of the ILO, wishes 
to formalize the informal sector. At present it is debatable whether the health insurance under RSPC 
should be voluntary or mandatory but the ILO’s feasibility study indicates that a voluntary system would 
be more opportune.  
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
Social protection in Senegal is in a transition phase wherein the extension of services is a key aspect. At 
present many social protection schemes are under construction and the future will have to tell whether 
the planned reforms will foster the expected results. The main obstacles are establishing coherence 
between the various involved ministries and actors as well as the financial sustainability of the ambitious 
CMU and RSPC.   
The trade unions have important roles to play due to their position in the boards of IPRES and CNSS. If 
RSPC is successfully implemented, Muhammed Ba, who conducted the field work for the Senegalese 
case, believes it could be beneficial for informal workers and their formalization. He however raises the 
concern that the government and the ILO, who seems to be the driving force behind the initiative, 
should be sure to engage informal workers in the planning and implementation of RSPC, not to run 
against the same difficulties as the 1996 reform and extension towards artisanal craftsmen. The CMU 
could provide a solution for the most vulnerable groups but financing this ambitious scheme and 
securing quality services could be problematic. Lastly, the UDTS indicated that the main obstacle for 
extension to informal workers is the fact that their revenues are low and the administrative processes of 
applying for social security are often complicated and cumbersome, discouraging informal workers from 
registering.  
In comparison to Guinea the political and socio-economic situation in Senegal is more favourable for 
union action towards the extension of social protection. In sum, there is more to start from, both in 
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relation to the existing national social security schemes, as in light of the “institutionalized” informal 
regimes. Building on these observations we recommend taken into the account the following issues.  
 First things first. The primary step that could be taken by Senegalese unions is lobbying the 
government to change the definition of “labour” in the labour code, which forms the basis of 
the eligibility criteria of the statutory social insurance schemes. Labour is limited to an 
employer-employee relationship, which for majority of workers in the informal economy (own-
account workers) does not hold true.   
 Increasing coherence. As mentioned above, there is more to start from in Senegal but this also 
implies that the multitude of programmes, strategies and projects need to be streamlined. 
Trade unions could play a watchdog role towards the effective functioning of the Délégation 
Générale de Protection Sociale et de Solidarité Nationale which has been created by the 
government in 2012 to this effect. Placing the benefits of a system’s approach, which takes into 
account matters of redistribution as well (see Robalino et al., 2012), on the political agenda 
might allow the development of a social protection framework that addresses Senegal’s 
inequalities.     
 Delineating tasks and responsibilities. Unions could advocate installing a clear division of labour 
between all relevant actors in the social protection landscape in Senegal. Specifically the 
multitude of ministries which are involved requires well-defined responsibilities in order to 
increase coherence and complementarity.  
 Picking your battles. Although Senegal is performing better economically, it remains important 
to prioritize in social expenditure. Developing a coherent framework is the first step but 
developing an incremental approach is the next. Rome was not built in a day. Trade Unions 
could play a role in defining the priorities based on the needs and perceptions of their 
constituencies21.  
 Redistributing.  The policy papers and academic articles and reports do not link the social 
protection agenda with the increased inequality in many African countries. Income inequality 
has not changed over the last decennia in Senegal. Although inequality is lower compared to 
other countries in the region “the richest two deciles of the population consume about half the 
goods and services in the country, roughly the same amount as the seven bottom deciles of the 
population, suggesting a substantial level of income disparity and inequality” (Kireyev, 2013:9).  
Trade unions, therefore could lobby to put redistribution on the political agenda: the revenues 
gained from key industries could serve as a financial base for social expenditures (health, 
education, …) 
 Putting your action where your mouth is. Unions have an important role to play in ensuring that 
the CMU will materialize. By monitoring the evolution of the implementation of the CMU, they 
could act pro-actively when obstacles arise, pressuring the government to stick to its made 
commitments.   
                                                          
21 Based on our own assessment we recommend prioritising health care.    
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 Investing in quality. In addition, building on Criel et al.’s (2002) study and likewise to the 
recommendation for Guinea, unions could equally stress the importance of the quality of health 
care and other social protection benefits for that matter. Increasing coverage to insurance 
schemes is namely related to the quality of the benefits that one receives in return for his/her 
contribution. Once the CMU is officially started unions could monitor its progress and the 
support customer satisfaction inquiries. They could also play an important role in ensuring that 
the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society are not left out.  
 Taking initiative. Alternatively, trade unions could increase their efforts in establishing 
cooperation with mutuelles or medical cabinets. Specifically with regards to the extension to 
informal workers creating work-place health care points or supporting “flying doctor” which 
move to the market-place or other informal workers’ hubs to provide medical care, are 
initiatives that could be scaled-up.   In sectors were the informal workers are not yet well 
organized, unions could increase their efforts in organizing informal workers.  
 Joining Forces. The multi-actor analyses of Senegal (see annex 1) identifies a variety of 
international partners but, besides the mutuelles de santé, no other local actors with whom 
could be cooperated in the field of social protection. This stipulates the donor-driven social 
protection agenda. The international partners are UNICEF, ILO, UNDP, World Food Programme 
(WFP), USAID and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) as mentioned in the introduction 
this amalgam of actors creates problems with regards to coherence and harmonization. The 
cooperation with mutuelles de santé could be scaled-up as the UDTS is already experienced in 
working with them. 
The role of CNV Internationaal in these endeavours could take to form of: organiszng exchange 
events between unions and mutuelles which have adopted “informal-workers-friendly” (e.g. Eksina);   
supporting the improvement of lobbying and advocacy skills; and supporting a local awareness 
raising campaign specifically if the CMU is implemented.  
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CHAPTER 3: Niger 
1. Setting the scene 
1.1. Socio-political and economic context 
The following is primarily based on the CNV context study, “Trade Union Movement in Niger: The Future 
Depends on the Present”, by Keja and Zanou (2012). For a more detailed overview of the socio-political 
and economic context we kindly refer to this report.   
The history of Niger since independence can be divided into two periods: between 1960 and 1990 Niger 
was ruled by a single party regime for 14 years followed by a military regime for 16 years. From 1990 
onwards the country became a multi-party democracy in which several political parties compete for 
power (Keja  & Zanou, 2012). Hamana Diori became the first president of independent Niger in 1960 and 
was leader of the first Nigerien political party, the Parti Progressive Nigérien (PPN).  A single-party 
regime wherein political opposition, notably the Sawaba and Tuareg movements, were oppressed was 
installed after his inauguration.  Corruption in the food aid sparked mass protests and in 1974 Diori was 
overthrown by a bloody coup d´état led by Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountché (Keja & Zanou., 2012). 
Under Kountché a military regime was installed and the general assembly was suspended.  Although 
economic growth picked up, through the exploitation of uranium mines in the North, popular support 
for the regime was negligible. In 1991 a multi-party democracy was installed after a national peace 
conference and a transition government paved the way to the first general election in 1993. Up until 
2011 the country was characterized by political instability caused by three coup d’états in 1996, 1999 
and 2010, respectively.  
The elections of In January 2011 were won by the Parti Nigerien pour la Democratie et le Socialisme 
(PNDS) and Mamadou Issoufou was inaugurated as president in April 2011 (Keja & Zanou, 2012). In the 
last couple of years the economic situation in Niger has improved but the regional situation, more 
specifically the war in Mali, the Boko-Haram in Nigeria as well as the volatile situation in Libya, threatens 
to disrupt the internal stability. The crises along the Nigerien borders have significantly augmented 
government military spending in 2012 and 2013 to the detriment of capital investments and social 
spending.  The ruling MNR (Mouvement pour la renaissance du Niger) coalition provides relative political 
stability but there are sustainability of the coalition if questioned due to the increased critics of the 
second strongest party towards the government (Ndoye & Ndiaye, 2014). 
The trade union movement in Niger is characterized by high coverage (both in the formal and informal 
sector), high fragmentation and little political power. In addition throughout the country’s history and 
long periods of dictatorships, trade unions have been constantly politicized and partisan. The internal 
democracy within unions and external struggles between unions also pose significant challenges for 
their effectiveness. Nevertheless, among a poorly developed civil society unions are still important 
organized interest groups (Keja & Zanou, 2012) 
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1.2. Economic Analysis: High growth rates and little social returns 
Niger is amongst the poorest countries in world. 61% of the population lives on less than 1 dollar a day 
and the median hourly wage in 2012 was 2887 FCFA (0,3 EUR) (Keja & Zanou, 2012). Niger ranked the 
lowest country in the HDI of 2012, with a HDI of 0.304. Remarkably, Niger’s GDP grew with 11,1% in real 
terms in the same year, one of the highest levels recorded in Africa. This spectacular growth was 
boosted by a good harvest and an exceptionally dynamic secondary sector, which grew by almost 38% 
driven by the extractive industries. Yet, the growth rate was a one shot wonder, as the GDP growth fell 
to 3,6% in 2013 and is expected to increased slightly to 6% in 2014. Reducing the national debt, tackling 
the significant current account balance deficit (-15,2 in 2013) and most importantly investing the 
increased national income in a sustainable, social and productive way remain huge challenges. In 2010 
only 3,29% of the state’s budget was devoted to social spending (including health and education), which 
is below the target set by the Social Protection Framework of the African Union.  
 
Table 13: Macro-economic indicators Niger 
  2012 2013(e) 2014(p) 2015(p) 
Real GDP growth 11.1 3.6 6 6.2 
Real GDP per capita growth 7.3 -0.3 2.1 2.3 
CPI inflation 0.5 1.9 2.5 1.3 
Budget balance % GDP -1.1 0.1 -1.8 -1.7 
Current account balance % GDP -15.1 -15.2 -15.3 -15 
Source: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' Ndoye  & Ndiaye  (2014) calculations. 
Due to huge investments in oil and mining sectors the country’s development is encouraging but there 
are severe management deficits in the natural resource sector (Ndoye & Ndiaye, 2014). In order to 
protect the Nigerien population from climate shocks, with which it is frequently faced, the country 
would benefit if the revenues from the extractive industries would be used to increase social spending 
and support social protection (Ndoye & Ndiaye, 2014). The African Economic Outlook (2013) states that 
economic diversification as well as the development of agri-businesses is necessary to generate inclusive 
growth.  
Labour statistics are notoriously unreliable in Niger but the following figures were presented in the 
study of Keja and Zanou (2012): in 2010 the active population was estimated to be 7 million on a total of 
about 15 million people. The unemployment rate is 16%, 25% for women and 12% for men. Youth 
unemployment is particularly high at an estimated 15%. Under-employment is stated to be between 
30% and 35%. The majority of the people work in the agricultural sector (between 80 and 85%), 
followed by commerce, restaurants and hotels in the tertiary sector (8,5%). Charwick in Roos & Zanou 
(2012) estimated that 50,000 workers are employed in the formal sector amongst which 44,000 are 
government employees (Keja & Zanou, 2012). 
The informal economy is dominant in Niger and more than 80% of the labour force gains his or her 
income through informal work. The majority of these people work in the agro-pastoral sector, petty-
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trade and commerce. As in other countries informal work is characterized by precarious working 
conditions and instable revenues (Keja & Zanou, 2012). 
 
2. Social protection 
In the following we will discuss the state of social protection in Niger, followed by a mapping of the 
existing social protection schemes in the field of old age pensions, occupational accidents and illness and 
health care. For an overview of the available social security statistical data as well as, key legislation and 
the ratification of key ILO conventions, please see annex 2.  
 
2.1. The state of Social Protection in Niger 
Social protection is enshrined in the Nigerien constitution of 25 November 2010 and was also an 
important part of the PRSP (2008-2012). In extension there are numerous sector and multi-sector 
policies and strategies which relate to the issues of social welfare. There is however no coherent 
strategy and therefore the multiplicity of strategies and projects are not able to create positive 
synergies.  According to Issa Younoussi, the local researcher who conducted the fieldwork for the 
Nigerien case, formal social protection systems only exist on paper for formal workers and therefore are 
unable to address the poverty and inequalities in the country. In what follows we will discuss the state 
of social protection in Niger zooming in on the three focal themes: old age pensions, protection against 
occupational accidents and illness and health care. 
According to Robalino et al. (2012) Niger has a fragmented, poorly designed social protection system 
which has low coverage. Formal social protection in Niger has several dimensions which can be 
categorized in two types of regimes.  
On the one hand there are non-contributory schemes in the form of cash or in kind transfers to 
vulnerable groups. These schemes can be labeled as social assistance and account for 0,68% of GDP. 
77% of the budget for social assistance comes from donors such as the European Union, the World Food 
Programme, USAID and international NGOs, 12% is financed from the HIPC programme and 11% is 
contributed by the Nigerien government (World Bank, 2010). Most attention and financial commitment 
has gone to the provision of emergency assistance, particularly in times of food crises. These social 
assistance programs offer cash transfers, school meals and other in-kind support through the schools, 
nutritional or health centres (Robalino et al., 2012). Although these programmes offer relief in times of 
crises (in 2001, 2005, 2008, and 2010, respectively) they do not address the chronic food insecurity. In 
response to this the World Bank initiated a Safety Net programme in 2010 (see box).  
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On the other hand there are contributory regimes, which are based on contributions of the beneficiaries 
and managed by the CNSS.  Social security in Niger covers all basic life-cycle risks mentioned in the ILO 
C102 convention on social security (see table 11). The main organizing body is the Caisse National de la 
Securite Sociale (CNSS) which provides old age, survivor and disability pensions, as well as benefits for 
work related accidents and illness, sick leave, child care, maternity leave and health-care. Although the 
constitution of 2010 specifically states that social protection should be provided to all workers in reality 
the CNSS does not reach out to workers in informal employment. The field data collected for this case 
study suggests that the reason for the low coverage amongst informal workers is their mistrust in state 
systems. They believe the CNSS to be a hidden strategy of the government to enforce taxes on them, for 
which they will get little in return. At the present the labour code to boot does not make reference to 
informal workers making it difficult for trade unions and other activists to pressure the government to 
extend social protection to informal workers. The CNT added that the low organization rate amongst 
informal workers also influence the low social security coverage. If more informal workers were to be 
organized in cooperatives for example, the cooperatives could pay the employer contributions to the 
social security schemes. In addition the cumbersome administrative procedures and requirements 
discourage many informal workers from registering to the CNSS.  
World Bank Safety Net Project 
The development objective of the project is to establish and support an effective safety net 
system which will increase access of poor and food insecure people to cash transfers and cash-
for-work programs. The project has three components: (i) Safety Net System, (ii) Cash Transfers, 
(iii) Cash for Work.   
The first will focus on the investment of management information systems in order to improve 
targeting as well as monitoring and evaluating the progress made. The second component aims 
to reach 80.000 poor households in four years’ time through monthly cash-transfers of 10 000 
FCFA per household. Beneficiaries receive a card with their details and the amount they have 
received (Robalina et al., (2012) suggest to expand the social assistance administration building 
on this first identification). The third component will provide an income for 60 days for 
approximately 15.000 people annually, during the lean season.  
This programme will specifically target those rural communities experiencing an unusually higher 
than average level of food insecurity (World Bank, 2010). The last component raises some 
questions from a labour perspective as it institutionalizes temporal work. The beneficiaries will 
benefit for a period of 60 days a year but their employment status is not structurally addressed. 
Research will have to show whether beneficiaries benefit in the long term from such 
programmes. 
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As is the case in Senegal the Fonds National de Retraite (FNR), which has been renamed Caisse de 
Retraite du Niger (CARENI) provides old age pensions for government officials but also family allowances. 
The CARENIis financed by the state treasury. The CNSS and CARENI only cover a tiny portion of the 
labour force, 3%, at a cost of 0,7% of GDP.  
Due to the low coverage and similar to the situation in most West-African countries, the majority of 
Nigeriens, in particular those working informally, resort to community-based solidarity mechanisms 
when confronted with life-cycle shocks, such as the death of a spouse, old age or changes in the family 
composition. These informal social protection mechanisms are however relatively less institutionalized, 
in comparison with Senegal, for instance. Finally, private insurance companies are also present in the 
country but only the small elite can afford to rely on their services. The table below indicates that most 
of the benefits are provided by the CNSS. In what follows we will take a closer look at three branches of 
interest for this study.  
Table 14: Social Protection Schemes in Niger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: fieldwork report (Younoussi, 2014) 
 
2.2. Recent Reforms 
The Nigerien government recognized the need for a comprehensive social protection strategy and 
embarked on a long policy-making process in 2008, with a reflection day between several stakeholders, 
such as relevant ministries, NGOs, the trade unions and employers’ organizations.  The reflection day 
was followed by a field visit to Ghana and workshops at regional level. This participatory approach 
indicates the governments’ commitment to developing a locally embedded social protection strategy.  A 
committee was installed in 2009 under the management of the Ministry of Population and Social 
Reforms, renamed the Ministry of Population, the Promotion of Women and Protection of Children, in 
2010. In 2011 a first draft was written, which was presented at regional levels during workshops in order 
to enrich the document. After these local consultation rounds the ILO and other financial and technical 
partners made some revisions, where after the strategy was presented to parliament in 2011. Although 
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the law on social protection was adopted in August 2011 it has yet to be translated in effective policies 
and programmes. According to Robalino et al. (2012) this lag could also be an opportunity because it 
creates  room for the Nigerien government to develop a genuine systems-approach to social protection, 
wherein “interconnected programs achieve interrelated functions” (Robalino et al., 2012:1). They argue 
that “social protection programs could perform better if interactions between them were exploited” 
(Robalino et al., 2012:2).   
3. Focal Themes 
3.1. Old Age Pensions 
Several laws regulate statutory pension schemes in Niger (see table Key Social Protection Indicators). All 
laws however date from 1967 and 1968 and have not been revised since. The legal texts furthermore do 
not include informal workers. 0,6% of the state budget is spend on old age pensions in 2006. The 
implementation of the old age pensions for formal private sector workers and staff of government 
institutions (such as nurses and teachers) is organized by the CNSS. The CARENI is in charge of old age 
pensions for civil servants. Both schemes are based on contributions made by the employers and the 
employees. In the case of CARENI the employer dues are directly financed by the state treasury. 
Although trade unions are part of the governing board of the CNSS and participate in social dialogue 
they have not been able to make the existing systems more inclusive.  
Apart from these social security pension schemes, several social assistance programs and safety nets 
which target the most vulnerable groups in society and give in-kind or cash benefits have been 
implemented, such as the Safety Net Programme financed by the World Bank in 2010, mentioned 
above. These safety nets generally provide assistance in times of food crises caused by natural disasters, 
such as droughts. Although the elderly can receive assistance they are not specifically targeted by the 
existing social assistance schemes. Robalino et al. (2012) argue that these schemes could form the 
foundation for a more comprehensive social protection system. The authors stipulate that the cash 
transfer programmes can be used to set-up basic systems for identification, targeting, record keeping, 
and benefits payment. Building on this platform other programs – such as social insurance, active labour 
market programmes and voluntary savings arrangements – could be gradually connected. According to 
Robalino et al. (2012) the Nigerien government should primarily focus on the rationalization of  
assistance programs and improvement of targeting mechanisms, which will lead to investments in basic 
administrative infrastructure that could be used for the development of more effective social insurance 
schemes in the future (Robalino et al., 2012: 23-24).  
Next to the statutory schemes many community-based schemes exist as well. These schemes are based 
on traditional solidarity mechanisms rooted in family, clan or occupational networks. Members give 
voluntary contributions to the schemes and can benefit from them when in need for instance in the case 
of marriage, funerals or baptisms. Community-based regimes which are specifically designed for the 
provision of old age pensions do not exist but community based regimes could of course be used if an 
elderly person is  in need of social assistance. The interviews conducted by Issa Younoussi, did not 
provide examples of the community-based solidarity mechanisms that have the potential to be scaled-
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up. As aforementioned this is partly due to the weaker institutionalization of such solidarity mechanism 
in Niger. 
3.2. Occupational accidents and illness   
There is a legislative framework for insurance against occupational accidents and illness in Niger (see 
table Key Social Protection Indicators). The CNSS is the governing body and provides benefits in the case 
of occupational accidents and illness to its members in return for contributions (due to the poor 
administrative and records keeping capacity and fragmentation between the different branches of the 
CNSS statistical data on contribution, coverage etc. is not available). As mentioned above the CNSS 
however does not include informal workers amongst its beneficiaries. As is the case for old age 
pensions, informal workers can in theory resort to traditional safety nets based on family of kin ties 
when in need of financial help due to work related injuries. Specific informal schemes which provide 
protection against these types of risks do however not exist in Niger.  
Social assistance schemes moreover do not provide protection against loss of income or compensation 
for work-related accidents or illness. Notwithstanding it is worth mentioning that international pressure 
has intensified for incorporating and ensuring workers’ rights in all World Bank projects, in particular 
their cash-for-work projects, such as the one mentioned above22. The Global Union Federations (GUFs) 
have been successful in their lobbying strategies in some cases (e.g. Building and Woodworkers 
International’s lobby resulted in the adoption of social security provisions for contract workers in World 
Bank construction project in Iraq)23.  If the safety net projects of the World Bank and other donors are to 
contribute to a comprehensive social protection strategy in the future, basic social security standards 
(C102, ILO 1952) must be provided and ensured. The cash-for-work programmes miss an opportunity to 
enhance workers’ income security if benefits for occupational accidents and illness are not granted to 
the beneficiaries of these social assistance schemes.  
Trade unions are actively raising awareness amongst informal workers to subscribe to the CNSS so that 
they can be able to access the benefits but informal workers are reluctant to join as they perceive it to 
be an indirect way of imposing taxes on them for which they will, in their eyes, receive little in return. 
The low levels of organization amongst informal workers in Niger also make it difficult to access 
protection for risk, in particular occupational accidents and illness. This, on the one hand, leads to little 
leverage over policy-making processes dealing with social protection and, on the other,  limits the 
potential of developing informal insurance schemes. The example of Transvie in Senegal, for instance, 
implicates that a level of organization amongst informal workers, is one of the factors which enable the 
creation of mutuelles.  
                                                          
22
 The ITUC for instance issues an official statement which urged the IMF and World Bank to protect workers’ rights 
in all their development interventions.    
23
 For more information on this care see http://www.equaltimes.org/behind-the-world-banks-projects-in-
iraq#.U2yhSIF_t2g 
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3.3. Health care 
Health care provisions in Niger can be divided into three groups: statutory health care through the CNSS, 
social assistance in the form of waivers for the most vulnerable groups and children under 5 and the 
mutuelles de Santé.  
The new 2010 constitution includes legislation concerning the rights to health and the labour code of 
1996 also obliges employers to protect the health and life of their workers and control health hazards 
and risk as well as allow medical consultation (L’ordonnance n° 96-039 du 29 juin 1996). The Plan de 
Développement Sanitaire (PDS 2011-2015), provides another institutional framework for health care in 
Niger. The PDS has the following strategies: 
 Increase the coverage of health care 
 Increase the quality of reproductive health services 
 Improve human resources and competences of health providers 
 Ensure permanent availability of medicines, vaccines, and medical equip[met 
 Decrease prevalence of diseases by an integrated monitoring system 
 Improve the governance and leadership of the Ministry of Public Health 
 Promote health related research  
Granting all this, it is regrettable that the 95 page document not once mentions informal workers. The 
document starts with a list of international guidelines and recommendations such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and the PRSP to which it is bound, but has neglected the labour perspective of 
health care (PDS, 2011-2015).  In what follows we will discuss the existing health care systems and the 
necessity of developing a strategy that explicitly targets informal workers.  
Statutory health care is managed by the CNSS and is accessible for private and public sector workers. In 
similar vein to the pensions scheme, during the fieldwork Issa Younoussi was not able to obtain data on 
the coverage, contributions etc. due to the inefficient functioning of the CNSS. There is no central 
statistical service which keeps records of CNSS schemes, beneficiaries, contributions etc., and the desks 
of the various branches of the CNSS often did not have up to date data either.  The research did indicate 
that many formal workers have additional health insurance through mutuelles, which are often formed 
on occupational lines. In contrast with other countries, informal workers do not have access to these 
mutual insurance schemes, as they require registration under the labour code, which for most informal 
workers is problematic.  
In 2008 the ILO supported the creation of a specific health insurance scheme for civil servants and 
granted 1 million FCFA to the Nigerien government for the development of a Cellule d’Appui au 
Développement des Mutuelles de Santé (CADEMS). There was conflict amongst several ministries over 
the authority of CADEMS, which according to Younoussi is due to “political tensions”. Finally, the 
directorate fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Affairs and since 2011 the Ministry of 
Public Affairs and the Ministry of Public Health jointly manage the CADEMS. The health care scheme for 
civil servants is not functional up to this day.   
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Although unions have been trying to convince informal workers to subscribe to the labour code, in order 
to receive health care through the CNSS or mutuelles, their efforts up till now have been in vain. For the 
most vulnerable groups the state has installed a social assistance scheme in which free health care is 
offered for certain diseases. Informal workers might be selected but the scheme does not specifically 
target them.  Informal workers are reached by universal social assistance schemes related to health, 
which were created in 2005 such as, free medical care for children up until 5 years of age, pregnant 
women and free care for caesarians, family planning and gynecological cancers. These initiatives are to a 
large extent financed by the World Bank and the IMF. Data on the coverage, effectiveness and quality of 
these projects is not available. In conclusion the majority of informal workers “doivent se débrouiller” 
(have to fend for themselves) according to Younoussi, by relying on family- or kin-ties in case of health 
related costs. 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
Compared to the previous cases, Guinea and Senegal, Niger has a much less developed social protection 
system. Due to the high poverty incidence and in some regions extreme vulnerability to food and 
environment crises, social protection in Niger primarily takes the form of emergency relief or ad hoc 
social assistance for targeted groups. Against this backdrop the World Bank’s Safety Nets Project aims at 
reducing chronic food vulnerability but fails to address important vulnerabilities related to labour. The 
contributory social security scheme is not adjusted to the Nigerien labour market and in reality most 
informal workers resort to traditional safety nets, such as family and kin ties when confronted with loss 
of income. The economic growth the country has witnessed in 2011 is however a window of opportunity 
for taking a new approach towards social protection. The economic growth, albeit centralized in the 
mining industry, has increases the government’s budgets and this could be used to finance social 
services and social protection schemes. This could decrease the dependency on international donors 
and allow for a more country-owned approach, instead of designing schemes for the sake of attracting 
donor funds. Building on these insights we would like to recommend the following focus areas and 
strategies.   
 First things first. The primary step that could be taken by Nigerien unions is lobbying the 
government to include informal workers in the labour code as well as key policy documents 
related to social protection such as the Plan de Développement Sanitaire (PDS 2011-2015). The 
silence of informal workers is a negation of the reality of the Nigerien labour market. The 
deadlock in the implementation of the Social Protection bill, voted in 2011, could be an 
opportunity for trade unions to re-open the discussions, specifically stressing the importance of 
the incorporation of informal workers in the laws and regulations on social protection as well as 
the development and implementation of social protection programmes.  
 Picking your battles. Niger ranked the lowest in the HDI in 2012 and has a poverty incidence of 
59,5%24 (World Bank, 2014) making it extremely important for the government to prioritize in 
social expenditure. This, to a certain extent goes against the systems approach which has been 
advocated to be a realistic path for Niger by Robalino et al. (2012), but might be preferable in 
                                                          
24
 http://data.worldbank.org/country/niger 
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the context of Niger, with particularly weak state institutions and services. Trade Unions could 
play a role in defining the priorities based on the needs and perceptions of their 
constituencies25.  
 Redistributing revenues gained from mineral resources.  The policy papers and academic articles 
and reports do not link the social protection agenda with the economic potential of the 
extractive industries. Trade unions could lobby to put this issue on the political agenda. The 
revenues gained from the extraction of Uranium and Gold for example – which according to AEO 
2013 will increase significantly over the following years – could serve as a financial base for 
social expenditures (health, education, …). The striking fact that the country’s GDP growth was 
over 13% in 2012, whilst it ranked as the lowest country on the HDI in the same year, could be 
used as a lobbying tool.  
 Taking initiative. Instead of trying to convince informal workers to register with the labour code 
in order to be allowed to access social protection through the CNSS, it might make more sense if 
unions think about alternative strategies. The CNSS is the only, slightly institutionalized, provider 
of social security in Niger and therefore has been the aim of union’s awareness raising activities, 
but our findings indicate that there are multiple reasons obstructing informal workers from 
registering, most notably the mistrust in the government. Unions could consider developing 
their own mutuelles for health care for example.  
 Ensuring decent work.  Unions could play an important role, in cooperation with the GUFs and 
ITUC, in pressuring the government and international donors, such as the World Bank, to include 
workers’ rights and social protection guarantees in the set-up of social assistance programmes, 
in particular in cash-for-work projects.   
 Joining Forces. The multi-actor analysis of Niger has identified a number of possible partners for 
CNT in their actions related to social protection (see annex 1). The field data suggest two 
relevant groups of actors: the Associations de défense des droits de l’homme, or those 
organizations which operate on human rights issues, and the platform of civil society actors, 
NGOs and associations, which has been created to advise the government on issues regarding 
social protection. The main challenge, according to the fieldwork, is the lack of harmonization 
and the un-institutionalized nature of both groups, which incapacitates the political leverage 
they have.  
The role of CNV Internationaal in these endeavours could take to form of: organizing exchange 
events between Nigerien unions and those in countries which met similar obstacles and found ways 
to overcome them; supporting the improvement of lobbying and advocacy skills; and supporting a 
local awareness raising campaign. An awareness raising campaign in the Netherlands about the 
misuse of the revenues of natural resources, such as uranium and gold, might also assist their 
partners in pressuring the Niger government into spending the gained revenues more equitably . 
Furthermore assisting the GUFs and ITUC in their lobby efforts towards the World Bank towards the 
                                                          
25 Based on our own assessment we recommend prioritising health care and food security.     
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inclusion of basic labour rights in all their development projects would increase the political leverage 
of local unions in their struggle.  
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CHAPTER 4: Togo 
1. Setting the Scene 
1.1. Socio-political and economic context 
The following is primarily based on the CNV context study, “Words cannot be eaten, but they can give 
hope: perspectives for the trade union movement in Togo”, by Keja et al. (2011). For a more detailed 
overview of the socio-political and economic context of Togo we kindly refer to this report.   
Togo, former German colony turned French and English protectorate after WOI, gained independence in 
1957 (West-Togoland became part of the independent state of Ghana) and 1960 (French Togo became 
the Republic of Togo).  
The contemporary political history of Togo can be divided into three periods: the short and violent rule 
of Olympio from 1961 to 1963, followed by the short presidency of Grunitzky between 1963 and 1967 
and the long and oppressive dictatorship of Gnassingbé Eyadéma of the Rassemblement du Peuple 
Togolais (RPT) from 1967 until 2005, and the succession by his son Faure Essosimna Gnassingbé. 
Gnassingbé installed some reforms but still primarily uses his father’s divide-and-rule tactics to remain in 
power. In sum Togo’s turbulent post-colonial history was marked by neo-patrimonial practices, 
oppression of opposition and a series of paper-elections in which the ruling party consequently ended 
up competing against itself due to persistent boycotts by the opposition (Keja et al., 2011).  
The overhaul of the political landscape in 2012 has been a source of tension and much debate. The Togo 
People’s Rally (RPT), the ruling party created in 1969, was dissolved in April 2012 in order to form a new 
party, the Union for the Republic (UNIR). The 50 RPT representatives formed a parliamentary majority 
group (GMP) and succeeded in maintaining the RPT majority obtained during the legislative elections of 
October 2007 (the National Assembly has 91 seats). In response to the postponement of elections 
scheduled for 2012, six opposition parties joined together in the Rainbow Coalition in August 2012. For 
similar reasons, the Let’s Save Togo Movement (CST), comprising seven opposition parties and civil 
society organisations, has held protests which have often degenerated into confrontation with police 
forces. In this new political environment, the government has opened negotiations with the opposition 
regarding institutional and constitutional reforms, in order to determine the length of the president’s 
term in office and to set electoral districts. The extent to which the upcoming legislative elections unfold 
peacefully will be a determining factor in maintaining calm in the country (AEO Togo, 2013).  
 
Trade Union Rights 
Right to Organise: the law prohibits anti-union discrimination but some categories of workers 
are prohibited from organising (e.g. police and workers in Expert Processing Zones) 
Right to Strike: Public servants are not allowed to strike (including health workers) 
(ITUC, Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2010c) 
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1.2. Economic Context 
Togo is among the poorest countries in the world. Real GDP per capita barely changed between 1960 
and the end of the 1990s, though recent years have shown some better performance (Keja, et al., 2011). 
Togo ranks 159 out of 187 on the HDI with a score of 0,459 and has a GINI coefficient of 39,3 in line with 
the  average of low HDI  countries (HDR, 2014). 
 
Togo holds considerable mineral reserves most notably it is one of the largest phosphate producers in 
Africa. It also has significant iron ore reserves and large deposits of marble and calcareous rock. 
Regrettably, similar to the situation in Niger and Guinea, the returns from the extractive industries have 
not been reinvested in the country’s overall development. The strength of the Togolese natural resource 
sector is that it has the potential of creating employment due to processing industries linked to the 
extraction of phosphate and cement for instance. In addition the sector is more diversified then for 
instance Guinea that heavily depends on the extraction of Bauxite (AEO Togo, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, there is little economic transformation and diversification and in 2012 the primary sector 
contributed 38% to the GDP, ahead of the tertiary sector (23%) and secondary sector (21%). Agriculture 
is an important sector and is good for 27% of the GDP. Interestingly, Togo’s growth is also stimulated 
through public works, such as the construction of roads, (which is counted as a form of social protection 
by some classifications). Together with cotton, phosphate, and construction sectors, estimated growth 
for 2012 was 5.9%. Despite relatively stable growth (on average 5% 2011-2014) and inflation rates, 
extreme poverty rose from 28.6% to 30.4% between 2006 and 2011 (Ntagungira, 2014).  
 
Table 15: Macro-economic indicators 
  2012 2013(e) 2014(p) 2015(p) 
Real GDP growth 5.9 5.6 6 6.3 
Real GDP per capita growth 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.7 
CPI inflation 2.6 1.8 2.3 1.6 
Budget balance % GDP -5.8 -4.6 -5.3 -4.4 
Current account balance % GDP -11.9 -11.7 -13.3 -13.8 
Source: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' Ntagungira (2014) calculations. 
 
If we look at the Togolese labour market, the huge youth unemployment and underemployment poses 
many challenges. Togo’s population is very young; with 60% aged under 25 and 8.1% of the youth is 
unemployment, whereas the percentage of underemployment is 20.5% (Ntagungira, 2014).  Child labour 
also poses significant challenges as 55% of children between 5 and 14 are engaged in work. Children are 
moreover most vulnerable to fall into poverty (World Bank, 2012). 
Most employment is in subsistence agriculture in rural areas or in the urban informal sector, where 
services dominate. Agriculture accounts for almost 60% of national employment. Commerce and trade 
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in urban areas is the largest source of employment, accounting for 22% of national employment. There 
has been a marked shift in sector employment, with a rising share in services, a falling share for industry, 
and little change in the dominance of agriculture. With the rise in the share of services in GDP, there has 
been a dramatic fall in productivity in this sector. In addition, the sector with the highest productivity – 
industry – has shown the least growth in employment. Thus, there has been a relative shift in the sector 
composition from high productivity industrial employment to lower productivity service sector jobs. This 
has led to a decrease in overall labour productivity in the economy. The figures below show that in fact 
the Togolese economy is largely informal (Keja et al., 2011).  
Table 16: Wage and self-employment status by sector 
Sector Wage/piece-rate earner Self-employed/family 
helper 
Total 
Agriculture 0.9% 58.0% 58.9% 
 
Mining 0.2%   
  
0.4% 0.6% 
 
Manufacturing 0.5%    3.2%  3.7% 
 
Construction  0.6%    1.2%  1.7% 
 
Transport 1.1%    
 
1.5% 2.6% 
 
Commerce and 
Trade 
1.3%    20.2%  21.5% 
Education/ Health
  
2.0%    0.6%  2.6% 
 
Administration 0.8%    0.1%  0.9% 
 
Financial Services 1.7%    4.4%  6.1% 
 
Other Services
  
0.3%    1.1%  1.4% 
 
 
Total  
9.4%    90.6%  100.0% 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 in Keja et al., 2011 
 
2. Social Protection 
In the following we will discuss the state of social protection in Togo, followed by a mapping of the 
existing social protection schemes in the field of old age pensions, occupational accidents and illness and 
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health care. For an overview of the available social security statistical data as well as, key legislation and 
the ratification of key ILO conventions, please see annex 2.  
2.1. The state of Social Protection in Togo 
Togo has no national social protection strategy but the country does have several social protection 
schemes and institutions and a number of laws and regulations that regulate different aspects of social 
protection: 
 Social Security Code, managed by the CNSS (law 2011-006 of 21 February 2011) 
 Law N° 2011/0031 of 18 February 2011, regarding the mandatory regime of health 
insurance  
 Ordinance N°68-16 of 5 June 1968, regarding the pension schemes 
 The Public Health Code  
 Law N° 2008-003  of 26 May 2008, which fixes the age of admission for pensions (60 
years) for the private and public sector 
 Interministerial arrest N°002/2012, which fixes the modalities of the list of professional 
illnesses 
 Arrest N° 12/92/MBES-SN of 1er September 1992, regarding the Agence de solidarité 
Nationale. 
 
Al these laws and regulations do not explicitly mention informal workers, except the pension branch and  
family benefits branch of the Social Security Code, in which informal workers are specifically mentioned 
but the extension has not been implemented yet.   
 
This amalgam of laws is complemented with an equally diverse set of involved ministries. The following 
ministries are active in the field of social protection: Ministry of Work, Employment and Social Security;  
Ministry of Social Protection and National Solidarity; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health; Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Planning; and Ministry of 
Community Development, Handicraft, Youth and Youth Employment (World Bank, 2012). There is 
general lack of harmonisation and coordination of tasks amongst all these government institutions 
which leads to sub-optimal service delivery.  
 
The World Bank in cooperation with other donors such as UNICEF, ILO, and UNDP, have since 2011 
supported the Togolese government with the creation of social protection strategy which will allow a 
more coherent approach (World Bank, 2012).  
 
AWorld Bank report (2012) on the state of social protection in Togo discusses two types of regimes, 
social assistance in the form of safety nets for the most vulnerable people and contributory schemes. 
The former fall under the responsibilities of the Ministry of Social Protection and National Solidarity and 
since 1992 the implementation is managed by the Agence de Solidarité Nationale. Social assistance 
primarily comes in the form of in-kind transfers of food through school feeding, nutrition supplements 
and food aid programmes. But cash transfers, temporary employment through labour intensive public 
works, and waivers for services (free caesarean sections or school fee waivers) are also provided in 
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Togo. Most safety net programs target highly vulnerable groups and coverage is limited, with the 
exception of universal programs like fee waivers for primary education. The share of GDP spend on 
safety nets is quite low and most spending goes to emergency measures in response to a specific crisis. 
The state budget and financial assistance from donors finance the social assistance interventions.  
Additionally the World Bank report mentions a trade-off between coverage and intensity. Some 
programmes have a wide coverage but the benefits are so low that the project has little  impact on the 
livelihoods of people. Targeted programmes on the other hand have problems with regards to 
identifying the indigents, as health care centres do not apply a uniform approach (see World Bank, 2012 
for an overview of all safety programmes, coverage and budgets).  
Based on the field data collected by Pierre Zanou for the Togo case, social assistance in Togo has the 
following limitations:  
 The governance is characterised by slow decision making and the administrative burdens 
between the Ministry in charge and the ones who provide the finances.  
 There is a perpetual conflict between the people in charge of the Ministry and the trade unions 
 There is a lack of financial, material and human resources.  The Agency for National Solidarity for 
example only has 18 executives for the entire country.  
 The notoriously unmotivated staff of the Ministry and the Agency for  National Solidarity   
 
Despite the limitations mentioned above the political will which lead to the creation of a Ministry, which 
oversees National Solidarity, as well as the initiatives taken by this Ministry to enrol certain solidarity 
actions are signs of a commitment by the government towards social assistance.  
 
The mandatory contributory social insurance scheme for all private sector employees and government-
employed staff is managed by the CNSS, which is divided into three branches: the family and maternity 
branch (child care, maternity leave, etc.), the pension’s branch (old age, survivors and disability 
pensions), and the professional risks branch (benefits for occupational accidents and illness). Unlike 
most Francophone West African countries the CNSS does not foresee health insurance and health care 
and unemployment benefits are also not provided. Salaried workers pay 4% of their salary to the CNSS 
and employers pay the other 16.5% (see World Bank, 2012 for an overview of all contributory 
programmes, coverage and budgets). The CNSS is managed by a tripartite board but CSTT, CNV 
Internationaal’s partners, is not part of the CNSS board, although they are  part of the governing board 
of INAM). The Caisse de Retraite du Togo (CRT) provides pensions, disability, survivor pensions, and 
family allocations to civil servants based on contributions of 7% of base salaries and a state contribution 
of 20%.  
In 2011 the first steps towards statutory health care were made with the creation of the “Institute 
National d’Assurance Maladie” (INAM)  which provides health insurance coverage for the public sector, 
including the central administration, local administration , para-public agencies, and retired public 
sector workers. The financing base of INAM is 7% of  base salaries, paid in equal amounts by the 
employee and the state. 
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INAM might present an improvement of the social insurance system in Togo yet several limitations can 
be discerned based on the interviews conducted for this care study: 
 The mandatory insurance scheme of the CNSS only covers 10% (in 2012 the World Bank 
stated that the coverage was 5%) of the population or approx. 4.000.000 people 
 There is a lack of transparency in the governance of the CNSS 
 The management is  centralised and there are cases of clientelism 
 The social dialogue which should supervise the functioning of the CNSS is not effective 
 The   extension to the informal workers has not been implemented despite the adoption of 
the Social Security Code in 2011.   
 
 
Table 17: Social Protection Schemes in Togo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: fieldwork report (Zanou, 2014) 
 
2.2. Recent reforms 
The Government of Togo has made important advances in the area of social protection, over the last 
several years, and aims to achieve universal social protection. 
 
In 2011 the Togolese Government has identified the general objective for social protection as, “to 
protect the Togolese population against vulnerabilities and social risks”. Building on this the World Bank 
(2012) suggests considering the following strategic objectives: 
1) Develop and extend a reliable and financially sustainable contributory social insurance system 
that addresses the risks of old age, death and disability to all households able to participate. 
2) Ensure access to health services, improve health outcomes and mitigate the adverse effects of 
health shocks by developing contributory mechanisms of health insurance.  
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3) Prevent destitution and build human capital of the most vulnerable through an integrated 
system of safety net interventions that address the needs of the chronic poor, those affected by 
shocks and the needs of specific vulnerable groups. 
4) Promote employability and access to jobs and income and safe working conditions among 
groups likely to be excluded from the labour market 
 
The World Bank (2012) furthermore argues for the adoption of a “systems approach which reduces 
fragmentation, promotes harmonization and can enhance both the performance of individual programs 
and the overall functions of social protection in creating opportunities, providing resilience and 
promoting equity” (World Bank, 2012: iv). In sum a systems approach involves actively seeking linkages 
between existing programs, like Robalino et al. (2012) proffer as well.  
 
In 2011 a new Social Security code was adopted by the government (law n. 2011-06 of February 2011 on 
the social security code). The code foresees the extension of social insurance coverage through the CNSS 
and CRT to informal workers. According to the World Bank (2012: 29) “this can however only be 
successful if the credibility and reliability of the CNSS and CRT is addressed”. The World Bank also argues 
that the government must take traditional voluntary savings mechanisms or other forms of mutual 
insurance via professional associations into account (World Bank, 2012: 29). 
 
3. Focal Themes 
3.1. Old Age Pensions 
The old age pensions are managed by the CNSS for workers with a formal contract. Employees who have 
reached the age of 60 and can prove they have worked and paid contributions to the CNSS for at least 
180 months and have stopped receiving a salary have the right to a pension (article 42 of the Social 
Security Code).  From 55 years onwards workers have the right to a pension if he or she is physically or 
mentally incapable of doing their job. The pensions are reduced with 5% every year the pension is 
granted before 60 years. If the conditions mentioned above are not respected people can receive 
allocations for old age, the decease of a spouse or invalidity. Although the CNSS on paper is extended to 
informal workers the implementation of this commitment has been subject to discussion amongst the 
involved ministries, the CNSS and other partners since 2011.  
As mentioned above civil servants are affiliated to the CRT which has 20 000 affiliates. There are two 
important shortcomings worth mentioning concerning the CRT: it does not offer protection against work 
related injuries or illness and has a chronic budget deficit.  
Similar to the country case studies discussed above, the majority of workers rely on traditional solidarity 
mechanisms at old age. Institutionalized informal pension schemes nonetheless do not exist and many 
individuals are particularly vulnerable at old age. This implies that they could be targeted by the 
aforementioned social assistance schemes, but these safety nets are at present not specifically designed 
to reach people at old age. Private insurance is only a possibility for those who have sufficient financial 
means.  
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3.2. Occupational Accidents and Illness 
Benefits for work related accidents and illnesses are managed by the CNSS, more specifically by the 
branch of professional risks. According to the social security code a victim of a work related accident is 
entitled to: 
 Medical care (consultations, medical/surgical care, medical tests, check-ups at the 
hospital/health centre, work related illnesses) 
 A compensation for the days incapable of working 
 A invalidity pension in case of permanent invalidity caused by the accident at work 
 The funeral costs and a survivors pension are is paid to the family if the worker died at work or 
as a cause of a work related injury 
 Benefits are also paid to the family if the worker is declared to be handicapped for more than 
66% 
Compensation for work related illnesses is granted by decree and according to a list of professional 
illnesses which is regularly revised by the Ministry of Health and Work.  
Without repeating ourselves, it is clear that most informal workers in Togo do not have any protection 
against occupational accidents and illness, except for traditional forms of solidarity. The government has 
to a certain extent missed an opportunity by not including the branch of professional risks in their 
commitment to extend social security to those in informal employment. Whereas the pension and 
family and maternity branches of the Social Security Code make reference to informal workers, 
protection against occupational accidents and illness have not been included.   
3.3. Health care  
Health care in Togo, like in many other Sub Saharan Countries is characterized by medical plurality, 
ranging from local traditional healers to national hospitals and everything in between (Leliveld et al., 
2010: 256). Although health care systems in Togo date back to missionary posts, the system has 
underwent significant changes over the last decades, according to Leliveld et al. (2010: 256), due to the 
monetization of the medicines as well as treatment. Against this backdrop, scholars and policy makers 
have argued that community-based health insurance schemes could increase the accessibility to 
professional healthcare. Leliveld et al. (2010) however conclude that these initiatives might not be 
sufficient for increasing health care services to the poorest, because the contribution fees to 
community-based health insurance schemes cannot be paid by the most vulnerable groups. Equitable 
access to health services could be achieved through fee waivers or lower premiums for vulnerable 
groups, such as children or the very poor, although the feasibility of such options needs further 
investigation. According to a World Bank study (2012) an estimated 6% of the population is covered by 
some type of health insurance, of which 4% by the INAM regime.  
 
According to Zanou, there are some 30 mutuelles in Togo with an estimated 600.000 beneficiaries. Some 
mutuelles function on the basis of microcredit schemes whilst other are based on the principle of 
solidarity. The functioning of mutuelles has been described previously and they work in similar fashion in 
Togo. The Togolese mutuelles however only have agreements with health centers and not with hospitals 
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which creates problems when people have severe injuries or diseases, which requires medical care that 
cannot be provided in a health centre. The CSTT has its own mutuelle, MUSA, which has been created 
for agricultural workers, workers in the transport sector and artisans. As mentioned above the mutuelles 
primarily offer health care insurance26.  
 
 
As previously discusses the CNSS does not provide health care. In 2009 the government did take 
initiative to create and health insurance scheme for public sector workers and installed the INAM.   
INAM is a mandatory, contributory health insurance scheme which covers the following public workers:  
 Staff of the Public Administration 
 Civil Servants 
 Magistrats 
 Professional military-staff (customs, fire-fighters, prison guards, forest guards) 
 Local authorities 
 Retired public servants 
The Togolese government has expressed that INAM is a first step in creating a universal health insurance 
scheme as promoted by the ILO’s social protection floor initiative. But the scheme already has delays in 
payment of benefits and in general the Togolese government and the administration is not yet ready for 
the delivery of universal health care according to the respondents interviewed for this case study.  
 
                                                          
26
 Please see 
http://www.coopami.org/fr/countries/countries_partners/cote_ivoire/social_protection/pdf/social_protection03.
pdf for more the reglementation of the UEMOA regarding Mutuelles 
The Shortcomings of the Mutuelles 
 Bad governance and lack of expertise in managing risks 
 Lack of financial resources for repaying medical care 
 Declining spirit of solidarity (nationally and internationally) 
 Lack of respect for the UEMOA standards  
 Dependency on international donors: many mutuelles collapse when the external 
funding dries up (e.g. Belgian support which dried up) 
 The government mistrusts the mutuelles and refrains from actively supporting them 
 Lack of regulatory framework to govern the mutuelles 
 Incoherence between different implementing agencies (religious groups, NGOs, 
community-saving schemes, occupational groups) 
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4. Conclusion and recommendations 
In conclusion, there are several factors which inhibit informal workers to access social protection in 
Togo: the uncertainty of their income and the fact that their income is not formally registered; the 
absence of a focal point or ombudsman for informal workers; the lack of statistical data on informal 
employment; The deficit of the pension branch of the CNSS; The fact that the social security code has 
not extended the protection for work related accidents and illness to informal workers; and the fact that 
many informal workers cannot meet the obligation of regularly contributions to the mutuelles (therefore 
many mutuelles build up debts).  Building on these insights we recommend the following priority areas 
for Togolese unions in their struggle for more accessible social protection.  
 First things first. The primary step that could be taken by Togolese unions is lobbying the 
government to include informal workers in all branches of the Social Security Code that was 
adopted in 2011.  The enforcement of the C102 into national law could also be an important 
lobby point for Togolese unions and CSTT, specifically.  
 Putting your action where your mouth is. Unions have an important role to play in ensuring that 
the Social Security Code, which at present remains a paper commitment, will materialize. The 
aspirations to expanding INAM to a universal health insurance code could also be monitored. If 
the government seems to take this commitment seriously unions should lobby for its 
participatory preparation and implementation.  
 Addressing unequal governing structures. Although the governing board of the CNSS is not 
effective at the moment it is important that CSTT is included in its structure.   
 Increasing coherence. As mentioned above, the multitude of programmes, strategies and 
projects need to be streamlined. Trade unions could put pressure on the government to develop 
a system’s approach, based on the complementarity of social protection schemes (see Robalino 
et al., 2012). Although the Social Security Code tries to encompass the different formal schemes 
a systems approach entails including informal mechanisms as well as redistribution.   
 Delineating tasks and responsibilities. Unions could advocate installing a clear division of labour 
between all relevant actors in the social protection landscape in Togo. Specifically the 
multitudes of ministries which are involved require well-defined responsibilities in order to 
increase coherence and complementarity. Trade unions could take up their watch-dog role and 
raise awareness about illicit practices or corruption in the field of social protection.  
 Picking your battles. In similar vein to the recommendations for the other case studies it is 
important to prioritize in social expenditure. The Togolese national budget is limited and needs 
are many. Trade Unions could play a role in defining the priorities based on the needs and 
perceptions of their constituencies27.  
 Redistributing.  The policy papers and academic articles and reports do not link the social 
protection agenda with the increased inequality in many African countries. Income inequality is 
increasing in Togo and 62% of the Togolese live below the absolute poverty line (GIZ, n.d.). 
                                                          
27 Based on our own assessment we recommend prioritising health care.    
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Trade unions, therefore could lobby to put redistribution on the political agenda: the revenues 
gained from key industries could serve as a financial base for social expenditures (health, 
education, …) 
 Investing in quality. In addition, building on Criel et al.’s (2002) study and similar to the 
recommendation for Guinea, unions could equally stress the importance of the quality of health 
care and other social protection benefits. Increasing coverage to insurance schemes is namely 
related to the quality of the benefits that one receives in return for his/her contribution.  
 Taking initiative. Alternatively, trade unions could increase their efforts in establishing 
mutuelles, to the example of MUSA. CSTT could investigate if and how MUSA could be scaled-up 
to other sectors which employ many informal workers. In sectors where the informal workers 
are not yet well organized, unions could increase their efforts in organizing informal workers.  
 Joining forces. In Togo there are few actors besides the Trade Unions who are working on the 
issue of social protection. The multi-actor analysis (see annex 1) does indicate that the Ligue des 
Droits de l’Homme, l’Association des Consommateurs, could be an interesting partner for CSTT, 
as they have influence on legislative processes. At the time of the research they were not 
directly involved with the issue of social protection but they work on the topic of human rights 
in general and in this sense they could support a rights-based approach to social protection.  
 
The role of CNV Internationaal in these endeavours could take to form of: supporting the scaling-up 
of MUSA to other sectors;   supporting the improvement of lobbying and advocacy skills; and 
supporting a local awareness raising campaign.  
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CHAPTER 5: Benin 
1. Setting the Scene 
1.1. Socio-political landscape 
The following is primarily based on the CNV context study, “Impossible n’est pas Beninois: The economic 
and social context of the Trade Union Movement in Benin”, by van Westen & Zanou (2010). For a more 
detailed overview of the socio-political and economic context of Togo we kindly refer to this report.   
Benin, the former French colony Dahomey, became independent in 1960 and went through a decade of 
political instability which was characterized by coup d’états and ethnic strife. The insecurity ended in 
1972 with the inauguration of Mathieu Kérékou, who initiated a socialist regime which lasted for two 
decades.    
In 1979, the CNR was dissolved, and Kérékou arranged show elections in which he was the only 
candidate. Establishing relations with the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Libya, he put 
nearly all businesses and economic activities under state control, causing foreign investment in Benin to 
dry up.  In 1989, riots broke out after the regime did not have money to pay its army and the banking 
system collapsed. Eventually Kérékou renounced Marxism and a convention forced Kérékou to release 
political prisoners and arrange elections. Marxist-Leninism was also abolished as the nation's form of 
government. The name of the country was officially changed to the Republic of Benin on 1 March, 1990, 
once the newly formed country's constitution was completed. In 1991, Kérékou was defeated 
by Nicéphore Soglo, and became the first black African president to step down after an election. 
Kérékou returned to power after winning the 1996 vote. In 2001, a closely fought election resulted in 
Kérékou winning another term, after which his opponents claimed election irregularities. 
On 5 March 2006 an election was held that was considered free and fair. The runoff election was held 
on 19 March, and was won by Boni, who assumed office on April 6. The success of the fair multi-party 
elections in Benin won praise internationally. Boni was reelected in 2011, taking 53.18% of the vote in 
the first round, becoming the first president to win an election without a runoff since the restoration of 
democracy in 1991. There were, however, some social tensions in 2012, including a long teachers’ strike 
for higher wages and economic tensions between the president’s office and an important economic 
operator who virtually controlled the two key sectors of the economy, namely cotton and port activities. 
Municipal and local elections in the first quarter of 2013 mobilised a good part of the country’s political 
leaders and population. 
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In line with Benin’s socialist political history the country has a strong trade union movement. The 
transition to democracy in 1990 was for example supported by the unions and at present, unions 
continue to actively pressure the government to implement reforms to the benefit of their 
constituencies. The most recent example is the prolonged union struggle in the education sector. Unions 
have been in recurrent strikes to force the government to increase teachers´ wages in 2014. One of the 
main weaknesses is the fragmentation of the trade union landscape; the 7 federations are more often 
working against than in cooperation with each other.  
1.2. Economic Analysis 
After a period of stagnated growth in 2008-2009 caused by the global economic crisis, which lead to a 
significant decrease in Benin’s export sector, the country seems to be recovering since 2011. The growth 
rate of the real economy increased from 2.6% in 2010 to 5,4% in 2012 (see table 18). The economic 
growth is primarily based on the revival of agriculture (in particular the cotton sector), which benefitted 
from good rainfall, as well as the port activities.  
The government announced an administrative modernization in 2013 and 2014 with a threefold 
objective:  to further mobilize its domestic resources; to make public spending consistent with its 
poverty-reduction strategy; and to improve the country’s business climate in order to develop the 
private sector. In reality the emphasis has been placed on the last goal.  According to van Westen & 
Zanou (2010) the Beninese government is obsessed with the business climate, to the detriment of 
labour.  Nonetheless poverty reduction deserves to be prioritized, as more than 36% of the Beninese 
population is still living below the poverty line and serious backlogs in reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) remain huge challenge. The government’s current account balance deficits 
(-8,5% in 2012) should also be tackled in order to sustain macro-economic stability.  
 
 
 
 
             Trade Union Rights 
Freedom of Association: The unions must deposit their statutes with the competent 
authorities, including the Ministry of the Interior, to obtain legal recognition, or face a fine or 
prosecution.  
Right to Collective Bargaining: Workers have the right to collective bargaining, with the 
exception of merchant shipping employees.  
Right to Strike: Authorities or employers may unilaterally deem a strike illegal; civil servants 
prevented from striking and the length of a strike must be indicated in advance 
(ITUC, Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2010d) 
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Table 18: Key Economic indicators Benin 
  2012 2013(e) 2014(p) 2015(p) 
Real GDP growth 5.4 5 4.9 5.3 
Real GDP per capita growth 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.7 
CPI inflation 6.6 2.6 2.3 2.9 
Budget balance % GDP -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.2 
Current account balance % GDP -8.5 -8.2 -7.9 -7.8 
Source: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' Ndoye & Fall (2014) calculations 
 
Cotton is the most important crop in Benin and contributes up to 13% of the GDP and is good for 45% of 
the tax revenues. From a global perspective however Benin is a small player and agricultural 
diversification therefore remains important. The second important sector is trade. The port of Cotonou 
is an important import hub for the region and Benin’s long border with Nigeria has resulted into vibrant 
trading activities. Aid is the third significant contributor to the economy and provides 10% of the GDP.  
 
The informal economy contributes 49,1% to the GDP of Benin (2010) and approx. 93% of men and 97% 
of women, work in the informal economy. We should note however that these figures are 
approximations. Statistics often depart from a binary perspective on the informal and formal economy 
whereas the reality is much more complex. The data does show us that the majority of workers in Benin 
are informally employed. Most informal enterprises are part of the artisanal and commerce sector, 
49,4% and 43,1% respectively, and 9 out of 10 businesses are set up in the informal economy (Ale, 
2013). The informal sector is getting well established on the labour market. The trade union movement 
has therefore started to organise informal workers and self-employed, which for UNSTB has meant that 
the due paying membership has increased from 18,000 to 51,290 in a few years. 
 
 
2. Social Protection 
In the following we will discuss the state of social protection in Benin, followed by a mapping of the 
existing social protection schemes in the field of old age pensions, occupational accidents and illness and 
health care. For an overview of the available social security statistical data as well as, key legislation and 
the ratification of key ILO conventions, please see annex 2.  
2.1. The state of Social Protection in Benin 
Social protection in Benin – as in the other countries previously discussed in this report – has two 
historical lineages. On the one hand, traditional solidarity mechanisms which go back to pre-colonial 
times and are based on social capital, family or kin ties. On the other hand, Benin has inherited a 
mandatory social security system from its colonial rulers, based on contributions made by employers 
and employees. 
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In 1990 social protection was back on the political agenda, in line with the new constitution which 
guaranteed respect for the rights of the most vulnerable citizens. Social protection became a key 
component of several policy documents such as Bénin 2025 Alafia, les Orientation Stratégiques du 
Développement (ODS), PRSP (2007-2009) and the Politiques et Stratégies Nationales de Protection 
Sociale 2004-2013(PSNPS). These documents nevertheless lack concrete policy measure and represent a 
list of objectives and aspirations but no clear mechanisms for reaching these goals. In addition, none of 
the documents present a coherent framework in which different risks and social protection schemes are 
presented in a complementary way. The PDNPS for example only focuses on the social actions, or 
targeted solidarity actions of the state towards vulnerable groups (such as health care waivers for the 
most vulnerable).  
 
In their review of social protection systems in Benin, Hodges et al. (2010) mention six types of schemes 
(we will discuss only four types based on the definition of social protection we have adopted). The first, 
social insurance, is built on the French model and is managed by the CNSS for private sector workers and 
the FNR for the public sector. Together they cover only 10% of the population. Both do not cover 
unemployment benefits and the CNSS, like in Togo, also does not offer health insurance. The other 
minimum standards of C102 of the ILO have been translated into a social security code by the Beninese 
government, which was altered in 2003, including a specific reference to the extension of social security 
to informal workers.  
 
The CNSS in Benin has three branches. A family benefits branch that covers prenatal care, child care 
allowances and in-kind benefits for women in labour. A pensions branch which provides old age, 
disability and survivor benefits and a professional risks branch that offers income security in case for 
occupational accidents and diseases. Contributions are paid by the employer (5,4%) and employee 
(3,6%). CNSS has an tripartite administration and is managed by a Directory General, who is appointed 
by the government (although according to the ISSA this should be done by the Governing Board). The 
Governing Board has a tripartite structure in which employers, employers and the state are represented.  
The interviews conducted in Benin suggest that the viability of the CNSS only exists on paper (see box).  
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The Mutuelle de Sécurité Sociale au Benin (MSSB), created in 2011, in order to reach out to informal 
workers, also resorts under the social insurance scheme. The MSSB offers old age pensions and health 
insurance but covers only 5000 beneficiaries in 4 provinces, according to COSI. In general many people 
do not even know of its existence. In response to these shortcomings and following the Bamako 
initiative Mutuelles de Santé proliferated during the 1980s and 90s. Nevertheless only 1,8% of the 
population was registered by a Mutuelle in 2009.   
 
The second social protection mechanism Hodges et al. (2010) mention are the social assistance 
schemes. According to them social assistance, or non-contributory social protection, is little developed 
in Benin. The Ministry of Family and National Solidarity (MFNS) does offer assistance to the most 
vulnerable groups but in 2008 only 1802 people were reached. Other examples are school feeding 
programs in disadvantaged areas or support for HIV/AIDS patients. In general we can say that these 
mechanisms have a limited impact and do not allow vulnerable people to structurally address their 
precarious situation. Although Hodges et al. (2010) place free education up until primary school and free 
health care for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and cesareans, under a separate category, according to our 
Shortcomings of the CNSS 
 
 Only 24% of the contributions are collected 
 Despite the investment of 800 million FCFA in improving the data collection and 
monitoring of the payment of benefits, sound information management has not yet 
materialized 
 The insurance files of employers are not up to date 
 The internal governance is not transparent 
 The discussions between the General Director and the Governing Body on the amount of 
funds (from the contributions) that should  be placed in the bank exemplify the internal 
conflicts 
 Political interference in the management of the CNSS 
 The fragmentation of trade unions which are presented in the CNSS mark the fragility of 
its functioning 
 The social dialogue that should manage the CNSS is not functional 
 Although the salaries of the staff and executives of CNSS have increased the services 
have not improved 
 The extension of social protection to informal workers is perpetually in a state of 
reflection 
 Lack of competent staff who can identify the level of one´s disability 
 The CNSS has not conducted any studies on the current situation in reference to its 
future aspirations.  
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definition these measure are also forms of social assistance. In similar vein, adopting our definition, the 
subsidies for food stuff also resort under social assistance, in contract with Hodges et al. (2010). Benin 
has presented subsidies for imported food, to poor families during the price spikes in 2007-2008. These 
subsidies yet mostly aided the upper classes as the subsidized goods were not part of the alimentary 
basket of poor households. In 2006 the government announced free health care for children up to 5 
years of age but has not implemented the law as of yet.  
 
A third form of social protection, identified by Hodges et al. (2010) in Benin, is the so-called “social 
actions”. These include assistance in cases of abuse, violence, exploitation or orphanage shelters for 
instance. A multitude of actors are engaged in offering social assistance to vulnerable people such as 
NGOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs). The state has created, 84 Centres de Promotion Sociales 
(CPS) and 25 (SSS), across the country. The CPS offers assistance with problems in the localities whereas 
the SSS are linked to the hospitals. Both, notwithstanding, have chronic budget deficits and lack human 
and material resources to be able to carry out their responsibilities.  
 
The fourth and last set of social protection measures discussed by Hodges et al. (2010) is the 
employment and revenue building strategies. In particular micro-finance institutions are well developed 
in Benin. In fact Hodges et al. (2010) argue they are the most development of the West African 
Monetary Union (WAMEU), with approx. 978.341 clients (about 20% of the active population) in 2008. It 
must be noted though that the extremely poor cannot access micro-credits and it is questionable 
whether micro-credits can fall under social protection schemes according to COSI representatives. 
Lastly, Employment policies are often short term projects which offer little support for the large number 
of youth in unemployment.  
 
 
Table 19: Social Protection Schemes in Benin 
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CNSS x x x x x x    
FNR x      x   
MFSN         x 
MSSB x      x   
Social Actions       x  x 
Micro-credit        x  
Mutuelles       x   
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RAMU28       x   
Source: fieldwork report (Zanou, 2014) 
2.2. Recent Reforms  
An important shift was made in the social protection provisions of the state in 2011 with the 
proclamation of a Régime de l’Assurance Maladie Universelle (RAMU) a state-lead universal health 
insurance system. After a participatory process RAMU was adopted in 2013 and aims to increase the 
coverage of health care and create affordable medical care for all. The initiative was supported by the 
ILO, the World Bank, OMS, and the French and Swiss bilateral cooperation. The CNSS and FRN are also 
part of the institutional framework on which RAMU is founded and which has the following 
cornerstones:  
 The level of contributions is based on one’s respective capacity and the most vulnerable 
people are exempted from paying contributions 
 Inter-generational and economical solidarity 
 The state is responsible for the legal framework 
 Equality of access 
 Participatory management (trade unions for instance are part of the governing body) 
RAMU is of particular interest for this study as it explicitly mentions informal workers as a key target 
group (RAMU, 2013). According to the website RAMU is supposed to offer the following benefits:  
 Medical consultations and care  
 Hospitalization 
 Medicines and blood transfusions 
 Laboratory examination, radiology and other medical imaging 
 Mandatory vaccines (except those which are already offered for free) 
 Equipment necessary for the recovery of the patient 
 Transportation of the sick towards the hospital or medical centre 
 Costs related to pregnancy and childbirth 
Withal there are important challenges to be overcome regarding the implementation of RAMU, more 
specifically the financing, the management and accreditation mechanisms of this ambitious plan still 
raise questions. The programme was launched in 2011 by the president without knowing how it would 
be implemented and without a legislative and regulative framework. This last pitfall has led to the 
temporary suspension of the activities, even before RAMU kicked-off. In other words, the absence of a 
legal structure has inhibited RAMU from being executed. Trade unions and other members of civil 
society warned the government for this situation during the drafting of the initiative but fell on deaf 
ears. The open dialogue between all concerned partners (such as the federations) has been reinstalled 
and at this moment the law which will allow its implementation is being debated. .  
                                                          
28
 RAMU has of yet not been operationalised 
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2.3. Financing Social Spending 
These ambitious plans of course cannot function on commitments alone; financial, material and human 
resources have to be in place to allow RAMU, and the other schemes mentioned above to be effective. 
Due to the plurality of mechanisms and actors the efficient allocation of resources is a core challenge for 
social protection in Benin according to Hodges et al. (2010). The diversity should initiate exchange of 
expertise and complementarity but in practice it often leads to incoherence and un-transparency. In 
addition, due to the freeze on the recruitment of government staff in the 1980s, following SAPs´ 
prescripts, there is a lack of civil servants. In 2010, 451 agents were employed by the MFSN, whereas 
1286 people are needed to manage the programmes effectively (Hodges et al., 2010). The financial 
resources invested in social protection are also not up to standard, in 2009 6.39 million FCFA was spend, 
or 0,9% of public expenditure equivalent to 0,2% of GDP.  
3. Focal Themes 
3.1. Pension Schemes 
There are two contributory and mandatory pension schemes in Benin: the CNSS for private sector 
workers and the FNR for permanent state employees (Agents Permanents d´Etat (APE)). The latter 
provides old age pensions but also family benefits and medical care (4/5 of hospital costs are covered by 
the FRN). Government staff have a right to a pension if they have reached the age of 60, have served for 
at least 30 years or if their medical or mental condition inhibits them from performing their job (note 
that there are specific categories of government personnel for whom other requirements count). In the 
case of the inability to work, a pension allowance will be granted but not an entire pension. Only 5,6% of 
the total Beninese population is covered by the FNR and that the pension branch has chronic deficits 
(the family and medical branch on the other hand have a surplus). The level of pensions granted can be 
altered by the government, if the SMIG increases or if the Statute of APE´s changes. At present the FNR 
is being restructured so that it can become an independent institution, which can manage its funds 
autonomously.  
The CNSS provides pensions for salaried workers who have paid contributions to the scheme for at least 
180 months and are 60 years or older. From 55 years of age, workers have a right to a proportional 
pension. Contributions are fixed and paid by the employer and employee. Some salaried workers 
voluntarily subscribe to the CNSS and in this instance pay both the employee and employer 
contributions in order to receive a retirement pension.  
Table 20: Beneficiaries of the CNSS and FNR pension schemes 
Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Public Sector (FNR) 9467 9567 9767 1674 
Private Sector (CNSS) 21073 22073 23860 23867 
Source: fieldwork report (Zanou, 2014) 
There are no pension schemes for informal workers albeit the provision in the social security code. The 
mutuelles governed by the Ministry of Labour (which will be discussed further on) are planning to 
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expand their services and specifically target informal workers. For most informal workers, traditional 
solidarity mechanisms are the safety nets whereupon people fall at old age.    
3.2. Occupational accidents and illness 
There is only one formal contributory security scheme which covers risks related to occupational 
accidents and illness, the CNSS. Civil servants and other government staff who fall under FNR, thus, do 
not have protection against work related accidents or illness. The following groups of salaried workers 
fall under the CNSS scheme and have a right to benefits related to occupational accidents and illness: 
 Managers companies with limited liability 
 Salaried executives of corporations 
 Students of professional schools 
 Interns 
 Apprentices 
 Members of cooperatives 
The contributions are entirely paid by the employer and all costs are reimbursed for the following 
expenses: 
 Surgical and dental medical assistance 
 Radiological and laboratory examinations and analyses 
 Medical care 
 The funeral costs in case of decease  
 If the person is disabled (for less than 20%) due to a work related injury he or she will 
receive  a bulk disability benefit  
 If the person is disable for more than 20% a disability pension will be granted 
Benefits for occupational illnesses are granted on the base of a list of eligible illness developed by the 
state.  
Informal workers are not protected against work related accidents and therefore CGTB, CNV 
International´s partner, as well as other trade unions such as the CSA and UNSTB put a large effort into 
raising awareness amongst informal workers about preventive measures, especially in high risk sectors 
such as transport for example.  They have also been involved in the set-up of the Fonds de Garantie 
d´Accident (FGA) which is regrettable not functioning any more (see box below).  
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Comparable to the case of old age pensions in Benin, informal workers fall back on solidarity 
mechanisms amongst family, kin or community members for work related injuries or illness. Because 
their income and survival depends on their ability to set up shop (in case of market women), or sell their 
goods on the street, many informal workers only seek medical care at critical moments; when they had 
such a bad injury that they cannot work or if they are so sick that they´re unable to stand on their own 
feet. This of course is to the detriment of their health and accentuates the need for protection against 
loss of income due to illness or accidents. Creating health centers that are near to the workplace of 
informal workers (such as in markets like in Accra or near transport stations like in Niamey) would 
increase the tendency of informal workers to seek medical aid sooner.  
3.3. Health care 
Health care in Benin is provided by a variety of actors, albeit only 8,4% of the population has health 
insurance: 5,6% through the FNR, 1,9% through the mutuelles and 0,9% through private insurance 
companies. The CNSS does not have a health care branch. In the private and semi-public sectors the 
health insurance schemes are created on the basis of collective agreements at enterprise level. These 
agreements generally lead to an insurance scheme for the workers as well as their families (with a limit 
of 6 children up to 21 years) and are financed by contributions of the employer (60% ) and employee 
(40%).   
In Benin there are two types of mutuelles, the Mutuelle de Sécurité Sociale au Benin (MSSB) which falls 
under the Ministry of Labour (see box) and mutuelles that are formed on the basis of community or 
occupational groups.  
The Fonds de Garantie d´Accident 
The FGA is a mutuelle who covers medical care in public hospitals and health centers for victims 
on the basis of an agreement between the service providers. However the FGA does not 
function accordingly and several obstacles prevent informal workers from accessing the FGA: 
 The government has not yet made the funds available to allow for the subsidized health 
care 
 There is not enough technical competence with regards to risk managing to allow the 
FGA to function properly  
 The different institutions are politicized 
 The trade unions do not have enough expertise and pedagogic training to influence the 
government in taking action and implementing the made commitments 
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In 2013, under pressure of the ILO, reforms were initiated and the creation of a Caisse de Prévoyance 
Sociale (CPS) was announced. The governing structures have been ratified by decree in 2012 but up to 
date the institutions are not functioning. Furthermore the stated reforms, notable an increase of the 
contributions to 3000 FCFA for individuals and 7000 FCFA for a group membership, have not been 
implemented. 
The traditional mutual insurance schemes have existed in Benin for several decennia, like in other West-
African countries. In the beginning the mutuelles only provided health insurance but recently many are 
restructuring and diversifying their services. They are based on the principle of solidarity and usually 
have a contributory set-up. The beneficiaries are all households, specifically those who are vulnerable. It 
must be noted that expenses related to chronic diseases are in general not covered by the mutuelles¸ as 
well as, medical evacuations from or to hospitals abroad. The mutuelles in Benin have considerable 
political weight and are consulted during the drafting of new strategies and policies related to social 
protection. They are projected as community based organizations yet the field data suggests that they 
are confronted with problems related to organizational structure, registration, recognition and 
representation. Furthermore, the lack of a national legislative framework poses problems and many 
mutuelles do not follow the UEMOA guidelines, in particular those related to uniting and decentralizing. 
UEMOA argues that the mutuelles should form national confederations (similar to trade unions) but 
should also be managed in a decentralized fashion to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of a 
small elite. These initiatives should decrease corruption and increase harmonization and transparency 
amongst the mutuelles and their beneficiaries.  
Mutuelle de Sécurité Sociale au Benin 
The MSSB provides health care and old age pensions for informal workers (in particular artisans, 
artistes, farmers, fishers, cattle holders, traders and other professional associations) and was 
installed already in 1999. MSSB was installed with the technical and financial support of the ILO 
(STEP programme) and the Belgian Technical Cooperation and is based on a monthly fee of 2000 
FCFA and is a voluntary scheme. The coverage is howver low with approximately 5000 
beneficiaries in 4 provinces (Chadare, 2014) and the MSSB faces a number of structural problems:  
 The lack of political will to provide the necessary subsidies 
 The increase of the contribution to the detriment of the beneficiaries 
 The administration’s lack of human resources and expertise 
 The role of every institution and branch is not clearly defined 
 The monitoring is left to the managing authority (the Ministry of Labour) 
 The misuse of funds  
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Both types of mutuelles make agreements with hospitals and health centers regarding the costs that 
need to paid. Payments are made directly to the hospital or health centre and can be recovered 
afterwards through the mutuelles. Honest cooperation between the mutuelles and health centers is 
important to insure the correct functioning of this type of health care system.  
There are a few private insurance companies in Benin but, due to the high rate of contributions, only a 
small elite has private health insurance.  
In Ale´s (2013) research on three informal sectors in Benin (namely catering, trade of unofficial petrol 
and agro-processing) not one Mutuelle was identified amongst the more than 60 economic-unites 
investigated. This suggests that workers´ organisations in the informal economy in Benin do not create 
their own mutuelles, in contrast with the examples we discussed above in Senegal (e.g. Transvie).  
 
4. Conclusion and recommandations 
In fear of repeating ourselves, Benin has witnessed a wave of policies related to social protection. The 
most significant ones in relation to the extension of social protection are the MSSB and RAMU. In this 
respect, the respondents interviewed for this study mentioned that the state must first and foremost 
execute the strategies it has adopted and respect the laws it has signed. In fact there is no lack of social 
protection mechanisms in Benin but an overload of fragmented approaches without a clear legal and 
policy structure which results into sub-optimal outcomes. For example, it is not clear how RAMU and the 
CPS will complement each other, although both intend to provide health insurance for informal workers. 
Trade unions in Benin are well organized and have made relative progress in reaching out to the 
informal economy. They therefore can play a significant role in the following areas of importance for the 
future development of social protection in the country.  
 First things first. It is advisable for the Beninese government to ratify the core ILO convention on 
minimum standards of social protection, C102. Unions could lobby for this to be taken up by the 
government.  
 Putting your action where your mouth is. Unions have an important role to play in ensuring that 
the RAMU and the reforms of the MSSB (now CPS), which at present remain paper 
commitments, will materialize. Unions could have an important role as watchdogs over the 
future implementation of both schemes.  
 Increasing coherence. As mentioned above, the multitude of programmes, strategies and 
projects need to be streamlined. Trade unions could put pressure on the government to develop 
a system’s approach, based on the complementarity of social protection schemes (see Robalino 
et al., 2012).   
 Delineating tasks and responsibilities. Unions could advocate installing a clear division of labour 
between all relevant actors in the social protection landscape in Togo. Specifically the 
multitudes of ministries which are involved require well-defined responsibilities in order to 
increase coherence and complementarity. Trade unions could take up their watch-dog role and 
raise awareness about illicit practices or corruption in the field of social protection.  
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 Picking your battles. In similar vein to the recommendations for the other case studies it is 
important to prioritize in social expenditure. The Beninese national budget is limited and needs 
are many. Trade Unions could play a role in defining the priorities based on the needs and 
perceptions of their constituencies.  Building on the initiatives taken with regards to health care 
(RAMU and CPS) seems logical.  
 Raising awareness. Unions play important roles in raising awareness about the importance of 
health insurance and other forms of social protection. If RAMU and CPS are effectively 
implemented unions could specifically try to convince their members into subscribing to these 
schemes (MMSB in the past has for instance been quite effective in attracting members 
amongst informal workers).    
 Redistributing. The policy papers and academic articles and reports do not link the social 
protection agenda with the increased inequality in many African countries. In terms of the 
inequality adjusted HDI Benin loses up to 35,8% on the HDI due to inequality (HDR, 2013). Trade 
unions, therefore could lobby to put redistribution on the political agenda: the revenues gained 
from key industries could serve as a financial base for social expenditures (health, education, …) 
 Investing in quality. In addition, building on Criel et al.’s (2002) study and likewise to the 
recommendation for the other countries, unions could equally stress the importance of the 
quality of health care and other social protection benefits for that matter. Increasing coverage 
to insurance schemes is namely related to the quality of the benefits that one receives in return 
for his/her contribution.  
 Joining forces. In Benin there are few actors besides the Trade Unions who are working on the 
issue of social protection. The multi-actor analysis (see annex 1) does indicate that the Ligue des 
Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, could be an interesting partner for CGTB and COSI. At the time 
of the research they were not directly involved with the issue of social protection but they work 
on the topic of human rights in general and in this sense they could support a rights-based 
approach to social protection.  
The role of CNV Internationaal in these endeavours could take the form of: organizing exchange 
events between Beninese unions and unions in other countries which have met the same obstacles 
and have overcome them;  supporting the improvement of lobbying and advocacy skills; and 
supporting a local awareness raising campaign.  
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CHAPTER 6: Examples from other countries 
 
As mentioned in the introduction social protection in Africa has witnessed a boost over the last decade 
with multiple countries taking initiatives regarding the extension of protection to and the accessibility 
for informal workers.  In this chapter we will briefly discuss the examples of social protection schemes in 
Rwanda and Ghana, as a point of reference, which have made relative progress with regards to 
extension of social protection to the informally employed. There are, of course, other countries which 
are worth mentioning as well; Ethiopia for instance, who – as one of the only countries in Africa – 
managed to developed a nationally owned social protection agenda to which donors must align (Holmes 
& Langwa-Ntale, 2012); and South Africa, with its three-tier old age pension scheme which has enabled 
an almost universal coverage (Van Zyl, 2003).  
Before we present the integrated system of mutuelles in Rwanda and the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana, it is necessary to say that there have been multiple studies on both schemes, 
presenting pro’s and con’s, weaknesses and failures, but for the purpose of this report we will be slightly 
more positive and stress the lessons that can be learned for our case study countries (Guinea, Senegal, 
Niger, Togo and Benin). Those interested in a more nuanced in-depth reflections on the social protection 
systems in Ghana and Rwanda are invited to consult the extensive bibliography in annex which includes 
numerous references to these cases.  
1. Mutuelles in Rwanda: Extending Coverage 
 
The Rwandese government has since 2005 increased its commitment towards Social Protection. After 
the elaboration of a social protection policy in 2005 and a Public Expenditure Review (PER) in 2006  
social protection  was adopted as one of the priority sectors in the Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy of 2007, by the government. Rwanda has an elaborate set of social security schemes 
for the private and public sector, well-functioning labour market programs (the Umurenge Programme) 
and of particular interest for this report mutuelles de Santé that in 2010 covered 91% of the population 
(Ruberangeyo et al., 2011). An absolute milestone in comparison with the coverage rates of the West 
African countries discussed in this study. What are the reasons behind the success of the mutuelles in 
Rwanda?  
The guiding principles of the Rwandese mutuelles are similar to those in Guinea, Togo, and the other 
case studies that are discussed in this report, namely:  pre-payment (once a year); solidarity;  risk 
pooling; subsidization of most vulnerable/poor people through targeting mechanisms; and 
supplementary to other health insurance schemes (Ruberangeyo et al., 2011). But what then explains 
the success of the Rwandese mutuelles in terms of coverage?  
 First of all, vulnerable groups are supported through the creation of financial mechanisms. 
Support can come from the state, NGOs or other civil society organisations but the process is 
managed by national policies and regulations in order to ensure coherence.  
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 Contributions are relatively low (RF 1000 or approx. 2 US dollars a year) and equal for everyone. 
The government matches these funds to cover the costs of higher care levels. 
  The member must pay a small co- payment at the health-care facility (a fixed amount or a 
percentage depending on the level of care). 
 There is a strong political commitment on all levels (national, regional, district,…). 
 There is a Global mobilization in favour of CBHI (local authorities, health facilities, etc.). 
 There are numerous awareness campaigns through media and community meetings. 
 These campaigns have help to support local ownership of the initiative thanks to the 
understanding of the concept. 
 The PER has made it possible to develop a sound financial plan, making the system financially 
affordable. 
 There is a mutuelle at every public health-care center. 
 Lastly, all levels of health care are accessible (health-care center, district hospital and referral 
hospital). 
On top of these strengths there are a few structural factors which have supported the implementation 
of the national system of mutuelles: a good functioning network of health facilities in the entire country; 
universal coverage is a political priority (strong political willingness); the health interventions are 
coordinated at national level; traditional community targeting mechanism are used to identify poor and 
indigents; and decentralization has led to representation of authorities close to the population 
(Ruberangeyo et al., 2011). Overall the mutuelles in Rwanda have made the following achievements 
(Ruberangeyo et al., 2011):  
• The rate of use of health services has increased significantly (0.86 in 2009) 
• High coverage rate of the population (91% as of June 2010) 
• Monthly reporting from all mutuelles at a decentralized level through a national database; 
• Coverage of the poorest people. 
In sum, we can state that the integrated system of mutuelles in Rwanda has been effective in providing 
health care insurance for the majority of its people and could be used as an increasing the coverage in. 
Building on the Rwandese example the following lessons can be drawn for Guinea, Senegal, Niger, Togo 
and Benin.  
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Lessons Learned 
 Lobby the government to make social protection a genuine priority 
 Develop a strategy for harmonizing the existing mutuelles 
 Develop a locally embedded and broad based media campaign to raise awareness of 
the benefits of  health insurance and understanding of the concept 
 Use traditional community-targeting mechanisms do identify the poor and vulnerable 
 Create a solidarity fund to subsidize health care of the poor and vulnerable 
 Centralize the coordination and management of the mutuelles  
 Invest in data management and develop a well-functioning data base of all mutuelles 
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2. Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
In 2003 Ghana passed a National Health Insurance Law following an election promise by former 
president John Kufuor. The law created the National Health Insurance Authority which licenses, 
monitors and regulates the operation of health insurance schemes and mandated the establishment of 
district-wide mutual health insurance schemes (DMHIS). The NHIS is a contributory scheme based on a 
minimum premium of 8 dollar per adult for registration (formal workers subscribed to the Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust, SSNIT, are automatically lined through a deduction from their 
salary). Witter & Garshong (2009) however argue that between 70% and 75% of NHIS is financed 
through taxation and only 20-25% from formal sector contributions and 5% from contributions from the 
informal sector.  
Children up until 18 years old as well as people over 70 are exempted from paying. On paper enrollment 
is mandatory but in practice non-compliance is rather high because informal workers are not captured 
by any database making enforcement difficult. Some formal workers furthermore reject to pay the 
subscription fee (which they need to pay on top of the deduction from their salary). There has 
nonetheless been a significant increase in enrollment between 2005 and 2008, rising from 6,6% to 45% 
in three years’ time (Witter & Garshong, 2009:4). In 2010 a new (more accurate) calculating 
methodology was adopted which resulted in an enrollment rate of 34% in 2010 (see figure below). 
 
Figure 2: Enrollment to the NHIS  
 
Source: Universal Access to Health Care Campaign Coalition (2013: 11) 
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In return a pre-defined package of benefits that coves 95% of the disease burden in Ghana is granted. 
Services include medical consultations, essentials drugs, shared accommodation, maternity care (normal 
and caesarian delivery), eye care, dental care and emergency care. The DMHIS contracts accredited 
providers (pubic, private and church-based) to deliver services to its members and reimburse them after 
submission of claims for services (Jehu-Appiah, 2012).    
 
The NHIS however has been confronted with a number challenges the most significant being the poor 
quality of health services (especially in the Northern regions) and the inequity of enrollment. Jehu-
Appiah (2012: 61) concludes that there is a lower enrollment amongst the poorest segments of society. 
An interesting finding however is the fact that indigent people have a relative higher enrollment rate 
then the poor. This suggests that the exemption strategy of the NHIS, which waivers registrations fees 
for those targeted as indigent, has been quite effective.  In line with what Criel et al. (2002) suggests the 
contribution fee and insurance-against future risks set-up are not the main reasons for non-subscription. 
Perceptions about the quality of services again seem to be important factors determining the choice of 
admission (Jehu-Appiah, 2012: 61).  
 
The Universal Access to Health Care Campaign Coalition (2013: 3) identified the following strengths in 
their report in honour of the 10th  year anniversary of NHIS: 
 
• Establishment of 145 autonomous schemes in 2003 and further expansion as new districts were 
created  
• Introduction of the Free Maternal Care Program in 2008 
• Commencement of a legal review process of Act 650, which led to the passage of Act 852 
• Establishment of a Claims Processing Centre (CPC) in 2010 
• Implementation of a Clinical Audit in 2010 
• Establishment of the Consolidated Premium Account (CPA) in 2011;  
• Establishment of the NHIS Call Centre in 2012  
The scheme is currently issuing instant ID cards through a pilot biometric registration program and is 
reviewing capitation payment arrangement for healthcare service providers.  
  
In conclusion, we can state that the NHIS has been quite effective in  providing health care insurance for 
a large part of its population but time will tell if NHIS will be able to overcome the challenges it faces 
with regards to reaching out to the poor and increasing its coverage rate. Building on the Ghanaian 
example the following lessons can be drawn for Guinea, Senegal, Niger, Togo and Benin.  
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Lessons Learned 
 Hold governments to their electoral commitments (many governments make promises 
they fail to fulfill after they won the ballot)  
 Develop a strategy that builds on the existing health care providers whether they are 
public, private or church-based  
 Good “indigent” targeting mechanisms and exemptions to registration fees can 
increase enrollment amongst the most vulnerable in society   
 Create a tax-based solidarity fund to subsidize the health care of the poor and 
vulnerable 
 Centralize the coordination and management of the health insurance scheme 
 Invest as much in the quality of enrollment than in the expansion of coverage 
 Address local perceptions on insurance systems, fees are not the most important 
reasons for non-enrollment 
 Invest in data management and develop a well-functioning data base  to support the 
registration of informal workers 
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CHAPTER 7:  Concluding remarks 
 
In this study the conclusions and recommendations have been presented at country level, because in 
the end it is at country level where social protection policies are to be implemented and strategic actors, 
including trade unions, play their role. In the following we will briefly present some concluding remarks 
which point at some similarities and cross-cutting findings among the five countries when looking at 
their social protection policies and schemes in relation to informal workers.  
A first cross-cutting finding is that coherence in policies and programmes poses a major challenge to the 
stakeholders involved. Various reasons can be thought of that may lead to incoherence and therefore 
less effective social protection policies and programmes. In the countries under study politics is a major 
hindrance to collective action because serving self-interests often prevails over serving public welfare. 
This does not only include party politics at national level but also politics among the stakeholders 
involved in influencing, formulating and implementing social protection policies and programmes. This 
prevents that the social protection of the informal economy is high on the national agenda, and political 
fragmentation makes it hard for trade unions and representatives of informal workers’ organizations to 
become part of a national discussion and become agenda setting.  
In addition, in all five countries national ownership of social protection policies seems to be missing, 
which in turn also leads to a lack of coherence. The rationale behind existing policies and programmes 
reflects a patchwork of ideas which can be traced back to the several international organizations and 
donors that are involved in social protection and offer their assistance to the countries under study. The 
overview of the lines of thinking on social protection presented in the first chapter of this study already 
shows that a ‘social protection pluralism’ exists. Countries where formal social protection policies and 
schemes have been almost non-existent run the risk of being confronted with the ‘fashion of the day’, 
over time leading to a patchwork of policies, governmental and executive bodies involved in social 
protection. This does not promote coherence. Countries that have been (partly) successful in gaining 
national ownership over their social protection agenda, such as Ethiopia, Ghana and Rwanda, show that 
this may lead to more coherence and more effectiveness. National ownership may also lead to 
downward accountability (to the people for whom the social protection schemes are set-up) instead of 
upwards (to the donors that often provide money and technical assistance to set up the schemes). The 
former may allow for a more active role of trade unions and informal workers representatives in terms 
of negotiating space and being a countervailing power.   
Successful examples from other countries (Ghana, Rwanda, and Ethiopia) show that political 
commitment to setting-up an effective social protection structure that includes also informal workers is 
an important prerequisite for any scheme or programme to be successful. And besides this commitment 
the focus on the most urgent needs is also a major characteristic. Instead of striving for a comprehensive 
and full coverage for all sorts of risks and destitution, the successful countries focus on one or two major 
areas first. Health insurance seems the most obvious among these risks, also because many surveys 
have pointed out that health risks / illness are among the most cited risks by respondents for falling 
(back) into poverty. Health insurance schemes can be set-up in numerous ways, which are less or more 
accessible for people in the informal sector as well. Ghana has set-up an obligatory national health 
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insurance scheme, partly based on previously existing mutual health organizations, Rwanda is in the 
process of doing the same, building on the mutuelles de santé. As explained in the chapter on these 
Ghanaian and Rwandan examples, the schemes are not perfect, but at least succeed in attaining a higher 
coverage than social security schemes for the formal sector usually do in other countries.  
Still, it should also be recognized that the set-up and implementation of social protection schemes is 
expensive. In societies where tax collection is very low due to a large informal economy, it can be highly 
questioned whether a full blown national social protection system is feasible and realistic. Partly, the 
political economy of redistribution plays a role here. Countries with high windfall profits from minerals 
and other natural resources could in theory chose to invest in social protection policies and institutions 
as well. Political systems that are mainly meant to be a vehicle for the elite to seek and capture rents, 
however, offer very little scope for redistributive policies.  Notwithstanding, for the countries we are 
talking about the possibilities to finance a social protection scheme are also very limited. This, again, 
emphasizes the need for setting priorities in which risks will be covered first and which risks should be 
covered in a later stage. A Catch 22 situation may arise. For extending a social protection system to the 
informal economy more tax income may be needed, but the same, often large informal economy limits 
the tax income base in many African countries to do so.  
Even if a country succeeds in setting up a social protection scheme it is not said that it will help the 
people. Often effective social protection requires actions in other policy areas too.  Health insurance will 
only be beneficial when there is a well-functioning health care system that ensures that people can 
receive adequate and effective treatment. This explains to a large extent why in some countries under 
study, including Togo, Guinea and Niger, participation in existing health insurance schemes is so low. 
Therefore low coverage figures on social protection may also be an indication that existing schemes lack 
a comprehensive ‘system approach’ in which other policy areas relevant for adequate risk management 
are also included. In addition, sound macroeconomic policies are equally important here. Old age 
pensions may certainly help elderly to survive but under high inflation rates the amounts they receive 
may evaporate without inflation correction (as often is the case, not only in the developing world). In 
sum, social protection policy is an integral part of wider social (including health) and economic policies. 
The issue of coherence also becomes the more urgent here as well.  
Last but not least a general, cross-cutting conclusion can be that much exists on paper, but far less has 
been implemented. Ratification, legislation, policy plans, they may all exist on paper but very little has 
become reality. Governance and institutional problems are main reasons for failing to convert paper 
into action and into effective social protection policies and schemes. And if schemes are there they are 
often plagued by weak management and governance.  For example, in all countries under study the 
governing boards of the CNSS are ‘tigers on paper’. CNV trade union partners are member of the 
governing boards (except for Togo), but the boards only existing on paper does imply that trade unions 
have very little political leverage within these boards.  In most countries we speak of in this report the 
trust of workers in social protection provisions is therefore also very low.  
Do these cross-cutting issues also have implications for the agenda of trade unions? Several 
recommendations have been given in each country chapter. We are not going to repeat them here. 
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What we would like to put forward here is the discussion whether in countries with weak institutional 
and governance structures it would be such a good idea to advocate that informal workers should be 
included in formal social protection schemes? Perhaps it is more important for trade unions to raise 
discussion within the country how social protection schemes can be set up that are tailored to the needs 
of informal sector workers, without looking too much at the schemes that have been set up for the 
formal sector. For informal workers it might be that we need more innovative, alternative schemes that 
go beyond the strict international definitions of what social security and social protection is or should 
be. These might be schemes set up without state involvement but set up by other stakeholders within 
an economic sector or among a specific group of workers. The degree of formality of these schemes 
would probably be less than schemes set up for the formal sector, but this would reflect most likely the 
conditions currently prevailing in the informal economy.   
The extent to which trade unions can reach informal workers is a huge debate and issue of concern for 
trade unionists. By working more closely together with informal workers’ representatives and 
organizations on the topic of social protection trade unions might be able to play a pivotal role in 
advocacy and service delivery regarding innovative social protection schemes. It could be one way to 
reach the informal workers whose risk exposure and vulnerability are notoriously high and critical. Trade 
unions could strengthen their role as partner of informal workers organizations, and with their strong 
networks with stakeholders in the formal sector, trade unions have a comparative advantage and added 
value in strengthening the political leverage of informal worker organization with regard to social 
protection issues.  
Rome wasn’t built in a day, it took centuries actually. The urgency of the problem of lack of social 
protection for informal workers is more urgent though. It will take more than one day to solve this 
problem but with much resourcefulness and political commitment a lot can be reached within one 
generation, as the successful cases in Rwanda, Ghana and Ethiopia, as well as the good examples from 
the five countries presented in the country chapters, show. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
References 
Adesina, J.O. (2011) Beyond the social protection paradigm: social policy in Africa's development, 
Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 32 (4): 454-470. 
 
AfDB (2012) Income Inequality in Africa, Briefing Note, 5, Addis Ababa: African Development Bank. 
 
Ale, A. (2013) Economie Informelle et L’Emploi au Bénin: Cadre et Pratiques de l’Economie Informelle 
dans 3 secteurs d’activités à Cotonou, Geneva: International Labour Office. 
 
Ambec, S. & Treich, N. (2003) Roscas as Financial Agreements to cope with social pressure, Working 
Paper, Grenoble:Labaratoire d’Economie Appliquée de Grenoble.  
 
Barrientos, A. (2012) social transfers and growth: What do we know? What do we need to find out?, 
World Development, 40 (1): 11-20. 
 
Booner, C. & Spooner, D. (2011) Organizing in the Informal Economy: Challenge for Trade Unions, 
International Politics and Society, IPG 2: 87-105. 
 
Chen, M. (2008). Informality and social protection: theories and realities, IDS bulletin, 39 (2): 28-27. 
Coleman,R. ( 2011) Realising Decent Work and Social Protection for All:How civil society organisations 
are creating change, London: Solidar. 
 
Criel, B., Noumou Barry, A., & Von Roenne, F (2002) Le projet PRIMA en Guinée Conakry : une 
expérience d'organisation de mutuelles de santé en Afrique rurale, Medicus Mundi, Belgium: Institut de 
médecine tropicale. 
 
Devereux, S. & Getu, M. (2013) Informal and formal social protection systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Kampala, Fountain Publishers. 
 
Devereux, S. & Sabatas-Wheeler, R. ( 2004) Transformative social protection, IDS Working Paper 232, 
Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Diop, F. & Ba, A. (2010) Mutual health insurance, scaling-up and the expansion of health insurance in 
Africa, USAID. 
 
Diop, A.Y. (2003) Governance of social security regimes: trends in Senegal, International Social Security 
Review, 56 (3-4):17-23. 
 
Docking, T. (2002) Responding to War and State Collapse in West Africa, United States Institute of Peace 
Special Report, Washingtong: USIP. 
 
103 
 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013-2016), Trade Union Co-Financing Programme: VMP 2013-2016. 
Den Haag. 
 
Ferreire, F. & Robalino, D. (2010) Social Protection in Latin America: Achievements and Limitations 
Policy Research Working Paper, 5305, Washington: World Bank. 
Gassama, K., Houeninvo, T., Traoré, B. (2014) Senegal 2014, African Economic Outlook, retrieved from 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Senegal_EN.p
df 
 
Finn D., van Wamelen, A., Lund, S., Cabral, A., Taoufki, M., Dörr, N., Leke, A., Roxburgh, C., Schubert, J. & 
Cook, P. (2012) Africa at Work: Job Creation and Inclusive Growth, McKinsey Global Institute. 
 
Ginneken, W.v. (1999) Social security for the excluded majority: a new challenge for the developing 
countriesI, International Social Security Review, 52 (1): 46-69. 
 
Ginneken, W.v. (2003) Extending social security:Policies for developing countries, International Labour 
Review, 142 (3): 277-294. 
 
Haddad, S., Fournier, P., Machouf, N., & Yatara, F. (1998) What does quality mean to lay people? 
Community perceptions of primary health care services in Guinea, Social Science & Medicine, 47 (3): 
381–394. 
 
Heintz, J. & Valodia,I. (2008) Informality in Africa: A review, Working Paper, 3, Cambridge: WIEGO. 
Hodges, A (2010) UNICEF: Etude sur l'état des lieux et les perspectives de protection sociale au Bénin, 
Oxford Policy Management, retrieved from  
http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/RessShowRessource.do?ressourceId=23024 
 
Holmes, R. & Lwanga-Ntale, C.(2012) Social protection in Africa: a review of social protection issues in 
research: policy and programming trends and key governance issues in social protection, Nairobi: PASGR. 
 
Holzmann, R. & Jorgensen, S. (2001) Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social 
Protection, and Beyond, International Tax and Public Finance, 8: 529–556. 
 
Hussmanns, R. (2003) Defining and measuring informal employment, Geneva: ILO. 
 
ILO (2004) Economic security for a better world, Geneva: International Labour Office.  
 
ILO (2012) R202 - Social Protection Floors Recommendation, ILO recommendations, 202, Geneva: 
International Labour Office. 
 
International Labour Office (2002) Decent Work and the Informal Economy, Report VI ILC 90th Session, 
Geneva: International Labour Office. 
104 
 
 
ISSA (2011) Africa: A new balance for social security, Geneva: ISSA 
 
ITUC (2010a) Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, retrieved from http://survey.ituc-
csi.org/Guinea.html?lang=en 
 
ITUC (2010b) Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, retrieved from http://survey.ituc-
csi.org/Senegal.html?lang=en 
ITUC (2010c), Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, retrieved from http://survey.ituc-
csi.org/Togo.html?lang=en#tabs-2 
 
ITUC (2010d) Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, retrieved from http://survey.ituc-
csi.org/Benin.html?lang=en 
 
Jacob, D. (1987) UNICEF Annual Report, Washington: UNICEF. 
 
Jehu-Appiah, C. (2012) Reaching the poor in Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme; Equity aspects 
and strategies to improve enrolment, Nijmegen 29 August 2012. 
 
Kaag, M. & Wade, B. (2009) Le syndicalisme au Sénégal: Une analyse du context, Utrecht: CNV 
Internationaal. 
 
Kaag, M., Keja, R. & Bacar, A.B. (2013) Guinea at the Crossroads: A labour rights perspective, Utrecht: 
CNV Internationaal. 
 
Kalusopa, T., Dicks, R., & Osei-Boateng, C. (2012) Social protection in Africa: African Labour Research 
Network. 
 
Keja, R., Leliveld, A. & Zanou, P. (2011) Words cannot be eaten, but they can give hope: perspectives for 
the trade union movement in Togo, Utrecht: CNV Internationaal. 
 
Keja, R. & Zanou, P. (2012) Trade Union Movement in Niger: The Future Depends on the Present, Utrecht: 
CNV Internationaal. 
 
Leliveld, A., Dekker,M.,  't Hart, C. &  Gnimad, J. (2010) Can't buy me health: financial constraints and 
health-seeking behaviour in rural households in central Togo, in Dekker, M. & van Dijk, R.A. Markets  
of well-being: navigating health and healing in Africa, Leiden: Brill:  255-281. 
 
Levy-Bruhl, D., Soucat, A., Osseni, R., Ndiale, J.-M., Dieng, B., & de Bethune, X., et al. (1997) The Bamako 
Initiative in Benin and Guinea: Improving the effectiveness of primary health care,  
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 12(Suppl. 1): S49–S79. 
 
105 
 
Manlan, O. (2014) Guinea 2014, African Economic Outlook, retrieved from 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Guinee_EN.p
df 
 
Mkandawire, T. (2005) Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation, Africa Development, 30(1-2): 
1-33.  
 
Mosoetsa, S. & Tshoaedi, M. (2013) COSATU Retreating to the Workplace in Post-apartheid South Africa: 
What about Community Struggles?, Rethinking Development and Inequality, 2: 28-46. 
Ndoye, D. & Ndiaye M. (2014) Niger 2014, African Economic Outlook, retrieved from 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Niger_ENG.pd
f 
 
Ndoye, M. & Fall, E.H. (2014) Benin 2014, African Economic Outlook, retrieved from 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Benin_EN.pdf  
 
Ntagungira, C. (2014) Togo 2014, African Economic Outlook, retrieved from 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Togo_EN.pdf 
 
Pal, K. (2005) Can low income countries afford basic social protection? : first results of a modelling 
exercise, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Robalino, D.A., Rawings, L., Walker, I. (2012) Building Social Protection and Labor Systems: Concepts and 
Operational Implications, Social Protection and Labor Discussion Paper, 1202, Washington: World Bank. 
 
Ruberangeyo, T., Ayebare, C. & de Laminne de Bex, A. (2011) Rwanda, Social Protection: An Ongoing 
Process, in ILO Sharing Innovative Experiences, Volume 18: Successful Social Protection Floor 
Experiencies, Geneva: ILO: 333-360. 
 
Sen, A. (1981: 31) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Sindzingre, A. (2006) The Relevance of the Concepts of Formality and Informality: A Theoretical 
Appraisal, in Guha-Khasnobis, B.,  Kandbur, R. & Ostrom, E. Linking the formal and informal economy: 
Concepts and Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Spooner, D. (2007) Trade Unions and NGOs: the need for cooperation, Development in Practice, 14 (1-2): 
19-33. 
 
Szirmai, A. (2012) Proximate, Intermediate and Ultimate Causality: Theories and Experiences of Growth 
and Development, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series, 032, Maastricht: UNU-MERIT. 
 
106 
 
Taylor, V. (2009) Social protection in Africa: an overview of the challenges: a study commissioned by the 
African Union, Addis Ababa: African Union. 
 
Theron, J. (2011) Non-standard workers, collective bargaining and social dialogue: The case of South 
Africa, Working Paper, 28, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Theron, J. (2010) Informalization from Above, Informalization from Below: The Options for Organization, 
African Studies Quarterly, 11(2&3): 87-105. 
 
Thiam, B. (2009) Study on extending social protection in Senegal, Working Paper, 3, Geneva: ISSA 
Universal Access to Health Care Campaign Coalition (2013) Ten years of the National Health Insurance 
Scheme in Ghana A civil society perspective on its successes and failure, Ghana: UAHCCC. 
 
Van Zyl, E.( 2003) Old Age Pensions in South Africa, International Social Security Review, 56 (3-4): 101-
120.  
 
Videt, B. (2014) Social protection for inclusive growth: How welfare schemes might contribute to 
economic growth, retrieved from  http://thebrokeronline.eu/Articles/Social-protection-for-inclusive-
growth. 
 
Westen, G.v & Zanou, P. (2010) Impossible n’est pas Beninois: The economic and social context of the 
Trade Union Movement in Benin, Utrecht: CNV Internationaal. 
 
WIEGO (2014) History and Debates, retrieved from  http://wiego.org/informal-economy/history-
debates. 
 
Witter, S. & Garshong, B. (2009) Something old or something new? Social health insurance in Ghana, 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 9(10): 1-13 
 
World Bank (2012) Togo: Towards a National Social Protection Policy and Strategy, Washington: World 
Bank. 
 
World Bank (2012) Project Information Document (PID) Appraisal Stage: Safety Net Project, Washington: 
Word Bank. 
 
World Bank (2012) Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of SDR 16, 2 Million 
(US$ 25,0 million equivalent) to the Republic of Guinea for a Productive Social Safety Net Project, 
Washington: World Bank. 
 
World Bank (2013) World Development Report: Jobs, Washington: World Bank. 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
ANNEX 1: Multi-Actor Analyses 
1. Guinea 
 
Nom Description Forces Faiblesses Partenaire Partenaire 
Potential 
CNTG CONFEDERATIO
N SYNDICALE 
DES 
TRAVAILLEURS 
DE GUINEE. 
Principal 
centrale 
syndicale du 
pays  
- Vaste 
couverture 
interprofession
nelle et 
territoriale. 
- Structure 
affiliée assez 
indépendante 
- Grande  
- Expérience 
avérée dans la 
constitution 
des mutuelles 
de santé 
- Participation 
au conseil 
d’administratio
n de la CNSS 
- Participation 
au CA des 
futures 
- insuffisance des 
moyens 
techniques et 
financiers dans 
la promotion de 
la protection 
sociale 
- Absence d’une 
politique 
nationale de 
protection 
sociale 
- Ministère du 
Travail 
- CNSS 
- Ministère de 
l’action sociale 
- CNV 
- BIT 
 
 
 
 
 
- INAMO 
- Caisse de 
prévoyan
ce sociale 
- Mouvem
ent 
syndical 
-  
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institution de 
protection 
sociale 
Ministère du 
Travail 
Département 
ministériel en 
charge de 
promouvoir la 
politique de 
travail de la 
Guinée 
- Connaissance 
acceptable du 
secteur de la 
protection 
sociale 
- Présence de 
quelques 
instruments 
juridiques: 
code du travail, 
code de la 
protection 
sociale, décret 
INAMO et de 
Caisse de 
prévoyance 
sociale 
- présence de 
l’inspection 
Générale du 
travail 
- connaissance 
relative sur la 
protection 
sociale 
- faiblesse des 
textes dans la 
couverture de 
tous les 
travailleurs de 
Guinée 
- faible capacité 
technique dans 
le montage, le 
suivi et 
l’évaluation des 
projets 
- BIT 
- Mouvem
ent 
syndical 
- Société 
civile 
- Gouvern
ement 
 
- Mutuelle
s 
professio
nnelles 
exerçant 
dans la 
protectio
n sociale 
- secteur 
prive 
(employe
urs et  
operateu
rs prive 
de la 
protectio
n sociale) 
CNSS Etablissement 
public 
- Expérience 
dans la 
- couverture 
limitée dans les 
- Ministère 
de 
Ministère de 
l’économie et du 
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administrative 
charge de la 
gestion du 
régime  général 
de sécurité 
sociale en 
Guinée 
 
 
couverture 
multisectorielle 
des travailleurs 
du secteur 
mixte et prive 
- Autonomie de 
gestion 
-  
prestations 
sociales aux 
travailleurs 
- couverture 
exclusive des 
travailleurs du 
secteur formel. 
- Lenteur dans la 
prise en charge 
des cas 
d’accident de 
travail et 
maladie 
professionnelles 
- Lenteur dans la 
prise en charge 
médicale des 
retraites 
l’action 
sociale 
- Ministère 
du 
Travail 
- CNTG 
- Associati
on 
internati
onal de 
la 
sécurité 
sociale 
plan 
- institutio
n 
internati
onales 
couvrant 
la 
sécurité 
sociale 
- BIT 
- Société 
civile 
Ministère action 
sociale 
Département 
Ministériel 
charge de 
l’élaboration et 
de la promotion 
de la politique 
de promotion 
sociale du pays 
- Existence de 
divisions 
spécialisées 
dans l’action 
sociale 
- couverture 
nationale 
- encrage 
institutionnel 
de la CNSS 
-  
- faiblesse des 
textes dans la 
couverture de 
tous les 
travailleurs de 
Guinée 
- faible capacité 
technique dans le 
montage, le suivi et 
l’évaluation des projets 
- CNSS 
- Partenaires 
sociaux 
- Système des 
nations Unies 
-  société civile 
- BIT 
- Association 
international de 
la sécurité sociale 
- société civile 
BIT Agence des - Longue - Faible présence - Gouvern Société civile 
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Nations unies 
spécialisées sur 
les questions de 
travail 
expérience 
dans 
l’élaboration et 
la promotion 
de programme, 
projet de 
promotion 
sociale dans les 
pays membre 
de l’ONU 
- Plus grande 
assiette de 
partenaires 
technique et 
financiers 
- Plus grande 
capacité de 
mobilisation de 
ressources 
en Afrique de 
l’ouest  et pas 
de bureau a 
Conakry 
- Faible intérêt 
pour le secteur 
informel 
- Faible 
connaissance 
empirique sur le 
secteur informel 
 
ement 
- Autres 
agences 
du 
Système 
des 
Nations 
unies 
- Mouvem
ent 
syndical 
Ministère de la 
santé publique 
Département 
ministériel en 
charge de la 
promotion de la 
santé et de 
l’hygiène 
publique 
- Expérience dans la 
politique de gestion de 
la santé  et l’hygiène 
publique en Guinée  
- Faiblesse des 
capacités de 
communication 
- Faible capacité 
d’élaboration et 
de gestion de 
projets et 
programme 
dans le secteur 
de la santé. 
- Faible capacité 
Autres 
départements 
ministériels 
- OMS 
- ONG 
internati
onales 
specialise
es en 
santé 
publique 
- Ministère
s de la 
santé de 
la sous 
région 
- Organism
e 
internati
onaux de 
protectio
n sociale 
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2. Senegal 
 
Nom Description Forces Faiblesses Partenaire Partenaire 
Potential 
Fonds nationals 
de Retraite  
Il s’agit d’un régime 
d’assurance sociale qui 
fournit les prestations de 
retraite, d’invalidité et de 
survivant, d’une part et 
d’autre part, les 
prestations d’allocations 
familiales aux agents 
fonctionnaires (civils, 
militaires et paramilitaires) 
de l’Etat. Il est financé par 
les cotisations et le budget 
de l’Etat.  
-Pension de 
retraite plus 
convenable, car 
calculée sur le 
pourcentage des 
salaires.  
- 
-Ne concerne que les 
travailleurs 
fonctionnaires de 
l’Etat, soit ….% 
-problème de 
financement : risque 
de déficite à cause de 
l’accroissement du 
nombre de retraités 
avec un faible nombre 
de cotisant et des 
réformes en 2002 (Loi 
N. 2002-08) 
Il n’y a pas de relations du point de vue 
institutionnel entre les syndicats et le 
FNR 
de couverture 
médicale et 
pharmaceutique 
des populations 
- Faible 
capacitives 
techniques et 
matériels pour 
la prise en 
charge des 
personnes du 
3eme âge. 
- Commun
auté 
rurales 
de 
développ
ement 
- Collectiv
es locales 
- Société 
civile 
- Structure
s 
mutualist
es du 
secteur 
informel 
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Institut de 
prévoyance de 
retraités du 
Sénégal (IPRES 
Régime d’Assurance 
sociale pour la retraite des 
salariés du secteur privé, 
des employés de maison, 
des agents contractuels ou 
décisionnaires de l’Etat,  
des  agents  des  
collectivités  locales  et  
des  établissements  
publics, du personnel des 
sociétés d’économie 
mixte.   
L’IPRES a un régime 
obligatoire général et un 
régime complémentaire 
pour les travailleurs  
cadres.  
Les prestations suivantes 
sont fournies : pension de 
retraite, allocation de 
réversion, allocation de 
solidarité et le fonds social 
-Dispositions pour les 
travailleurs 
domestiques et 
journaliers à pouvoir 
bénéficier de ses 
prestations. 
-disposition d’un 
fond social 
-calcul des pensions : 
système de pointage, 
désavantageux par 
rapport aux retraités 
du FNR. 
-le plafond du salaire 
de base pour le calcul 
des cotisations ;  
- la faiblesse du taux de 
couverture de la 
population  
(environ 12% de la 
population active et 5 
à 7% de la  
population  totale) 
- des contraintes 
juridiques et 
techniques qui freinent  
la prise en charge des 
activités non salariées.  
Les syndicats sont 
membres du conseil 
d’administration 
 
Caisse de 
Sécurité Sociale 
(CSS) 
Institut de prévoyance 
sociale qui a en charge les 
branches de la sécurité 
sociale que sont : les 
allocations familiales, de 
maternité et les accidents 
de travail et de maladies 
professionnelles. Sa 
population cible est les 
travailleurs régis par le 
code du travail et de la 
Elle couvre  tous les 
travailleurs du 
secteur privé formel .  
-ne prend pas en 
compte une grande 
partie de la population 
qui évolue dans 
l’économie informelle 
et leur famille. 
- loi 73.37 du 31.7.73  
portant Code de 
Sécurité Sociale  
 n’intègre pas les 
autres branches  
Les syndicats sont 
membres du conseil 
d’administration 
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marine marchande et des 
journaliers et autres pour 
la branche accident de 
travail et maladies 
professionnelles 
uniquement.   
de sécurité sociale. 
- 
Instituts de 
prévoyance 
maladie (IPM) 
Crées par un décret de 
1975, elles sont des 
régimes d’assurance pour 
la branche « santé et soins 
médicaux) de tous les 
travailleurs du secteur 
privés. Toute entreprise 
ayant au moins 300 
employés est tenue de 
créer une IPM, si elle en 
dispose moins, alors elle 
est tenue de s’inscrire 
dans une IPM inter-
entreprises.  Le 
financement est assuré 
par une cotisation 
mensuelle patronale et 
salariale de 4-15% 
appliquée sur une assiette 
de 250 000 f CFA 
maximum. La prise en 
charge peut aller de 50 à 
80%.  
   
Couverture des 
travailleurs du 
secteur formel et des 
membres de leurs 
familles.  
-exclusion d’une forte 
partie de la population 
active. 
-faible niveau de 
couverture 24%  et 
risque d’évasion 
sociale 
-absence de 
coordination entre IPM 
-exclusion des 
travailleurs de 
l’économie informelle ; 
Pas de relation, les IPM sont gérées par 
les employeurs au sein des entreprises 
Les mutuelles de 
Santé 
 
Elles constituent un 
régime d’assurance 
maladie volontaire, 
Accessible aux 
travailleurs de 
l’économie 
-Faible capacité 
contributive des 
membres  (pour les 
L’UDTS à sa propre 
mutuelle et peut en 
travailler avec 
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contrairement à l’IPM qui 
est un régime obligatoire.  
Leur mise en place peut 
être le fait des travailleurs 
d’une entreprise du 
secteur formel ou de 
l’économie informelle. Au 
Sénégal, la Transvie, qui 
regroupe des 
transporteurs, est l’une 
des mutuelles illustrative 
de l’économie informelle.  
informelle.  mutuelles de 
l’économie informelle) 
-problème de 
gouvernance des 
mutuelles ;  
-faible adhésion des 
travailleurs (27% de la 
population couverte) 
 
d’autres. 
Bureau 
international du 
travail 
 
Organisme international 
en charge de la question 
de l’organisation et de la 
supervision du respect des 
conditions de travail par 
rapport aux conventions 
ratifiés par le Sénégal. 
-expertise dans la 
mise en œuvre des 
nouvelles politiques 
pour la sécurité 
sociale. 
-pilotage du 
programme 
d’extension de la 
protection  sociale 
  oui 
Ministère du 
Travail (Direction 
de la protection 
sociale) 
 
Ministère de tutelle des 
inspecteurs du travail. Il a 
en charge, d’une manière 
générale, la question de la 
protection sociale et de 
l’exécution de son 
programme de protection 
sociale, en partenariat 
avec le BIT. 
-pilotage des 
réformes sur 
l’extension de la 
protection sociale 
  Oui  
Ministère de la 
santé publique 
Ministère en charge des 
questions de prévention et 
-l’expertise sur la 
question de la CMU 
-faible niveau de 
coordination avec les 
 Oui  
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(cellule d’Appui à 
la Couverture 
Maladie 
Universelle) 
 
 
de santé de la population. 
Elle dispose pour ce qui 
est de l’extension de la 
couverture maladie, d’une 
cellule qui a en charge 
cette question, en plus de 
ses exercices en gratuité 
des soins et de l’appui aux 
mutuelles de santé.  
(couverture maladie 
universelle) 
autres ministères qui 
ont en charge la 
question de la 
protection sociale. 
Ministère de 
l’économie et des 
finances (MEF)  
Ministère en charge du 
programme de la stratégie 
nationale de la protection 
sociale (lancé en 2005). 
L’objectif de ce 
programme est de 
permettre un      meilleur    
accès    des    groupes  
vulnérables aux  systèmes 
de protection sociale et  
aux   mécanismes   de   
prévention   des   risques  
majeurs et de gestion des 
catastrophes. Il partage 
aussi le programme de 
l’exécution du socle de 
protection sociale avec le 
ministère du travail. 
Expertise de la 
situation 
économique du pays, 
et particulièrement 
sur l’état financier et 
budgétaire de l’Etat.  
-Lenteur dans 
l’exécution des 
programmes. 
-instabilité 
ministérielle.  
- faible niveau de 
coordination avec les 
autres ministères qui 
ont en charge la 
question de la 
protection sociale. 
 Oui  
Comité national 
du  
Dialogue social  
 (CNDS) 
Comité mis en œuvre par 
le gouvernement suite aux 
concertations nationale, 
en 2002, qui ont amendé 
la charte nationale sur le 
dialogue social. Il est une 
-Médiation entre le 
patronat et les 
employés.  
-rapport de 
facilitation entre le 
secteur formel et 
-absence  d’une  
politique  nationale  de  
promotion  du  
dialogue  social ;  -
carence  de  la  
législation  sociale ;   
Organisme triparti, 
donc partenaire de 
l’UDTS  
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structure tripartie  qui a 
pour mission « la 
prévention et la régulation 
des conflits ».  
Le CNDS intervient aussi 
dans les recommandations 
en termes de travail 
décent et de protection 
sociale surtout dans 
l’économie informelle. 
l’économie 
informelle ;  
-absence de 
coordination entre les 
différentes 
institutions ; 
-absence de régulation 
du champ du dialogue 
social ; absence de 
dentition des 
domaines 
d’intervention de 
chaque institution 
 
UNICEF Organisme international 
de l’ONU pour l’éducation 
et la culture. Avec l’Etat du 
Sénégal, il a engagé un 
programme qui s’étend de 
2012 – 2016 portants sur 
l’initiative du socle de 
protection sociale.   
-Santé pour les 
enfants  
-éducation inclusive 
(80% des enfants 
auront accès à 
l’éducation de base 
d’ici 2016) 
-D’ici  2016,  objectif 
de protection  accrue  
contre  les  violences,  
l’exploitation,  les  
abus  et  les  
pratiques  
socioculturelles  
néfastes des enfants 
les plus vulnérables ;  
- D’ici 2016, les 
enfants les plus 
vulnérables,  
bénéficient d’une 
prise en charge 
-définition du critère 
de ciblage ; 
-la non prise en 
compte du travail des 
enfants, dans 
l’économie informelle 
notamment ou en tant 
que employés 
domestiques² 
 Oui  
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accrue de  leurs 
besoins, de 
protection sociale et 
des politiques 
sociales 
PNUD Il s’agit d’une institution 
de l’ONU qui s’occupe des 
questions de 
développement humain. 
En matière de protection 
sociale au Sénégal, le 
PNUD s’active en accord 
avec le ministère de la 
santé sur l’assurance 
maladie.  
Expertise sur le 
développement 
humain 
Rapport annuel de 
développement 
humain du Sénégal  
Absence d’intervention 
dans les autres 
branches de la 
protection sociale. 
 oui 
PAM 
(Programme 
d’Alimentation 
Mondiale) 
 
Organisme d’aide 
alimentaire de l’ONU. En 
matière de protection 
sociale, le PAM met plus 
l’accent sur l’assistance 
alimentaire. 
Assistance 
alimentaire (petit-
déjeuner et 
déjeuner) aux 
475.000 élèves des 
écoles primaires et 
institutions 
préscolaires, 40% des  
écoles primaires; 
-Assistance aux 
communautés 
rurales pour 
augmenter la 
résilience 
communautaires 
pendant la période 
de soudure; 
- Stabilisation du prix 
-programmes 
essentiellement 
destinés aux milieux 
ruraux, non prise en 
compte du risque de 
malnutrition en milieu 
urbain, du fait de 
l’absence de ressource 
et de la promiscuité 
dans la vie familiale ;  
L’expertise locale pour 
savoir ce dont les 
populations ont besoin 
comme aliment 
nutritionnel  
 oui 
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des céréales pendant 
la période de 
soudure; 
USAID 
 
Agence du gouvernement 
américain en charge de la 
question du 
développement 
économique et de 
l’assistance humanitaire. 
Au Sénégal en matière de 
protection sociale, l’USAID 
a contribué à la mise en 
place de certaines 
mutuelles de santé, 
surtout pour l’économie 
informelle. 
Expertise en matière 
d’études sur le 
développement 
Assistance technique 
aux acteurs de 
l’économie 
informelle (avec 
l’UNACOIS) 
-Insuffisance dans les 
accomplissements par 
rapport à l’étendue de 
l’économie informelle. 
-Absence d’étude 
descriptive sur la 
composition de 
l’économie informelle 
 
 oui 
Agence Française 
de 
Développement 
(AFD)  
 
Agence de développement 
économique et social du 
gouvernement français. 
Dans les pays de l’UEMOA, 
l’AFD définit un 
programme de 
renforcement du système 
de la protection sociale, en 
matière de couverture 
maladie universelle. 
Mise en place d’un 
programme de 2012 
à 2014 de 5 milliard 
d’euros pour 
l’extension de la 
couverture contre le 
risque maladie. 
 
Absence d’analyse 
descriptive de 
l’économie informelle 
 
 Oui  
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3. Niger 
 
Nom Description Forces Faiblesses Partenaire Partenaire 
Potentiel 
Etat et différents 
départements 
ministériels   
Ministère de la santé 
publique, Ministère de la 
promotion de la Femme et 
de l’Enfant, Ministère du 
Travail et de l’Emploi, 
Ministère de l’Education 
Nationale. Ces différents 
ministères ont en charge 
l’élaboration de la politique 
et la stratégie nationale en 
matière de protection 
sociale 
Leurs forces 
résident dans la 
capacité de 
promouvoir une 
politique nationale 
de protection 
sociale. De même, 
ils ont en charge de 
tracer le cadre 
législatif et 
réglementaire de 
cette politique 
Leur faiblesse se 
trouve dans la mise 
œuvre de la politique 
et dans l’absence de 
fédération des 
activités sectorielles 
Le CNV international 
ne coopère pas avec 
l’Etat les différents 
départements 
ministériels  
Mais le CNV 
international est 
un partenaire 
potentiel de 
l’Etat 
CNSS
29
 et FNR
30
 Il s’agit des 2 institutions 
nationales en charge des 
régimes formels de retraites 
et de sécurité sociale des 
travailleurs salariés au Niger 
Leur force réside 
dans la capacité à 
élaborer des textes 
législatifs et 
réglementaires qui 
régissent les 
régimes formels 
des pensions et des  
retraites au profit 
des travailleurs du 
secteur formel au 
Niger 
Leur plus grande 
faiblesse se situe dans 
l’absence de 
perspectives en 
matière de sécurité 
sociale au profit des 
travailleurs de 
l’économie informelle 
Le CNV 
international ne 
coopère pas avec 
la CNSS et le FNR 
Mais le CNV 
international est un 
partenaire potentiel 
pour ces deux 
institutions 
international 
Syndicats Il s’agit des organisations Leur principale Leur faible se situe Le CNV Les autres 
                                                          
29
 Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale 
30
 Fonds National de Retraite 
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des travailleurs qui œuvrent 
en faveur de la protection 
sociale de leurs membres 
tant dans le secteur formel 
que dans le secteur 
informel.  
force se situe dans 
leur capacité de 
mobilisations et de 
défense des droits 
sociaux des 
travailleurs. Elles 
organisent des 
formations et 
sensibilisent au 
profit des 
travailleurs tant du 
secteur formel que 
du secteur informel  
essentiellement dans 
le manque 
d’initiatives concrètes 
en vue de la prise en 
compte  travailleurs 
informels en matière 
de protection sociale 
international 
coopère déjà 
avec la CNT 
organisations 
syndicales sont des 
partenaires 
potentiels du CNV 
international 
Associations de 
défense des 
droits de 
l’homme 
Il s’agit des structures 
fondées sur le principe de la 
défense et de la  promotion 
des droits humains 
Leur force réside 
dans les formations 
qu’elles offrent aux 
populations par 
rapport à leurs 
droits et devoirs de 
citoyens 
Leur faiblesse se situe 
dans la faiblesse de la  
couverture des 
actions qu’elles 
offrent en matière de 
protection 
Le CNV 
international ne 
coopère pas avec 
les associations 
de défense des 
droits humains 
Mais le CNV 
international peut 
est un partenaire 
potentiel des 
associations des 
droits de l’homme 
Mutuelles et 
assurances 
privées 
Il s’agit des structures mises 
en place par les employés et 
employeurs sur la base de 
régimes contributifs. Elles 
offrent des prestations 
d’assurance sociale aux 
travailleurs salariés 
Leurs forces 
résident dans la 
capacité de 
promouvoir les 
régimes formels de 
sécurité sociale 
La faiblesse est 
l’absence d’initiatives 
envers les travailleurs 
sus secteur informel 
en matière de 
politique d’assurance 
sociale   
 
Le CNV 
international ne 
coopère pas avec 
les mutuelles et 
les assurances 
privées 
Mais le CNV 
international peut 
est un partenaire 
potentiel des 
mutuelles et des 
assurances privées 
Plate forme des 
organisation de 
la société civile, 
ONGs et 
Il s’agit des organisations qui 
accompagnent l’Etat dans la 
mise en œuvre de la 
politique de protection 
Leurs forces 
résident dans la 
capacité de 
plaidoyer auprès 
La faiblesse se situe 
dans le manque de 
fédération des 
initiatives et des 
Le CNV 
international ne 
coopère pas avec 
organisations 
Mais le CNV 
international est un 
partenaire potentiel 
de ces structures 
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associations  sociale  des partenaires en 
faveur de la 
protection sociale 
actions en matière de 
protection sociales 
Autres 
partenaires de la 
protection 
sociale au Niger 
(BIT, OIT, CSI
31
 
monde et CSI 
Afrique, 
Fondation wage 
Indicator 
Il s’agit des autres 
partenaires qui participent à 
promouvoir la protection 
sociale au Niger. Beaucoup 
appuient l’Etat dans sa 
politique en accordant les 
financements nécessaires.   
Leur force réside 
dans les moyens 
financiers  
conséquents dont 
ils disposent pour 
appuyer l’Etat et 
peuvent infléchir 
sur sa politique 
nationale 
Leur faiblesse se situe 
au niveau du manque 
de fédération des 
actions 
Le CNV 
international 
coopère déjà 
avec certaines de 
ces organisations 
qui n’ont pas de 
représentations 
nationales ici au 
Niger 
 
 
 
4. Togo 
Nom Description Forces Faiblesses Partenaire Partenaire Potential 
Etat 
Ministères 
Départements 
Communes 
Le Togo est un Etat unitaire 
situé en Afrique de l’Ouest 
entre le Ghana et le Bénin. 
 Il est divisé en 4 grandes 
régions avec un taux de 
croissance de 3,2% (2011). La 
population est de 5 millions 
environs. 
Le Ministère du Travail et de 
la Fonction Publique, Le 
Ministère de la Santé 
Publique, le  
Ministère de la Protection 
Dispose de :  
-   un fichier des 
acteurs de 
l’économie 
informel urbain ; 
-   un Institut de 
l’assurance maladie 
des fonctionnaires 
et des retraités de 
l’Administration 
publique ; 
- une Agence de 
solidarité 
Absence d’un 
document de 
politique nationale 
de protection sociale 
 
Absence de loi 
organique du Régime  
d’Assurance Maladie 
Universelle (RAMU) 
Il n’existe pas une 
coopération entre 
CNV-International 
et l’Etat Togolais 
ni avec les 
Ministères 
Les différents 
Ministères sont des 
partenaires potentiels 
                                                          
31
 Confédération syndicale Internationale 
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sociale et de la solidarité 
Nationale, interviennent 
dans le domaine de la 
politique sociale. 
La Délégation à 
l’organisation du secteur 
informel rattachée à la 
Présidence de la République   
a pour mission de recenser   
d’identifier les acteurs du 
secteur informel au Togo. 
Le ministère du Travail et 
celui de la Santé assure la 
tutelle de la CNSS et l’INAM 
(Institut National de 
l’Assurance Maladie. 
nationale ; 
 
Il existe une 
volonté politique 
de promouvoir la 
protection sociale 
et 
 d’élaborer les 
textes législatifs et 
réglementaires . 
CNSS La CNSS est un établissement 
public à caractère social, 
chargé de la gestion du 
régime de sécurité sociale. 
Elle gère les assurés du 
secteur formel et les 
membres de leurs familles 
 La CNSS fournit les 
prestations de :        
- vieillesse (pension 
aux travailleurs  
retraités aux 
survivants) ; 
- maternité et 
allocations 
familiales ; 
- risques 
professionnels ; 
 
. assure la 
formation des 
cadres 
 
. procède aux 
Le régime général de 
sécurité sociale ne 
couvre que les 
travailleurs du 
secteur formel privé. 
Le retard dans la  
mise en œuvre du 
code de sécurité 
sociale 
 modifié en faveur 
des travailleurs de 
l’économie 
informelle. 
CNV- 
International ne 
coopère pas avec 
la CNSS 
La CNSS Togo peut être 
un partenaire potentiel 
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études ;          
 
. élabore des 
projets de textes 
législatifs et 
réglementaires ; 
 
. gère les 
travailleurs 
migrants 
  
Syndicats Les Syndicats sont des 
organisations 
représentatives des 
travailleurs opérant dans le 
secteur formel notamment. 
Ils sont chargés de la défense 
des intérêts des travailleurs 
et de l’amélioration de leurs 
conditions de vie. 
La CSTT, la CNTT sont les 
Syndicats les plus 
représentatifs. 
Ils constituent un 
acteur du dialogue 
social et de la 
négociation 
collective de travail.  
Ils sont membres 
du Conseil 
d’Administration de 
la CNSS, des 
commissions 
nationales 
tripartites. 
Ils participent à 
l’élaboration des 
textes à caractère 
social et 
économique. 
Ils élargissent leur 
base syndicale par 
l’adhésion des 
travailleurs de 
l’économie 
- ils manquent 
d’experts en matière 
de protection 
sociale ; 
- ils n’ont pas une 
autonomie financière 
pour entreprendre 
des études sur 
l’extension de la 
sécurité sociale. 
La Gouvernance des 
mutuelles de santé 
des syndicats n’est 
pas performante. 
Ils ont des difficultés 
à recouvrer les 
cotisations des 
membres et à 
rembourser les frais 
des prestataires. 
La CSTT est 
partenaire à CNV-
International 
- CSTT 
- Devoir Dignité (ONG) 
- Ministère de la 
Protection Sociale et 
de la Solidarité 
Nationale 
- Délégation de 
l’organisation du 
secteur informel 
(rattachée à la 
Présidence de la 
République) 
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informelle. 
Les syndicats 
bénéficient d’appui 
des partenaires et 
de la subvention de 
l’Etat. 
FNR Il s’agit d’une Caisse des 
retraités, structure rattachée 
au Ministère des Finances.  
Elle gère les pensionnés de 
l’Administration publique et 
les militaires. 
Le Fonds National 
de Retraite assure 
les pensions de 
vieillesse, les 
allocations 
familiales et de 
maternité.  
Les survivants 
bénéficient de 
pension ou 
d’allocation de 
survivants. 
- gère les différents 
fichiers. 
Le Fonds National de 
Retraite est 
déficitaire. Il n’assure 
pas des prestations 
aux travailleurs de 
l’économie 
informelle ni celles 
des risques 
professionnels 
Ne coopère pas 
avec CNV-
International 
FNR 
Ministère des Finances 
Associations de 
défense des Droits 
de l’Homme 
Ce sont des organisations 
légalement reconnues. Leur 
mission est la défense des 
Droits de l’Homme y compris 
celle de la protection sociale.  
- La ligue des Droits de 
l’Homme, l’Association des 
Consommateurs participent 
à l’élaboration des textes 
législatifs et réglementaires. 
 
Elles développent 
une capacité de 
sensibilisation, de 
mobilisation des 
populations. 
- disposent des 
canaux de 
communication et 
d’information 
efficaces ; 
- bénéficient de 
l’appui de l’opinion 
publique.  
- Absence de staff 
permanent de 
coordination 
nationale ;  
-pluralité 
d’associations de 
défense de Droits de 
l’Homme ;  
- crise de leadership 
et de 
représentativité ; 
- absence de 
programme 
Ne coopère pas 
avec CNV-
International 
  
- Associations des 
Consommateurs 
- Ligue Nationale des 
Droits de l’Homme et 
du Citoyen 
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spécifique sur le droit 
de la protection 
sociale : 
- difficulté de 
financement de leurs 
activités. 
 
 
 
5. Benin 
Nom Description Forces Faiblesses Partenaire Partenaire Potential 
Etat  
Ministères  
Départements 
communes 
Le Bénin, Etat unitaire, 
démocratique, est situé en 
Afrique de l’Ouest ; ayant 10 
millions d’habitants dont 
51% de femmes avec 27 
Ministères dont  
 -  le Ministère de la Famille,  
des Affaires Sociales, de la 
Solidarité Nationale, des 
Handicapés et des Personnes 
de Troisième Age mène des 
actions sociales à l’endroit 
des personnes indigentes, 
handicapées,  des enfants en 
situation difficile, des 
personnes de troisième âge ; 
- le Ministère du Travail, de 
la Fonction Publique et du 
Dialogue Social  est chargé 
Dispose d’un 
document de 
politique holistique  
de protection 
sociale 
-lance un 
programme 
d’Assurance 
Maladie Universelle 
(RAMU) 
-exécution de la 
gratuité de la 
césarienne ; 
- gratuité de 
l’enseignement 
primaire public au 
profit des filles ;   
- consultation 
gratuite des 
- Absence d’un texte 
de loi et celle des 
textes de mise en 
œuvre  
- Absence de 
cohérence des 
actions 
- Existence de conflit 
en matière de tutelle 
de mise en œuvre de 
la politique sociale 
-    la procédure de 
prise en charge des 
personnes indigentes 
est lourde et 
complexe   (lourdeur 
administrative) 
 
OMS, BIT, 
Coopération 
Suisse, 
Coopération 
Française, 
Canada. 
 
CNV-International 
n’a pas de 
coopération avec 
les Institutions 
publiques de 
l’Etat (Ministères, 
Départements, 
Communes) 
Ministère de la 
Famille, des Affaires 
Sociales, de la 
Solidarité Nationale, 
des Handicapés et 
des Personnes de 
Troisième Age ; 
Ministère de la Santé 
à travers le Régime 
d’Assurance Maladie 
Universelle ;  
Ministère du Travail, 
de la Fonction 
Publique et du 
Dialogue Sociale pour 
l’extension de la 
sécurité sociale 
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de l’extension de la sécurité 
sociale,   des mutuelles de 
l’Etat,  des travailleurs de 
l’économie informelle 
(artisans) 
enfants de 0 à 
5ans ; 
- existence du 
Fonds d’indigence 
géré par le 
Ministère de la 
Santé en 
collaboration avec 
le Ministre de la 
Famille 
CNSS Etablissement public chargé 
de la mise en œuvre du 
régime général de la sécurité 
sociale des travailleurs du 
secteur formel privé. Il s’agit 
d’une structure autonome 
placée sous la tutelle du 
Ministère du travail. Son 
siège est à Cotonou 
Fourniture de 
prestations 
suivantes : 
- pension de 
vieillesse et de 
survivants ; 
- prestations aux 
familles (allocations 
familiales et de 
maternité) 
- les risques 
professionnels 
(rente) ; 
- pratique des soins 
médicaux pour les 
membres des 
familles des 
assujettis au code 
de sécurité sociale 
(enfance, 
maternité). Elle 
dispose de 
structures 
- gouvernance 
interne peu 
performante ; 
- absence d’étude 
actuariale pour 
vérifier les 
statistiques et 
l’équilibre ou le 
déséquilibre entre les 
branches chargées 
des prestations ; 
- retard dans la mise 
en œuvre du 
programme 
d’extension du 
régime de sécurité 
sociale aux 
travailleurs de 
l’économie 
informelle ; 
- conflit entre le 
Directeur Général, le 
Conseil 
Pas de 
coopération avec 
CNV- 
International 
La CNSS a besoin 
d’expertise. Elle    
dispose d’une 
capacité de 
cofinancement 
(formation des 
formateurs) 
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départementales.   d’Administration et le 
Ministre 
FNR Fonds National de Retraite 
(fonctionnaires et civils) est 
une structure administrative 
dépendant du Ministère des 
Finances 
- Assure la branche 
pension de 
vieillesse et 
pension de 
survivants ; 
- assure les 
allocations 
familiales, les 
congés de 
maternité ; 
- participe aux frais 
médicaux pour des 
Agents Permanents 
de l’Etat ; 
- assure les 
évacuations 
sanitaires en 
Europe. 
- perspectives : 
création d’une 
Agence autonome 
(réforme en cours) 
- Chroniquement 
déficitaire ; 
-  La lenteur dans la 
liquidation des 
dossiers des Agents 
Permanents de l’Etat 
retraités est 
observée ; 
- le FNR ne couvre 
pas les 
prestations des 
risques 
professionnels ; les 
travailleurs de 
l’économie 
informelle sont 
exclus. 
Ne coopère pas 
avec CNV-
International ; 
mais coopère 
avec la 
coopération 
française. 
- Ministère des 
Finances 
- FNR 
Syndicats Ce sont des organisations 
représentant notamment les 
travailleurs du secteur 
formel. 
Elles ont une fonction 
revendicative.   
Ils sont très actifs 
au Bénin ; 
participent aux 
réformes de la 
politique sociale au 
niveau national et 
sectoriel. 
Organisent les 
élections sociales 
- Difficultés de 
fidéliser les 
travailleurs du 
secteur informel ; 
- Absence d’experts 
en matière de 
protection sociale 
(gestion des risques,  
des mutuelles) 
CNV- 
International 
Coopère depuis 
plusieurs années 
avec CGTB et la 
COSI Bénin 
-  la CGTB souhaite le 
renforcement de la 
coopération ; 
 - la COSI Bénin 
souhaite un appui en 
matière de 
protection sociale ; 
- la Confédération 
des Syndicats 
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en vue de 
déterminer la 
représentativité 
syndicale. Ils sont 
membres du 
Conseil 
d’Administration de 
la CNSS, du Conseil 
Economique et 
Social, du Conseil 
national du Travail 
et celui de la santé, 
sécurité. 
- élargissement des 
bases syndicales 
dans le secteur 
informel.  
Stratégie : 
développement de 
microcrédit, 
sensibilisation par 
les programmes de 
formation en 
matière des risques 
professionnels 
(Taxi-moto, 
artisans…) 
- ils bénéficient de 
la subvention de 
l’Etat 
 
- gouvernance 
interne limitée ; 
- faible capacité 
d’autofinancement.  
Autonome (CSA) 
également 
Associations de 
défense des Droits 
La ligue des Droits de 
l’Homme et du citoyen : c’est 
Leur existence 
affaiblit les abus 
Elles n’interviennent 
pas spécifiquement 
CNV-International 
ne coopère pas 
Risque de conflit 
entre les syndicats et 
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de l’Homme une Association chargée de 
la défense des droits 
humains (lutte contre la 
torture, le droit de vote du 
citoyen-les 
emprisonnements arbitraires 
des gardes à vue 
dans les centres de 
police et les 
traitements des 
prisonniers de droit 
commun ; 
- visites périodiques 
des prisons ; 
- construction de 
nouveaux 
bâtiments de 
prison grâce à leur 
effort de 
sensibilisation 
participe aux 
travaux des 
réformes sociales ; 
- dispose d’une 
grande capacité de 
communication et 
d’information sur 
les menaces des 
Droits humains. 
dans le domaine de 
la protection sociale 
des travailleurs de 
l’économie 
informelle. 
Leur programme est 
limité faute de loi sur 
l’économie 
informelle 
 
avec l’Association 
des Droits de 
l’Homme et du 
citoyen 
les associations des 
droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen. 
- la double 
appartenance 
comme syndicat et 
comme membre de 
l’Association des 
Droits de l’Homme et 
du citoyen est une 
menace pour la 
coopération. 
Mutuelles Elles sont des organes 
associatifs à but contributif. 
Elles opèrent dans le 
domaine de la santé, de 
microcrédit, de pensions de 
vieillesse… 
Elles relèvent des initiatives 
privées pour la plupart. 
Certaines initiatives relèvent 
du Ministère du Travail ou 
Leur existence 
complète l’action 
sociale de l’Etat et 
celle des structures 
formelle privées. 
Elles constituent 
une base pour le 
RAMU. elles 
peuvent servir de 
vecteur pour toute 
- absence de loi 
organique ; 
- l’organisation des 
mutuelles laisse à 
désirer ; 
- Le manque de 
diversification de leur 
champ d’action ; 
- le taux de 
recouvrement des 
Les mutuelles des 
syndicats ont 
comme 
partenaires  
- CNV-
International ; 
- COSI Bénin ; 
- CGTB 
 
- La mutuelle du 
Ministère du Travail 
souhaite la 
coopération avec  
CNV-International ; 
 
- la COSI-Bénin veut 
renforcer sa 
coopération en la 
matière 
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des entreprises privées ou 
semi-publiques 
politique sociale. 
Elles sont les relais 
de l’UEMOA en 
matière 
d’encadrement 
technique. Elles 
disposent de 
partenaires 
internationaux. 
cotisations est faible, 
véritable cause de 
leur affaiblissement. 
La problématique de 
la gouvernance et de 
la formation en 
matière de risques  
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ANNEX 2 : Key Social protection Indicators 
 
1. Guinea 
Country data Guinea 
1) Population size
32
 
10,48 Million 
2) GDP per Capita 
498 Million 
3) Population aged above 65
33
 3,3% 
4) Dependency ratio
34
 85 % 
5) Percentage of people in informal employment
35
 90% 
6) Percentage of people covered by social protection
36
 3% is covered by formal social 
security (CNSS)  
7) Old age contributors ratio (% working age)
37
 11,1% (2006) 
8) Old age pension beneficiaries ratio total (incl. mean-tested | 
periodic benefits)
38
 
8,8% (2009) 
9) Employment Injury to economically active protection ratio 
(contributors) 
Nd 
10) Employment Injury recipient ratio total (incl. means-tested | 
periodic benefits) 
Nd 
11) Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP
39
 2.47% 
a. Public social protection expenditure excluding health 
benefit in kind as a percentage of GDP 
Nd 
b. Total Health expenditure (public and private) as percentage 
of GDP
40
 
6.0% (2011) 
c. Public Health expenditure as percentage of GDP
41
 1.6% (2011) 
12) Percentage/number of informal  workers covered by social 
protection 
Nd 
13) Key Legislation Law No. 94/006 of 14 February 
1994, on the Social Security Code 
                                                          
32
 ISSA Country Profile Guinea 
33
 ISSA Country Profile Guinea 
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
34 ISSA Country Profile Guinea 
35
 ASC Map: Selected decent work indicators (2013) 
36
 ISSA Country Profile Guinea 
37
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=CP-1b+OA 
38
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=CR-1f+OA 
39
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c 
40
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=H-1a 
41
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=H-1b 
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14) Ratified (relevant) ILO Conventions
42
 C017, C018, C121 
 
2. Niger 
Country data Niger 
1) Population size
43
 
17 200 000  
 
2) Population aged 15-64
44
 7564 (47,6%) 
3) Dependency ratio
45
 110% 
4) Percentage of people in informal employment
46
 90-95%
47
 (1995) 
5) Percentage of people covered by social protection
48
 3% of the population is 
covered by formal social 
security (CNSS and FNR) 
6) Old age contributors ratio (% working age) 49 nd 
7) Old age pension beneficiaries ratio total (incl. mean-tested | 
periodic benefits) 
nd 
8) Employment Injury to economically active protection ratio 
(contributors) 
nd 
9) Employment Injury recipient ratio total (incl. means-tested | 
periodic benefits) 
nd 
10) Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP
50
 3.29% (2009) 
a. Public social protection expenditure excluding health 
benefit in kind as a percentage of GDP 
nd 
b. Total Health expenditure (public and private) as percentage 
of GDP 
nd 
c. Public Health expenditure as percentage of GDP
51
 2.9 % (2011) 
11) Percentage/number of informal  workers covered by social 
protection 
nd 
12)  Legislation 
52
  
                                                          
42
 The most important ILO conventions with regards to social security are: C017 (Workers’ compensation, 
accidents), C018 (Workers’ compensation, illness), C102 (minimum standards), C121 (employment injury benefits), 
C130 (medical care and illness), C155 (Occupational Safety and Health), C161 (Occupational Health Services),  C168 
( Protection against unemployment) 
43
 ISSA Country Profile Niger 
44
 Population aged 15-64 in 2010 (Medium variant). Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,   
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
45 Population aged 14 or younger plus population aged 65 or older, divided by population aged 15-64 Medium 
variant World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
46
 ASC Map: Selected decent work indicators (2013) 
47
 http://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/sites/default/files/uploads/public/PDF/LMP/niger_2013_final_web.pdf 
48
 BTI 2012 
49
 Secsoc does not have data for Niger  
50
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c 
51
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=H-1b 
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a. Old Age pensions Law n° 67-016  18 March 
1967 ;  law  n° 65-23 25 May 
1967 ;  decree n° 67-025 of  2 
February 1967 ; arrest n° 
477/MFP/T of 2 March 1968 ; 
and decree n° 67-025  of 2 
February 1967 
b. Occupational accidents and illness Decree n° 65-117  of 18 
August 1965 
13) Ratified (relevant) ILO Conventions C018, C102, 155, C161 
 
3.  Senegal 
Country data Senegal 
1) Population size
53
 
 
13,11 Million 
2) Population aged 15-64
54
 6 899 (53.3%) 
3) Dependency ratio
55
 88 % 
4) Percentage of people in informal employment
56
 89,67 % (M=80,2% F=92,4)
57
 
5) Distribution of informal workers, by  sex:   
a. Sectors (agriculture, industry manufacturing, trade, 
construction & energy, transport, other services, …) 
68.9% of the informal sector 
is constituted by commerce
58
 
 
 
b. type of work (employer, employee, own-account, casual 
worker, family workers, etc.) 
nd 
c. education nd 
d. rural/urban nd 
6) Percentage of people covered by social protection
59
 20%
60
 
7) Old age contributors ratio (% working age)
 61
 5% 2008 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52
 Data field work (Younoussi, 2014) 
53
 ISSA Country Profile Senegal 
54
 Population aged 15-64 in 2010 (Medium variant). Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,   
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
55 Population aged 14 or younger plus population aged 65 or older, divided by population aged 15-64 Medium 
variant World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
56
 ASC Map: Selected decent work indicators (2013) 
57
 Decent Work Indicators in Africa 
58
 https://liveatlund.lu.se/intranets/LUSEM/NEK/mfs/MFS/194.pdf 
59
 ISSA Country Profile Benin 
60
 http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/SocialProtectioninSubSaharanAfrica.pdf 
61
 Data derived from secsoc 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic2?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=204&p_show_descs=Y 
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8) 8) Old age pension beneficiaries ratio total (incl. mean-tested | 
periodic benefits) 
0.7% 2007 
9) Illness employment protection ratio (affiliated)62 2,8% 2001 
10) Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 5.34% 2010 
a. Public social protection expenditure excluding health 
benefit in kind as a percentage of GDP 
2.06% 2010 
b. Total Health expenditure (public and private) as percentage 
of GDP 
6.0% 2011 
c. Public Health expenditure as percentage of GDP 3.5 % 2011 
11) Percentage/number of informal  workers covered by social 
protection
63
  
nd 
a. By sex nd 
b. By age nd 
c. By sector nd 
12)  Key Legislation The law of 15 June 1961 on 
Social Security for Civil 
Servants ; Law  n° 73-37 of 31 
July 1973 ; Law n° 97-05 of 10 
March 1997 ; Law  n° 73-37 of 
31 July 1973 ; law n° 91-33  of 
25 June 1991 and lastly law n° 
75-50  of 3 July 1975. 
13) Ratified (relevant) ILO Conventions C102, C121 
4. Togo 
Country data Togo 
1) Population size
64
 
6,28Million 
2) Population aged 15-64
65
 55,2% 
3) Dependency ratio
66
 81,2% 
4) Percentage of people in informal employment
67
 More than 90% 
                                                          
62
 No. of working age affiliates to a illness benefit scheme see 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic?p_lang=en&p_indicator_code=CP-2a%20SI&p_geoaid=686 
63
  http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/ShowWiki.action?wiki.wikiId=809 
64
 ISSA Country Profile Togo 
65
 Population aged 15-64 in 2010 (Medium variant). Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,   
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
66 Population aged 14 or younger plus population aged 65 or older, divided by population aged 15-64 Medium 
variant World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
67
 
http://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/sites/default/files/uploads/public/Afrika/Landeanalyser/labour_market_profil
e_2012_-_togo_web.pdf  
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5) Percentage of people covered by social protection68 
5 % 
6)  Old age contributors ratio (% working age) 69 3.1% (2009) 
7) Old age pension beneficiaries ratio total (incl. mean-tested | periodic 
benefits) 
16.7% (2009) 
8) Employment Injury to economically active protection ratio 
(contributors) 
2.3% (2009) 
9) Employment Injury recipient ratio total (incl. means-tested | periodic 
benefits) 
0.0% (2009) 
10) Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
5.73% (2010) 
a. Public social protection expenditure excluding health 
benefit in kind as a percentage of GDP 
2.31% (2010) 
b. Total Health expenditure (public and private) as percentage 
of GDP 
8.0% (2011) 
c. Public Health expenditure as percentage of GDP 4.2% (2011) 
11) Percentage/number of informal  workers covered by social protection70  
 Nd 
12) Key legislation 
Law N°2011-006 of 21 February 
2011 
13) Ratified (relevant) ILO Conventions 
C102 will enter in force in June 
2014 
 
5. Benin 
Country data Benin 
1) Population size
71
 
 
9.35Million 
2) Population aged 15-64
72
 
5 107 ( 53.7%) 
3) Dependency ratio
73
 
86 % 
                                                          
68
 ISSA Country Profile Togo 
69
 Data derived from secsoc 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic2?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=204&p_show_descs=Y 
70
  http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic2?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=768&p_show_descs=Y 
71
 ISSA Country Profile Benin 
72
 Population aged 15-64 in 2010 (Medium variant). Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,   
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
138 
 
4) Percentage of people in informal employment
74
 
98,2% (M=97,2%, F=99,2) 
5) Percentage of people covered by social protection
75
 
Less than 10 % (238 138 formal 
sector workers were covered by 
the CNSS in 2009) 
6) Old age contributors ratio (% working age) 76 
5.2% (2009) 
7) Old age pension beneficiaries ratio total (incl. mean-tested | periodic 
benefits) 
0.2% (2005) 
8) Employment Injury to economically active protection ratio 
(contributors) 
4.0% (2006) 
9) Employment Injury recipient ratio total (incl. means-tested | periodic 
benefits) 
0.0% (2005) 
10) Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
4.31% (2009) 
a. Public social protection expenditure excluding health 
benefit in kind as a percentage of GDP 
1.5%(2008) 
b. Total Health expenditure (public and private) as 
percentage of GDP 
4.6% (2011) 
c. Public Health expenditure as percentage of GDP 2.4% (2011) 
11) Percentage/number of informal  workers covered by social protection
77  
 200 000 people covered by 
mutuelles de santé 
12) Key Legislation 
Law No. 98-019 of 21 March 
2003, on the Social Security 
Code, with 2007 amendment 
(Law No. 2007-02 of 26 March) 
and 2010 amendment (Law No. 
2010-10 of 22 March). 
13) Ratified (relevant) ILO Conventions 
C018, C61 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
73 Population aged 14 or younger plus population aged 65 or older, divided by population aged 15-64 Medium 
variant World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm  
74
 ASC Map: Selected decent work indicators (2013) 
75
 ISSA Country Profile Benin 
76
 Data derived from secsoc 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssiindic.viewMultiIndic2?p_lang=en&p_geoaid=204&p_show_descs=Y 
77
  http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/ShowWiki.action?wiki.wikiId=809 
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ANNEX 3: List of Respondents and Documents Consulted During the 
Fieldwork 
1. Guinea 
Interviews 
1. Monsieur Amadou Diallo, Secretaire Generale de la Confederation Nationales des travailleurs de 
Guinee 
2. M. Bandia Gorogna, point focal CNV a la CNTG 
3. M. Louis Mbemba Soumah, Secretaire Generale du Syndicat Libre des enseignants et chercheurs 
de Guinee (SLEG) - USTG 
4. Monsieur Elhadj Mamadou Mansare, President du Conseil d’Administration de la Caisse 
Nationale de Securite Sociale de Guinee 
5. Madame Dogomet Barry, Inspectrice Generale du Travail en Guinee 
6. Dr. Alia Camara, Inspecteur General adjoint du Travail en Guinee 
7. M. Doumbouyah, conseiller au Ministere de travail 
8. Elhadj Mamadou Yaya Balde, Secretaire General du Syndicat du transport et mecanique 
generale de Ratoma 
9. Dr. Mamadouba Camara, consultant specialist des organisations mutualistes 
10. Hadja Mariama Barry, charge des projets de mutualite aupres de la CNTG 
List of consulted documents 
 Code de de la securite sociale de la Guinee 
 Code du travail de la Guinee 
 Decret du President de la Republique instituant l’institut national de l’assurance Maladie 
Obligatoire INAMO 
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 Le troisieme document de Strategie de reduction de la pauvrete en Guinee DSRP III. 
 www. CNSS 
2. Senegal 
Interviews 
11. Mme Rosalie, Ministère du travail,  chef de division chargée des CMU à la direction de la  de la 
protection sociale, ministère du travail (l’immeuble Yoro Lam), 9/04/2014 (23 min) 
12. Assane Diop, Chargé des programmes l’UTS / Syndicat du BTP, l’hotel King Fahd Place, 
15/04/2014 (26 min) 
13. Abriel Pino, Expert du OIT sur la protection sociale, King Fahd Place, 15/04/2014 (10 min) 
14. Dr Pape Babou Ndiaye, Chargé d’étude à l’IPRES, King Fahd Place, 14/04/2012 (17 min) 
15. Abdoul Azize Sy, Chargé du secteur informel à l’UDTS, à Pikine, 07 & 20/04/2014 (32 min) 
16. Dr Ousseynou Diop, Ministère de la santé, économiste de la santé, cordonnateur du CAPSU 
(caisse d’assurance pour la sécurité sociale universelle), king Fahd Place, 14/04/2014 (12 min) 
17. Ibrahima Seck, Caisse de Sécurité sociale Directeur prestations familiales et sociales, CSS, 
17/04/2014 (15 min) 
18. Ibrahima Diop, Secrétaire permanent de l’UNACOIS JAPPO (syndicat des travailleurs de 
l’informel), l’UNACOIS Jappo (colobane), 16/04/2014 (1h27 min) 
List of consulted documents 
 Rapport d’Atelier d’identification de l’existant  et des  lacunes  dans la mise en œuvre d’un socle 
national de protection sociale au Sénégal, octobre 2012. 
 Document de la Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale, Ministère de l’économie et des 
finances, 2008 
 Rapport d’enquête nationale sur l’économie informelle, Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de 
la démographie, 2010-2011. 
 Etude    technique    sur    l’administration    du Régime  simplifié  pour  les  petits  contribuables 
(RSPC) au Sénégal, BIT Janvier 2014 
 Etude  technique  sur  la  branche  retraite  du Régime  Simplifié  pour  les  Petits  Contribuables 
(RSPC) au Sénégal, BIT Janvier 2014 
 Etude   technique   sur   la   branche   santé   du Régime  Simplifié  pour  les  Petits  Contribuables 
(RSPC) au Sénégal, BIT Janvier 2014 
 Juliette Alenda  (2012), Évolution de l’assurance maladie au Sénégal : de l’exclusion à l’inclusion 
du secteur informel, working  paper.  
 Caisse de Sécurité Sociale, recueil de textes fondamentaux de la CSS du Sénégal 
 Rapport sur l’extension  de  la  protection  sociale  à  l’économie informelle :  vers  un  Régime  
simplifié  pour  les petits contribuables (RSPC) au Sénégal, BIT Mai 2013. 
 Code de la Sécurité Sociale du Sénégal 
 Code du travail du Sénégal 
 Document sur L’analyse des prestations et des indicateurs de résultats de la protection sociale 
Préparé par Pascal Annycke, BIT, mai 2008 
141 
 
3. Niger 
Interviews 
19. Mamane Zaroumeye Yacoubou, chargé des affaires syndicales et statistiques à la CNT, lieu de 
l’entretien siège CNT, date de l’entretien 08/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 3 heures 
20. Ibrahim Hamidou Koda, chargé des affaires sociales et de la lutte contre le sida à la CNT, chef 
service à la CNSS, lieu de l’entretien siège CNT, date de l’entretien 09/04/2014, durée de 
l’entretien 2 heures 
21. Laouly Issoufou, Secrétariat Confédéral aux Activités Sectorielles à la CNT, lieu de l’entretien 
siège CNT, date de l’entretien 10/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 30 minutes 
22. Gado Sanda, président du syndicat des conducteurs de taxi (SYNCTAXI), affilié à la CNT, lieu de 
l’entretien siège du syndicat, date de l’entretien 11/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 1heures 30 
minutes 
23. Abdou Litini, président du syndicat des vendeurs de café et thé (SYVEDICAF), affilié à la CNT, lieu 
de l’entretien quartier château 9 Niamey, date de l’entretien 11/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 1 
heures 
24. Mme Zeini Hadiza, présidente du syndicat des restauratrices (SYNARESNI), affilié à la CNT, lieu 
de l’entretien médiature de la république, date de l’entretien 14/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 
30 minutes 
25. Mme Thérèse Hubert, présidente du syndicat des coiffeuses (SYNACOIFNI), affilié à la CNT, lieu 
de l’entretien atelier de coiffure, date de l’entretien 14/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 25 
minutes 
26. M. Alzouma Traoré, secrétaire exécutif de l’ONG SOS Femmes et Enfants victimes de violences 
familiales, lieu de l’entretien siège de l’ONG, date de l’entretien 15/04/2014, durée de 
l’entretien 20 minutes 
27.  Mr. Insa Youssa Maiyaki, président du syndicat des travailleurs bois et constructions, lieu de 
l’entretien ancien siège de la CNT, date de l’entretien 16/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 20 
minutes 
28. 1Mr. Oumarou Boubacar Maiga, Secrétaire Général du syndicat des travailleurs bois et 
constructions,  lieu de l’entretien ancien siège de la CNT, date de l’entretien 16/04/2014, durée 
de l’entretien 20 minutes 
29. Mme. Oumou Sabiou Dicko, directrice de la caisse nationale de sécurité sociale, lieu de 
l’entretien à la CNSS (bureau), date de l’entretien 17/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 15 minutes 
30. Mr. Idé Zarmakoye, coordonnateur national de la Plate-forme des Organisation de la Société 
Civile (OSC) sur la protection sociale, lieu de l’entretien siège de l’ONG, date de l’entretien 
17/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 30 minutes 
31. Mr. Illa Samaila, chargé du plaidoyer au niveau de la Plate-forme des Organisations de la Société 
Civile (OSC) sur la protection sociale, SG du regroupement des ONG et associations du secteur 
de la santé, lieu de l’entretien siège de l’ONG ROSEN, date de l’entretien 18/04/2014, durée de 
l’entretien 1 heures  
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32. Mr. Abdou Galo Karim, chef de division financement à la Direction des Etudes et de la 
Programma (DEP) du ministère de la santé, lieu de l’entretien Ministère de la Santé Publique 
(MSP), date de l’entretien 18/042014, durée de l’entretien 25 minutes 
33. Mr. Ali Idé, président du comité de gestion de la mutuelle de la Société Nigérienne de 
Télécommunication (SONITEL), lieu d’entretien bureau de l’infirmerie, date de l’entretien 
22/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 30 minutes 
34. Mme Dibril Bintou, directrice de la solidarité nationale au Ministère de la Promotion de la 
Femme et de la Protection de l’Enfant (MPFPE), leu de l’entretien ministère, date de l’entretien, 
22/04/2014, durée de l’entretien 25 minutes.  
   
List of Consulted Documents  
Règlements UEMOA sur la mutualité 
 Règlement n°07/2009/CM/UEMOA portant réglementation de la mutualité sociale au sein de 
l’UEMOA 
 Règlement d’exécution n°002/2001/COM/UEMOA déterminant les modalités de procédures de 
constitution d’argent et d’immatriculation des mutuelles sociales et leurs structures faitières 
 Règlement d’exécution n°003/2001/COM/UEMOA relatif aux règles prudentielles portant sur les 
risques courts, aux mécanismes de garantie et au contrôle du fonctionnement des mutuelles 
sociales et de leurs structures faitières 
Textes de lois nationaux et rapports 
 La constitution du 25 septembre 2010 
 La Politique Nationale de Protection Sociale (PNDS), ministère de la population, de la protection 
de la femme et de l’enfant 
 Loi n° 95-015 du 3 juillet et son décret d’application n°96-224 du 29 juin 1996 portant 
généralisation des couts de santé 
 Loi n° 2003-033 du 5 août 2003 instituant une catégorie d’établissement publics dénommés 
« établissements publics à caractère social » (EPS) ont pour objectifs  l’exercice d’une activité 
sociale visant l’amélioration des conditions de vie des populations dans les domaines de la 
santé, protection de la femme et des enfants, personnes handicapées et/ou âgées, l’éducation 
sociale, formation professionnelle, sécurité alimentaire, sécurité sociale, santé et sécurité des 
travailleurs, promotion de l’emploi 
 Loi n° 2003 du 3 août 2003 portant création de la CNSS 
 La loi n° 65 du 15 mai 1965 relative au contentieux de la sécurité sociale 
 La loi n° 67-016 du 18 mars 1967 déterminant les conditions d’application du régime des 
retraites de la loi n° 65-23 du 15 mai 1965 relative au contentieux de la sécurité sociale 
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 Décret n°62-127 révisé en 1996 pour aboutir au décret 96-456 règlementant les prestations 
fournies par les hôpitaux stipulant la prise ne charge des frais hospitaliers pour les 
fonctionnaires à 80%   
 Décret n° 65-116 du 18 avril 1965 portant déterminant les règles de gestion du régime des 
prestations familiales 
 Décret n° 2005-064/PRN/MFP/T du 11 mars 2005 portant approbation des statuts de la CNSS 
 Décret n° 65-117 du 18 août 1965 portant détermination des règles de gestion du régime de 
réparation et de prévention des accidents de travail et maladies professionnelles 
 Décret n° 65-116 du 18 août 1965 portant détermination des règles de gestion du régime des 
prestations familiales par la CNSS 
 Décret n° 67-025 du 2 février 1967 portant détermination des règles de gestion du régime des 
retraites 
 Arrêté n° 477/MFP/T du 2 mars 1968 pris en application du décret n° 67-025 du 2 février 1967 
portant détermination des règles de gestion du régime des retraites 
 Décret 2005-064/PRN/MFP/T du 11 mars 2005 portant approbation des statuts de la CNSS  
 Code de travail ordonnance n°96-039 du 29 juin 1996  
 Plan de Développement Sanitaire (PDS) 2005-2009, MSP, Niamey, 2005-2009 
 Rapport d’analyse des politiques du fonctionnement de la santé au Niger 
4. Togo 
Interviews 
35. Le Secrétaire Général de la CSTT 
36. Le Secrétaire Général de la CSTT, 1er Adjoint 
37. MATEPEY, chargé de l’information au Conseil National du Patronat du Togo 
38. Madame N’DJOME, Assistante de la Directrice Générale de l’INAM (Institut National d’Assurance 
Maladie) 
39. Directeur Général du Travail et des Lois sociales 
40. Directeur de la Protection Sociale, Monsieur BIGNANDI Palakimyèm 
41. Monsieur SAMAROU, chargé des maladies ordinaires des agents de l’Etat 
42. Monsieur HANNOUKOPE, Secrétaire Permanent de la Conférence Internationale de la 
Prévoyance Sociale, intérimaire 
43. Monsieur Dossou, Directeur de SADD 
44. Monsieur MOUKENGUE ETOTA Adolphe Gabriel, Inspecteur Régional de la Prévoyance Sociale, 
Docteur en droits fondamentaux de l’Université de Nantes 
45. Monsieur OROU BANGNA, Directeur de la Délégation du secteur Informel/Présidence de la 
République 
46. Docteur DOGBE kokou, Directeur Général de la Santé Publique 
47. Docteur BABA Bibiane, Directrice des Etablissements de Soins, membre du Conseil 
d’Administration de l’INAM 
48. Monsieur DOSSOU yves, Directeur de l’ONG SADD (Solidarité, Développement Durable) 
49. Monsieur le Directeur des Programmes chargé des Droits de l’Homme 
144 
 
50. Monsieur AGBO  François, Coordonnateur National des Syndicats du secteur informel 
51. Monsieur ADOME Dogi, Directeur Exécutif de la Mutuelle de santé CSTT 
52. Madame SAIZONOU Ghislaine, Coordonnatrice des mutuelles au Togo, Département ITVC-
Africa-Lomé 
53. Madame SANNY Reine, Assistante de Direction à la CNSS 
54. Monsieur AGBOKOU, Directeur des Affaires Administratives à la CNSS 
55. Monsieur AKOUE Adrien, Secrétaire Général CSI-Afrique 
56. Monsieur GBETOULA Sylvestre, Secrétaire général Adjoint de l’Administration Publique 
57. Monsieur A. AKOLLY, Administrateur de l’ONG Devoir Dignité  
58. Madame DOSSOU Mirianne, Directrice de l’INAM (Institut National d’Assurance Maladie) 
59. Monsieur ABALO, représentant du BIT 
60. Monsieur Kossi Dodzi ABOEYABA, Assistante Juridique et chargé de projet-ONG-SADD 
List of Consulted Documents 
Les textes de loi et de règlement 
 Loi N° 2011-006 du 21 février 2011 portant code de sécurité sociale 
 Loi N° 2011-003 du 18 février  2011, instituant un régime d’assurance maladie des Agents 
Publics et assimilés 
 Décret N° 2011-034/PR portant statut de l’Institut National d’Assurance Maladie (INAM) 
 Décret N° 2011-035/PR fixant le régime du partenariat entre l’Institut National d’Assurance 
Maladie (INAM) et les formations sanitaires 
 Décret 2011-032 fixant les taux et modalités de paiement des cotisations au régime obligatoire 
d’assurance maladie du 02 mars 2011 
 Document sur la présentation générale d’assurance maladie (présenté par le Directeur des 
prestations de l’INAM) 
Les documents d’informations générales 
 Rapport 2012 sur la situation des Droits de l’Homme au nord Togo-juin 2013 
 Fiche d’informations sur la protection sociale : un droit fondamental de l’ONG-SADD (solidarité 
et action pour le développement durable) 
 Fiche d’information sur la sécurité sociale - ONG-SADD (volume1) 
 Fiche d’informations sur les prestations familiales et de maternité -            ONG SADD (volume3) 
 Communication sur la protection sociale : un mécanisme pour un développement inclusif 
(Milieux économique et sociaux UE-Afrique-par Adrien  B. AKOUETE, Secrétaire Général Adjoint 
CSI-Afrique-mars 2014)  
 Document sur les missions de l’ONG- Devoir-Dignité : prévention sanitaire et suivi médical des 
personnes de troisième âge 
 Articles de presse sur l’atelier de sensibilisation sur la protection sociale dans le secteur informel 
Togo ¨Presse N°9047 du jeudi 30 mai 2013-BIT Ministère du Travail. 
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5. Benin 
Interviews 
61. Monsieur DJAGOU Ernest, Directeur Général du Travail ; 
62. Monsieur NATABOU Emile, Directeur de la mutuelle de sécurité sociale (Ministère du Travail et 
de la Fonction Publique) ; 
63. Monsieur ATIOGBE Urbain, chargé des mutuelles du secteur informel-COSI-BENIN 
(Confédération des Organisations Syndicales Indépendantes du Bénin) ; 
64. Monsieur CHADARE Noel Secrétaire Général de la COSI-BENIN ; 
65. Monsieur ZOUNON Emmanuel, Secrétaire Général UNSTB (Union Nationale de Syndicats des 
Travailleurs du Bénin) (initiative sur le secteur informel) ; 
66. Monsieur HOUNGUEVOU Paul Secrétaire Général Adjoint, chargé du secteur informel-micro 
crédit CSA (Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes) ; 
67. TODJINOU Pascal, Secrétaire Général de la CGTB (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs du 
Bénin) ; 
68. Uzziel Twagalimana, représentant continental de l’ONG Solidarité Mondiale, programme officer 
CNV ; 
69. Monsieur DAGA, Directeur des prestations à la caisse nationale de sécurité sociale (CNSS) ; 
70. Monsieur ABDOU Mohamed Bachirou, Chef Cellule de la Statistique et de la Coopération à la 
CNSS ; 
71. AHISSOU Constant, statisticien, stagiaire (CNSS). 
List of Consulted Documents 
Textes de lois nationaux et rapports 
 Le document de politique holistique sur la protection sociale au Bénin 
Les textes de lois et de règlements  
 Loi N° 98-019 portant code de sécurité sociale au Bénin du 21 mars 2003 et la loi 2007-02 du 26 
mars 2007 modifiant la loi ci-dessus.  
 Loi 2010-10 du 22 mars 2010 portant code de sécurité sociale du 22 mars 2010. 
 Loi N° 86-013 du février 1986 portant statut général des Agents Permanents de l’Etat. 
 Loi 2004-27 modifiant le statut général des Agents Permanents de l’Etat 
 Loi N° 86-014 du 26 septembre 1986 portant code des pensions civiles et militaires de retraite. 
 Arrêté interministériel N° 2005-743/MFE/MSP/CAB/SP du 13 juin 2005 relatif à la mise en place 
du mécanisme d’utilisation du Fonds sanitaire des indigents. 
 Arrêté N° 2011-008/MS/DC/SGM/DRFM/SA du 4 janvier 2012, relatif au fonctionnement du 
comité technique chargé de l’élaboration de la mise en œuvre des actions stratégiques en vue 
de l’ouverture effective des droits aux prestations de l’assurance maladie universelle au Bénin 
1er avril 2012. 
 
Documents généraux d’informations 
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1- Etudes  
 étude relative à la branche de l’assurance maladie selon la mutuelle de sécurité sociale par 
Monsieur ATIOGBE (COSI-BENIN) ; 
 projet de création d’une mutuelle de santé des agents de l’Etat ; 
 tableau des statistiques sur la mutuelle de santé du Ministère du Travail (document partiel) ; 
 étude comparative des systèmes de protection sociale au Rwanda et au Burundi ; 
2- Les ouvrages 
 les acteurs de l’économie informelle, les atouts pour le développement durable, réalisée par 
l’UNSTB sur la protection sociale (2011) ; 
 actes du séminaire continental sur la place des mutuelles de santé dans les politiques 
d’assurance maladie universelle, réalisé par WMS – soutien Coopération belge, 2011 ; 
 revue du BIT N° 146-147-2077, renforcement des syndicats : le rôle de l’éducation ouvrière. 
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 Whenever possible, thesaurus terms were used for searching (f.e. ASC thesaurus: social protection USE social 
security) 
79
 Via https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/search-
filter?query=health+insurance&filtertype_0=subject&filter_0=INSURANCE&filter_relational_operator_0=equals&fi
eld=subject 
